46 Mr Lamey at the time of the offence had worked at the premises for some months. He was not a certified scaffolder. He was not a recognised trainee under the 2001 Regulation. He possessed no qualifications which would have allowed him to perform basic scaffolding work. Waterside did not conduct adequate checks to ensure that Accute Scaffolding's employees held appropriate licences or qualifications. Its practice was to have new workers at the premises complete a site registration form which included details of their qualifications. This usually occurred at the site induction. Mr Lamey did not complete a site registration form because he did not undergo a site induction.
47 Waterside's failure to ensure that Mr Lamey was appropriately qualified for the work he was undertaking reflects a failure to comply with its own written policies on this issue. Waterside at the time of the offence had a safety plan, entitled "Managing Occupational Health and Safety", dated 26 October 2005. In that Plan under a section headed "Risk Assessments & Systems of Work" appears the following:
Where organisation's [sic] or individuals must hold a licence or qualification in order to undertake specific duties, perform work or operate equipment, ensure appropriate licences or qualifications are sighted, verified and recorded.
48 The person designated with the responsibility to ensure that the workers at the premises held the appropriate licence or qualification, was the site manager. At the time of the offence this was Mr Bull. Mr Bull in an affidavit said he was aware Mr Lamey was a worker at the premises employed by Accute Scaffolding but he had not had any direct contact with him prior to the accident. He also said that after the accident it came to his attention that Accute Scaffolding had failed to notify Waterside that Mr Lamey had commenced work at the premises. In a passage extracted from his affidavit Mr Bell deposed:
Following the accident, it became apparent to me that Accute had started Mr Lamey on site without notifying Waterside beforehand. In the absence of this notification, he had not received a site induction from Waterside, and it was the responsibility of all subcontractors to advise when they sent a new worker to the site so that a site induction could be provided. This induction is will [sic] usually carried out by Waterside employees at the site, but not by me. It was impossible for Waterside to keep track of who was new to the site. Given the number of workers involved in the job, we relied on the subcontractors to keep us informed of all workers who had not been on the site before and had therefore not been inducted onto that site. We were never informed of Mr Lamey's first attendance on site by either Accute or PCH and this was why he never received a site induction. However, this is something that was only determined after his accident had occurred, and not beforehand.
49 In an earlier passage from his affidavit Mr Bull sought to explain that there were at the premises at any particular time six to eight scaffolders on site and up to 80 to 100 workers. He said it was, "impossible for me or for Waterside to keep track of which workers were new to the site". Later he said, "[I]t would have been impossible and impracticable for me to directly supervise either the scaffolders or any other sub-contractors since there were between 80 to 100 people working on that site at any one time".
50 These sentiments in my view purport to deflect responsibility from Waterside's statutory obligations to ensure safety onto other parties by reason of those parties' responsibilities of supervision. The fact that Accute Scaffolding, for example, had supervisory and other safety-directed responsibilities at the premises does not discharge Waterside from its obligations to ensure that the sub-contractors working on the project held appropriate qualifications. Waterside was the principal contractor with attendant responsibilities at the premises. It had a written policy directing it to "sight, verify and record" all licences and qualifications. If it were indeed impossible, as Mr Bull suggested, for Waterside to "keep track of" all new workers at the premises because they were too numerous, it was incumbent upon Waterside to devise a policy or a system capable of practical implementation. If the workforce was deemed too large no doubt steps could have been taken to provide Mr Bull with some assistance, in the form of a suitably qualified person, or persons, who could have carried out the appropriate safety instructions as directed by Waterside.
51 According to the agreed facts Waterside failed to monitor the activities of Accute Scaffolding in accordance with clause 227 of the 2001 Regulation in that it allowed the workers to recommence work on wet scaffolding, and failed to prevent Mr Lamey from climbing on the outside of the scaffolding. Waterside also failed to induct a number of sub-contracted workers to the site contrary to clause 213 of the 2001 Regulation. This latter agreed fact I take it is confined to Waterside's failure to conduct a site specific induction in respect of Mr Lamey in particular.
52 With regard to Waterside's failure to monitor the activities of the scaffolders upon resumption of the work, performed while the scaffolding was still wet, Mr Bull expressed the following opinion:
Before going back to work after the rain the scaffolding or leading hand should have conducted an assessment of the structures to satisfy himself that the scaffolding was safe to work from
53 There can be no doubt that Accute Scaffolding was obliged to assess the risks to its workers arising from the wet scaffolding. Equally, there should be no doubt that Waterside, as the principal contractor, was obliged to monitor the activities of the scaffolders. If it were not feasible to do so directly then Waterside should have taken steps to ensure someone else, or some other entity, was monitoring their activities. Waterside has acknowledged its statutory obligations in this regard, in any event, by its plea of guilty.
54 Waterside's failures to ensure the safety of the workers at the premises reveals serious deficiencies in its systems of work at the premises. On the other hand Waterside had developed a number of systems and procedures focused on safety issues for use at the premises. Its Safety Plan has already been mentioned. Its Scope of Works for the premises with regard to the scaffolding work required that a work method statement be issued and signed off by "the builder" prior to any work commencing. Accute Scaffolding provided Waterside with its SWMS. This document was considered earlier in these sentencing reasons. It recorded under the heading "Personal qualifications" three categories of qualified scaffolders and one labourer. It indicated that the labourer utilised a log book. It conveyed the impression, perhaps unintended, that Accute Scaffolding's workers were either appropriately qualified or in the process of becoming qualified, and under the supervision of a ticketed scaffolder, in conformity with the 2001 Regulation. Waterside was entitled to rely on the contents of the SWMS as a preliminary measure in satisfying itself that Accute Scaffolding's workers, including Mr Lamey, were suitably qualified, trained, or undergoing appropriate supervision, to perform the work.
55 Anthony Robert Johnson who swore an affidavit on behalf of Waterside explained that Waterside as the principal contractor awarded the scaffold contract to PCH Group Limited and that PCH sourced its work crew from local sub-contractors, including Accute Scaffolding. Mr Johnson had been made aware of this arrangement in advance and had been assured on the basis of PCH's good reputation that it would only use experienced and skilled workers. The contract between Waterside and PCH contained various terms which sought to emphasise that the scaffolding company would operate safely. According to Mr Johnson Waterside convened a site meeting with representatives of both PCH and Accute Scaffolding on 25 August 2006, that is three days before the accident. One of the purposes of that meeting he said was to reinforce to the scaffolders the need to maintain safe work practices at the premises. He referred in particular to concerns held by Waterside about areas of incomplete scaffolding and the need to attend to this, as soon as possible.
56 The Safety Plan required all personnel on the premises to complete necessary induction training. The scaffolders were required to supply green cards as per the Scope of Works. Sub-contractors were advised that they were to present workers for a site induction prior to commencing work. It was an agreed fact that Waterside complied with its obligations as principal contractor to induct persons in respect of the majority of workers on the premises.
57 Other aspects of Waterside's safety procedures included the requirements in the Safety Plan that all new workers be inducted to the site, that all new workers complete a site registration form, and that the site manager "sight, verify and record" all necessary qualifications and licences. These latter aspects have been earlier referred to. The failure to attend to these matters constituted a serious deficiency in an otherwise reasonably comprehensive and effectively managed safety system.
58 The Scope of Works also required adequate supervision at all times and the presence on site of a suitably qualified site foreman. According to Mr Bull he was in daily communication with the scaffolders and other sub-contractors through regular tool-box meetings. Waterside also had site supervisors and a safety officer assigned to the premises. A site safety committee held weekly meetings which included a safety walk for the purpose of identifying hazards and other safety issues. Any safety issues identified by this means were followed up. Mr Bull said he had a practice of immediately drawing a sub-contractor's attention to any unsafe practices that he observed on site.
59 These matters demonstrate that Waterside did have a system at the premises for monitoring the activities of the scaffolders and other sub-contractors, which for the most part had been effectively implemented except for those deficiencies which have been earlier identified. The existence of its safety system at the premises in place and in force at the premises prior to the offence operates to reduce the objective seriousness of the offence.
Reasonable foreseeability of the risk to safety