(a) General findings
(i) Credit of the witnesses
The Judge made the following general observations concerning the
relative credibility of the witnesses:
. Mr Inglis was "ruthless and dishonest".
. Mr Forrest "would conduct his business in a way to achieve his
commercial ends, even if it involved threats and falsehoods"; but he
"attempted to answer the questions asked (in evidence) honestly",
although "there was little of his evidence which was contentious
from a credit point of view".
. Mr Morales "presented as an unsatisfactory witness" and some of his
evidence should not be accepted.
. Mr Ensor's way of giving evidence was "convoluted". Although some
of his answers were inconsistent, he had to deal with a very long
cross-examination, some of which was confusing. The "overall
impression" was that Mr Ensor was "an honest witness".
. Mr. Harrison, "(u)nlike any other witness, ... had no financial
interest in the outcome of the proceedings" and attempted to remain
unbiased. Subject to the difficulty he had in recalling some
matters, given the passage of time and the many conversations that
occurred, he was "a most credible witness".
(ii) Proper law of the contracts
As has been noted, the primary Judge held that Australian law was the
proper law of each of the agreements, including the Reserved Contract.
This conclusion was not challenged on the appeal.
(b) Specific findings
(i) Did cl.8.1 of the Ensor Purchase Agreement oblige Mr Ensor to
permit CAM5 to be used for the importation of the 100 Alpacas?
The Judge found that any ambiguity in the language of this provision,
and, in particular, the meaning of the term "facilities", should be
resolved by recourse to statements made in the course of negotiations.
The Judge concluded that the reference to "facilities" was intended to
mean that "the parties were to share all that was necessary for the
importation of the alpaca, including the use of CAM5". However, the
Judge went on to hold that Mr Morales accepted Mr Ensor's stance in
relation to the use of CAM5, and in doing so, waived his rights in
that regard, and that by never insisting that CAM5 be available for
use by Mr Inglis or IAM and entering into negotiations with Mr Ensor
for the sale of the 100 alpacas, the effect of the waiver remained up
to the time of entry into the Reserved Contract.
(ii) Did the written agreement dated 15 February 1992 constitute the
contract between ACL and Mr Inglis?
As has been said, the Judge held that, notwithstanding the antecedent
oral negotiations, the parties intended to reduce the terms of their
agreement to writing in the form of the instrument dated 15 February.
(iii) The passing of property under the ACL/Inglis Agreement
The Judge held that this was a sale of ascertained goods and that the
passage of property was dealt with by cl.4.2 of this agreement, which
made that passage dependent upon the event of delivery as provided in
cl.4.1. There was a notional delivery at the time of entry into the
agreement. The Judge held that, notwithstanding the reference to
"free on board" in cl.6.2, cl.4.2, properly construed, governed the
question when property passed. The Judge further held that, on its
true interpretation, cl.4.2 meant that property was not to pass until
all payments were made under the contract.
(iv) Payments made under the ACL/Inglis Agreement
The Judge accepted that the initial payment of US$75,000 due under the
Longstone Agreement was paid on 16 April 1991. As to the payment of
US$77,000, there was documentary evidence of payments of US$66,000 to
Mr Morales prior to entry into the Longstone Agreement. The inference
should be drawn that it was agreed that a credit of US$75,000 be
applied to the ACL/Inglis contract. As to the US$77,000, the trial
Judge accepted that this amount should also be credited, thus giving a
total of US$152,000.
Although there was evidence of a payment made directly by IAM of
US$32,278 on 12 June 1992, the Judge was not satisfied of the nature
of the consideration for the payment; and was likewise not satisfied
of the purpose for which Mr Inglis made a payment of US$10,000 on
15 May 1992. The Judge was thus not satisfied that all the payments
required by cl.7 had been made. (As has been mentioned, the Judge had
previously referred to, but rejected, evidence of Mr Morales that, on
18 August 1992, he had received AUD$210,000 from IAM. The Judge found
that it was not received until the end of August, but this finding is
vigorously challenged by the appellants.) Accordingly, it was held
that property had not passed under the ACL/Inglis Agreement.
(v) The First and Second Purchase Agreements
The Judge held that the Second Purchase Agreement "was intended to be
a complete replacement for the (First) ... with the consequence that
the (First) was rescinded upon entry into the Second ...".
As to the Second Purchase Agreement, it was held that this agreement,
particularly cl.1.1, did not interfere with the ACL/Inglis contract;
so that, for the purposes of the Second Purchase Agreement, the vendor
was Mr Inglis alone; that is to say, Mr Morales was not a selling
party under the Second Purchase Agreement.
Clause 7.2 of the Second Purchase Agreement provided as follows:
"7.2 The Vendor warrants that the permit holders of Cam No. 5 under
which these animals are to be imported into Australia will obtain all
necessary permits, licences, documents and authorities required of him
to enable the animals to be imported into Australia as required by
AQIS."
The Judge held that the effect of this provision was that Mr Morales
(and Mr Inglis) warranted that Mr Ensor would do everything necessary
to obtain permits for the import of the 100 alpacas. That is,
Mr Morales "needed to have in place" an agreement with Mr Ensor in
respect of the use of CAM5 at the time the alpacas were ready for
exportation. As has been noted however, the Judge found that by the
time Mr Morales became a party to the Second Purchase Agreement, he
had waived his rights in regard to the use of CAM5.
(vi) Passing of title under the Second Purchase Agreement
The primary Judge held that this, also, was a sale of ascertained
goods, and that the passing of property was governed by ss.22 and 23
of the Sale of Goods Act. It was held that the terms of cl.4.2
demonstrated that the parties had turned their minds to the question
of passage of title and that this clause prevailed over other possible
indications to the contrary in the agreement. The Judge concluded
that property in the alpacas passed to IAM as from the time of payment
of the sum of $50,000.
(vii) The Reserved Contract
As has been noted, Mr Harrison purported to execute the Reserved
Contract as the representative of ACL. The primary Judge held that,
by virtue of the conduct of Mr Morales in permitting the negotiations
to proceed "without disabusing" Mr Ensor of the contention that ACL
was not to be bound by the Reserved Contract, Mr Harrison had
"ostensible authority" to enter into that contract. The learned Judge
further held that, in any event, since Mr Morales had "personally
performed" the contract by drawing lots for the alpacas the next day,
he had ratified it.
The Judge held that although there were two false statements in the
contract (that is to say, (1) the purported appointment of Mr Harrison
as ACL's agent; and (2) the reference in cl.1 to a prior contract for
the sale by Mr Morales to Mr Ensor of 300 alpacas), it did not follow
that the agreement was "unworkable". Nor was it void for uncertainty.
The Judge further found that, whatever the subjective intentions of
Mr Morales, he was bound by his objective conduct in personally
performing the agreement.
The primary Judge also held that the use of CAM5 for the importation
of ACL's 55 alpacas provided consideration for the agreement.
(viii) Priority as between the ACL/Inglis Agreement and the Reserved
Contract
It was contended, on behalf of Mr Ensor, that he was entitled to the
protection of s.28(1) of the Sale of Goods Act, having acquired the
alpacas under the Reserved Contract from a seller in possession, as a
buyer acting "in good faith and without notice of the previous sale".
The Judge held that, even if a person does not have actual notice,
there will be a want of good faith if "a reasonable person would have
been put on inquiry. A deliberate 'turning a blind eye' would not
attract the (statutory) protection...".
In identifying what was the relevant "previous sale", the Judge held
that only the ACL/Inglis Agreement should be considered, and not the
Second Purchase Agreement, since Mr Morales "was only a seller under
the former". It was concluded that the evidence did not demonstrate
that Mr Ensor had notice of the ACL/Inglis Agreement.
The Judge further held that, even if at mid-August (when the
negotiations began for the Reserved Contract), Mr Ensor had some
information of a sale from ACL to Mr Inglis sufficient to put him on
inquiry, that position changed on about 17 August when Mr Morales told
Mr Harrison that "the Forrest contract was at an end". It was thus
concluded that Mr Ensor did not have actual notice of the ACL/Inglis
Agreement; that his failure to make any inquiry did not affect his
good faith; and that Mr Ensor was entitled to the protection of s.28
and obtained a good title to 45 alpacas under the Reserved Contract.
(ix) Ensor's possessory title
Mr. Ensor further claimed a possessory title to the 100 alpacas. For
this purpose, Mr Morales' beneficial title to either the 100, or the
55, alpacas was acknowledged. In order to establish the claim, it was
necessary for Mr Ensor to demonstrate that IAM was not their true
owner at the time Mr Ensor acquired possession, that is, 7/8 September
1992. The primary Judge held that, at this date, notwithstanding the
denials of Mr Morales, the "Inglis/IAM agreement" (i.e. the Second
Purchase Agreement) was still on foot. Although, according to its
terms, property in the alpacas had passed to IAM, the passing of
property under that contract was dependent upon the passing of
property under the ACL/Inglis Agreement. Accordingly, the Judge
concluded that IAM was not in a position to set up its title to the
animals against Mr Ensor's possessory title.