Consideration
13 In a consideration as to penalty, the Court first assesses the objective seriousness of the offence as charged: Lawrenson Diecasting Pty Ltd v WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector Ch'ng) (1999) 90 IR 464 (at 474):
In case of prosecutions under the OH&S Act, this proposition has often been expressed by saying that the "true measure of penalty lies in the nature and quality of the offence" ...
And in Morrison v Powercoal Pty Limited (2003) 130 IR 364 at [32]:
In assessing the gravity of the offence the focus, therefore, must be on the risk and, viewing it objectively, the seriousness of the act or omission that gave rise to the risk. In other words, the consequence of an accident will not, of itself dictate the seriousness of the offence or the amount of penalty. However, the occurrence of death or serious injury may well manifest the degree of seriousness of the risk to health and safety to which persons may have been subjected ...
14 Some matters arise from the evidence which make the assessment of the objective seriousness of this offence difficult. The defendant pleads guilty to the failure to ensure the safety, in particular the safety of a trainee employee of Sydney Metro Crane (SMC) (one of the sub-contractors on its worksite). The trainee was working on the defendant's worksite and was wearing the appropriate safety equipment (specifically a safety harness), which was not, the circumstances revealed, attached to the boom lift platform on which the trainee was required to work. The prosecution particularised to the defendant that it relied upon the defendant's failure to ensure safety through its failure to ensure there was proper training and supervision of Mr Gallace, the deceased trainee.
15 It is relevant to the assessment of the seriousness of the offence that during work that morning, it was brought to the attention of Mr Cunningham (a supervisor of the sub-contractor, SMC, the crane supplier on site) that Mr Gallace (the deceased) was working on the platform of the boom lift without attaching his lanyard. This warning was given by Mr Traini, who was employed by the defendant and responsible, on behalf of the defendant, for site safety.
16 Work for all the SMC employees was stopped by Mr Cunningham and all SMC employees, including the deceased, were re-instructed as to the safety features as well as the need to attach their harnesses. The defendant, as principal contractor on site, therefore did implement its safe work programme and adhered to its responsibility as a supervisor to ensure employees were reminded as to the safe use of all equipment.
17 Mr Gallace was a trainee with five weeks on the job for SMC. After the lunch break, that is, after the warning had been issued, he was raising up the platform of the crane lift to reach his task as a rigger to bolt in the overhead steel members of the roof structure. Approximately 25 minutes after work resumed, Mr Gallace was sighted by Mr Freeland of SMC (his direct supervisor on site) who was working some 11 metres away. Mr Freeland noticed Mr Gallace's hand was resting in the same place on the top of the platform and he realised the hand had been in the same place for about 10 minutes. At the same time, Mr Cunningham, from the ground, noticed Mr Gallace's body pressed between the steel member on the roof and the hand-rail of the EWP's basked. Mr Gallace's body appeared to be bent backwards over the basket. Mr Cunningham swiftly reached to release the crane platform by lowering the boom lift. On release to lower the lift, Mr Gallace then fell some 7.7 metres to the ground from the basket.
18 Mr Gallace was, on examination, deceased.
19 Consideration must be given to two reports placed by before the court. Expert mechanical/machinery evidence revealed after examination of the EWP machine after the incident:
4. COMMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS
It is difficult to determine what occurred in the incident that caused the death of Mr Mark Gallace while using the subject Haulotte HA18PXEWP. In assessing the operation of this EWP it was noted that the machine was quite jerky to operate and had significant delays in terms of the time for the control imports to relay to actual movement of the machine operating systems. This may have played a part in the incident.