8 Mr A C Casselden of counsel, who appeared for the prosecutor, tendered the following evidence in the sentencing proceedings:
1. A statement of agreed facts in respect of the prosecutions against Interland and Mr Vecchiato.
2. A statement of agreed fact in respect of the prosecution against Mr Karabelas.
3. A factual inspection report by Inspector Phillip May dated 11 July 2005.
4. 12 photos taken by Inspector Phillip May on 22 April 2005 which show the construction site at St Luke's; the level two formwork deck; the uncovered penetration on the level two formwork deck; the view of the formwork deck from level one and the level one floor surface.
5. A WorkCover publication of "The Code of Practice - Formwork" dated 22 June 1998 (sections 3 and 4).
9 The agreed statement of facts for Interland and Mr Vecchiato, excluding formal parts, stated:
2. At all material times Franco Vecchiato, ("the second defendant"), was a director of the corporation Interland Constructions Pty Limited (ACN 051 623 280) ("the first defendant").
3. At all material times:
· Kell & Rigby Pty Limited ("Kell & Rigby") was a corporation within the construction industry;
· Kell & Rigby was the principal contractor responsible for the construction of an extension known as the "Link" at St Luke's Grammar School, 8 Tango Avenue, Dee Why ("the premises").
4. At all material times:
· The first defendant was a corporation in the business of providing formwork, steel fixing and concrete services ("formwork services and materials") to the construction industry.
· The first defendant was engaged in the provision of formwork services and materials to Kell & Rigby.
· The first defendant was an employer.
· The second defendant was the sole director of the first defendant.
· The first defendant used the premises as its place of work.
· On or about 7 February 2005 the first defendant engaged a subcontractor, PTV Management Services Pty Ltd ("PTV") to provide formwork services and material to the premises.
5. At all material times:
· PTV was in the business of providing formwork services ("formwork services and materials") to the construction industry.
· PTV was an employer and in particular employed Christos Tsigaropoulos, Chris Armanditis, Vinzelos (Vic) Karabelas and Loui Oubani.
· Vic Karabelas was employed as PTV's site foreman at the premises.
· The premises were PTV's place of work.
· By purchase order dated 7 February 2005 PTV was engaged as a subcontractor by the first defendant to provide formwork services and materials at the premises.
· Mr Peter Karabelas was the sole director of PTV.
6. Christos Tsigaropoulos ("the injured worker") had commenced employment with PTV as a formworker on the premises, approximately one week before the incident. The injured worker was a qualified formworker and had thirty years experience in the industry.
The Incident
7. On the day of the incident (21 April 2005), PTV's site foreman, Vic Karabelas gave directions to the injured worker to modify the formwork deck on level 2 of the premises by extending the formwork deck.
8. The injured worker, with the assistance of Chris Armanditis, and under the instructions of PTV's site foreman, Vic Karabelas, removed the handrail that was in place on level 2 and proceeded to carry out the modification works to the formwork deck on level 2.
9. The formwork deck the injured worker was working on measured approximately 25 metres in length and was between 5 and 6 metres wide. The formwork deck the injured worker was working on was approximately 2.7 metres high and was located above the level one surface.
10. At approximately 2.30pm the injured worker fell from an unguarded edge on the formwork deck approximately 2.7 metres to the concrete floor below. There were no witnesses to the incident. Loui Oubani, a labourer for PTV found the injured worker and raised the alarm.
11. At the time of the injured worker's fall there was no handrail or any other fall prevention measures in place. After the incident catch platforms were erected by PTV under the supervision of Lachlan Munro, Kell & Rigby's site manager.
12. The injured worker suffered serious injures including three fractured ribs, and a fractured skull. The injured worker was transported to Royal North Shore Hospital and was treated as an inpatient for two weeks.
Systems of Work Prior to and up to the Incident:
13. Prior to the first defendant or PTV commencing work on the premises, Kell & Rigby required a safe work method statement ("SWMS") to be submitted detailing the proposed manner in which work conducted by the first defendant and PTV on the premises was to be carried out. A SWMS was prepared by PTV and submitted to the first defendant, through the second defendant. The second defendant perused that document and submitted it to Kell & Rigby.
14. Some time after submitting the required SWMS, PTV and the first defendant were inducted on to the premises by Kell & Rigby personnel and commenced work pursuant to their respective contracts.
15. The induction process in accordance with Kell & Rigby's usual practice as detailed by Lachlan Munro, site manager of the premises includes;
"A 60…(filling) out the induction form, (showing)…their green card and any industry qualification. We then read through our site rules and procedures which we tick off as we go. They then read and sign their work method statement in front of us to ensure they understand."
16. A contractual term, which formed part of the site rules, between the first defendant and Kell & Rigby required PTV and the first defendant to notify Kell & Rigby of their intention to remove any safety hand rails prior to doing so ("site rule").
17. The site rule was communicated to the first defendant and PTV, and in particular the injured worker, during the induction process by Kell & Rigby personnel. The first and second defendant relied upon the site induction conducted by Kell & Rigby for the information to be conveyed to PTV and the first defendant.
18. The WorkCover publication "Code of Practice - Formwork" published on 22 June 1998 provides information on safe work systems and control measures in relation to formwork. Section 4 provides that control measures to prevent persons working at heights from falling should be provided and maintained as part of a safe system of work. These control measures may include fencing, handrails, safety screens, scaffolding, guardrails, safety nets, elevating work platforms, fall arrest systems or a combination of the above. Systems of fall protection should also be provided for persons installing and removing safeguards. Where the erection of formwork deck involves work at height of more than one standard frame (of the standard 1.8 m height) with end fittings, a system to prevent or arrest falls must be provided to safeguard persons at risk of falling.
19. At the time of the incident there was no handrail or any other fall prevention measures in place.
Interland /Franco Vecchiato ("first defendant/second defendant")
20. The second defendant was site supervisor for the first defendant at the premises at the time of the incident. Neither the first or second defendant conducted a site specific or general induction at the site.
21. The second defendant attended the premises 2-3 times per week for half a day at a time. The second defendant was not on the premises on the day of the incident, but had been there the previous afternoon. His site walk of the afternoon before the incident established all handrails were in place at that time.
22. The second defendant, on behalf of the first defendant, held a few toolbox talks with the foreman on site, namely Vic Karabelas. When the second defendant was asked:
Q 77 What were these toolbox talks about?
The second defendant replied:
A77 Whenever any safety issues came up of cleanliness or site procedures I was advised by Kell & Rigby to inform them.
23. The first defendant did not have a system for assessing and reviewing the adequacy of the SWMS provided by PTV.
24. The first defendant did not have an adequate system or procedure to ensure that subcontractors were working in accordance with their SWMS.
25. The first defendant did not have an OH & S training system in place for these premises.
PTV/Peter Karabelas
26. The SWMS provided by PTV was of a generic nature for typical formwork activities. PTV employees were not consulted regarding the nature of the work that was to be carried out at the premises prior to preparing the SWMS that was submitted to Kell & Rigby.
27. PTV did not have a system in place for consulting with staff when preparing a SWMS.
28. Supervisors for PTV did not receive formal OH& S training and did not understand the nature of a SWMS.
29. PTV did not enforce compliance with the SWMS relevant to the premises.
30. PTV did not arrange for a revised SWMS or risk assessment to be carried out at any time, prior to or after instructions to remove the handrail was given.
31. Mr Peter Karabelas seldom attended the site and kept in contact with the site via telephone calls to his foreman Vic Karabelas. Mr Peter Karabelas had attended the site once prior to the incident.
Details of the Systems of Work after the Incident
Interland/Vecchiato ("first defendant/second defendant")
32. The first defendant via the second defendant appointed a safety officer.
33. The first defendant participated in the toolbox meeting post the incident implementing a revised SWMS prepared by PTV and the Master Builders Association.
PTV/Peter Karabelas
34. PTV appointed a permanent safety officer.
35. A revised SWMS was prepared, with the assistance of the Master Builders Association. The revised SWMS has in place more detailed control measures to be implemented when working at heights.
36. Mr Peter Karabelas expressed a commitment to ensure that PTV's employees would be trained more regularly to identify hazards.
37. Weekly site meetings were conducted with employees.
Factual Report
38. On 22 April 2005 Inspector Phillip May attended the premises. He prepared a Factual Investigation Report dated 11 July 2005 and took a series of photographs of the site.
39. On 22 April 2005 Inspector Phillip May issued a Prohibition Notice No 144089 upon PTV for working at heights from formwork deck without edge protection. On 29 April 2005 Inspector Phillip May revisited the site to follow up on the Prohibition Notice and found that the notice had been complied with.
Proceedings
40. On 17 April 2007 documents were filed in the Industrial Court of NSW. On 23 April 2007 orders were made by the Industrial Court of NSW commencing proceedings against the first defendant for a breach pursuant to section 8(2) of the Occupational Health & Safety Act 2000.
41. On 17 April 2007 documents were filed in the Industrial Court of NSW. On 23 April 2007 orders were made by the Industrial Court of NSW commencing proceedings against the second defendant for a breach pursuant to section 8(2) of the Occupational Health & Safety Act 2000 by virtue of section 26(1) of the Occupational Health & Safety Act 2000.
42. The first defendant does not have any prior convictions.
10 The agreed statement of facts for Mr Karabelas was in similar terms to the agreed statement of facts for both Interland and Mr Vecchiato.
11 Mr R Reitano of counsel appeared for Mr Karabelas and relied upon an affidavit of Mr Karabelas, the director of PTV, sworn on 14 March 2008. Mr Karabelas was not required for cross-examination.
12 Mr Karabelas stated that in late 1993 his father Vinizelos Karabelas, a formwork carpenter of many years, encouraged him to take up an apprenticeship with his company. Mr Karabelas subsequently enrolled at TAFE and commenced his apprenticeship.
13 In 1997, Mr Karabelas started working under the name of Mani Construction. By 2000 Mani had a turnover of $500,000 and Mr Karabelas' role was to be the estimator and bid for work. Mr Karabelas would only attend on-site when concrete pours were occurring. The site supervisors were his father and his brother Tom.
14 In 2001 PTV was formed by Mr Karabelas. He stated that in 2003 it became his operating company. Although PTV was a considerable business, it returned losses in 2004 and 2005. The company employed five carpenters, a truck driver, some labourers and office staff. Mr Karabelas would engage contractors when needed.
15 Mr Karabelas stated that in 2006 PTV was liquidated on his accountant's advice, as he did not want to be prosecuted for trading while insolvent. At the time, PTV had an accumulating debt of $430,000. He recalled that at the time the company had a problem collecting funds due from debtors. Mr Karabelas registered a new company, Formcom Holdings. He is the sole director and shareholder.
16 Formcom has about 15 employees/subcontractors working on three or four different sites at any one time. It is in the same line of business as Mani and PTV in providing formwork and steelwork to the construction industry. Mr Karabelas' father works as a site supervisor and the safety officer is his younger brother, Mr Louka Karabelas.
17 The safety officer position was created after the incident which gave rise to this prosecution. Mr Karabelas stated that to enable his brother to work as the safety officer he sent him to a course in June 2005 conducted by Comet Training Pty Limited, an accredited WorkCover training body. This course took over five days to complete.
18 Mr Karabelas stated that his brother is responsible for undertaking site safety inductions, toolbox meetings and weekly meetings. Once every month he is required to tag all tools and machinery to ensure that they have been serviced, maintained and function safely. He also conducts a safety walk with the builders once every week. Further, he is required to prepare safe work method statements and to email Mr Karabelas the minutes of all his toolbox talks and keep him informed. Mr Karabelas regularly observes him by visiting the worksites of Formcom. Mr Louka Karabelas' role as a safety officer is audited once every four months by a representative of the Master Builders Association. These safety practices and procedures which were executed by Mr Louka Karabelas were introduced after the incident.
19 Mr Karabelas outlined the procedures undertaken by PTV prior to the incident. He stated that he was in regular discussions with the supervisors on the jobs and would have toolbox talks on site to ascertain what methods were adopted to ensure the safety of employees at different stages of the work. He admitted that the toolbox talks did not provide comprehensive cover and were insufficient in number. Mr Karabelas stated that he was aware that his past practices were incorrect and that he was guided by the builder and relied on their safety systems. He also relied on workers in possession of a "green card" system which demonstrated that they had received safety training on building and construction sites. Mr Karabelas stated that the procedures to ensure safety had to be upgraded after the incident to minimise risks associated with formwork. Formcom also purchased a considerable amount of safety equipment such as hard hats, work boots, safety vests and harnesses.
20 Mr Karabelas stated that prior to the incident, in his capacity as a director of PTV, he ensured that every job had its own safe work method statement on site. PTV also had a safety management plan. A copy of the safe work method statement submitted to Kell & Rigby and a copy of the safety management plan were annexed to Mr Karabelas' affidavit.
21 The current system used for safe work method statements and toolbox talks by Formcom is now more formal than in 2005 with less reliance being placed on the builder. A sample toolbox talk record was annexed to the affidavit.
22 Mr Tsigaropoulos' experience and qualifications were set out in Mr Karabelas' affidavit. He has had thirty years experience in formwork and holds a green card and formwork competency certificate. Mr Tsigaropoulos was inducted into the site by Kell & Rigby. He has indicated on Kell & Rigby's site induction form that he understands the need to make sure that handrails and signs are placed around penetrations and that it is necessary to ensure that all scaffolding where work is being done has handrails and kickboards. A copy of the workers' training for the St Luke's site and a copy of Mr Tsigaropoulos' site induction form were annexed to Mr Karabelas' affidavit.
23 Mr Karabelas understood that Mr Tsigaropoulos and Mr Amanditis were instructed by his father, the supervisor of the site, to dismantle a handrail in the area where the incident occurred. This was done to permit an extension of the formwork in that area. He stated that the workers were then told by Mr Karabelas' father to complete work in another area. Mr Karabelas spoke to his father and neither one knew why Mr Tsigaropoulos was in the area when the incident occurred. Mr Tsigaropoulos had been told not to climb down the frames.
24 Mr Karabelas stated that he does not personally own property. However, Mani owns two commercial properties which are valued at $450,000 and $220,000. There are loans of $300,000 and $100,000 owed respectively on these properties. He is the sole director and shareholder of Mani. His net weekly earnings are $980 per week and his rent is $1,600 per month.
25 Mr Karabelas expressed his contrition for the incident. He said that he tried his best to make sure workers at his site were safe. He learnt a great deal from the incident and in particular that it is necessary for Formcom to take responsibility for all aspects of work safety and not to rely on others. Mr Karabelas stated that the improvements to safety he has made are designed to ensure that this type of incident does not recur.
26 Mr A Rogers of counsel, who appeared for Interland and Mr Vecchiato, called Mr Vecchiato and Mr Ray Virta, the safety officer for Interland, to give evidence. He tendered the following evidence in the proceedings:
1. A set of documents produced by Interland which included PTV's Safe Work Method Statement dated 27 April 2005.
2. Interland's Records of Task Specific Induction dated 5 June 2007 and 7 June 2007.
3. A copy of Interland's Safe Work Method Statement dated 30 May 2005 .
4. Interland's site safety folder which contains reviews of work method statements, machine log books, check lists, electrical tag register, task specific induction, toolbox meetings and safe work method statements of Interland and its contractors.
5. Site Safety Committee Meeting Minutes of Kell & Rigby for the St Luke's site covering the period February to May 2005.
27 Mr Vecchiato gave evidence that he was aware of the incident, the subject of these proceedings and that he also knew that the incident occurred after a handrail was removed. He stated that he was not at the site on the date the incident occurred, but was present at the site the day before. Mr Vecchiato stated that the handrail was in place on 20 April 2005. He said that if it had not been in place during his site visit, he would have ensured that the deficiency be rectified by PTV.
28 Mr Vecchiato was then taken to PTV's safe work method statement. The statement provided:
...
· At the leading edge, erect a catch platform and hand rails where working height is 1.8m or more.
· Use safety harness where catch platform is not able to be used.
...
29 In respect of the above statement, Mr Vecchiato gave evidence that a handrail was probably sufficient to prevent the incident considering the particular circumstances in which it arose. He stated that he could not recall seeing a catch platform on 20 April 2005 when he inspected the site. He said that, however, if the safe work method statement provided for a catch platform, he would have ensured that whomever undertook the work would adhere to the statement. Mr Rogers conceded that PTV's statement was provided after the incident and was dated May 2005.