3 There was tendered into evidence an agreed statement of facts in the following terms:
1. The Inspector prosecuting this matter is duly appointed under Division 1 of Part 5 of the Occupational Health & Safety Act 2000 (NSW) and empowered under s.106(1)(c) of the said Act to institute proceedings in the within matter.
2. PORT KEMBLA COPPER PTY LTD [ACN 076 258 976] ("the defendant") is a company duly incorporated and has its registered office at Military Road, Port Kembla in the State of New South Wales.
3. The defendant, at all material times, conducted its operations involving the smelting of copper and refining of metal from its premises at Military Road, Port Kembla 2505, in the State of New South Wales ("the premises").
4. At all material times the defendant was an employer and employed Claude Franze ("Franze") as a refinery process technician.
5. Franze commenced employment with the defendant in approximately January 2000.
6. The defendant's refining operations are conducted in areas including the Tank House and the Precious Metals Plant.
7. As part of the defendant's copper refining process cathodes were grown in an electrolyte solution in a tank. Metal impurities, referred to as "slimes", form as part of this process and are removed from the electrolyte solution.
8. At all material times, the defendant owned and operated a SupaFlo Filter ("the machine"). The machine was used in the copper refining process to remove the slimes from the electrolyte solution.
9. The machine was located in the Precious Metals Plant at the top of a platform approximately 6 metres from the ground. Access to the machine was via a set of stairs. There was a short landing where the stairs met the platform. At the end of the landing adjacent to the machine was the machine's control panel.
10. The machine consists of a number of filter plates covered by cloth filter bags. Electrolyte solution is injected into the filter plates through a pipe at one end of the machine. The filter plates are then compressed by a hydraulic ram which is also located at one end of the machine. The pressure created by the compression of the filter plates causes the electrolyte to be discharged from the electrolyte solution. The electrolyte is then filtered away from the machine through a second pipe located at the other end of the machine. Once the electrolyte has been discharged from the plates, a cake of slimes remains stuck between the filter plates.
11. The slimes attached to the filter plates consist of a mixture of metals consisting of approximately 70% water, 20% sulphuric acid and 5% copper. Due to the presence of sulphuric acid, slimes are classed as corrosive and classified as hazardous according to the criteria of Worksafe Australia. The concentration of sulphuric acid in the slimes can be of a lower percentage of slimes produced during the refining process.
12. The machine's filtering process, or cycle, takes approximately 1 hour and can occur several times in one day while the machine is in operation. At the end of each filtering cycle, an alarm is automatically activated and sounds throughout the Precious Metals Plant to alert technicians that the cycle is complete.
13. A technician must ascend the stairs to the machine in order to access the control panel to stop, or acknowledge, the alarm. Once the alarm is acknowledged, the ram of the machine decompresses, the filter plates open and are agitated if needed, to shake the slimes off the filter plates. The loosened slimes are discharged through the bottom of the machine into a steel hopper located beneath the platform.
14. At various times prior to 14 August 2001 the defendant was aware of incidents in which slimes, mixed with electrolyte and water, had sprayed from the machine contrary to the normal operation of the machine. Recorded instances of emissions from the machine were reported on 4 and 6 May 2000 and 13 March 2001.
15. Prior to 14 August 2001 the defendant had investigated the cause of emissions from the machine. The defendant had performed maintenance on the machine and made modifications to the machine to reduce and eliminate the emissions. One such modification was the placement of a protective tarpaulin which was positioned over a handrail which was located adjacent to the machine and was approximately waist height, in such a position where it was intended to prevent emissions from spraying onto the stairway access to the control panel of the machine or onto the ground below. It is not known whether the tarpaulin was in place on 14 August 2001.
16. At approximately 11:00 pm on 14 August 2001, Franze ascended the stairs of the machine in order to acknowledge the alarm which was sounding indicating that the machine cycle was complete. Franze pressed the alarm button on the control panel of the machine. Franze turned away from the control panel to proceed back down the stairs when he was sprayed with slimes which struck his face and went behind his safety glasses.
17. Franze suffered corrosive burn injuries to his right eye and was unable to resume his normal work for a period in excess of seven days following the incident.
18. At the time of the accident, Franze was wearing safety glasses, safety gloves, a safety helmet and a respirator around his neck.
19. Prior to 14 August 2001, Franze received classroom style and on the job training in relation to electrolyte circulation and the handling of slimes and was certified as competent to operate the machine. At all material times prior to and on the accident date the training received by Franze did not include information or warning in relation to the risk of possible emissions of slimes from the machine during its operation.
20. At all material times on 14 August 2001, there was no adequate protective screening provided by the defendant to ensure that any emission from the machine was prevented from coming into contact with any workers.
21. Following the accident, the defendant undertook an internal investigation ("the Company Investigation").
22. The Company Investigation determined that pipe work to the machine may have been partially blocked with solid material at the time of the incident, leading to a build-up of pressure which caused the emission from the machine. The partial blockage may have developed in the days prior to the accident date when the machine had not been in operation.
23. Subsequent to the incident involving Franze, and as a result of the Company Investigation, the defendant made further changes to the machine involving the construction of a permanent sliding perspex barrier to prevent emissions coming into contact with workers and introduced procedural changes to ensure that the manual flush of the machine was conducted when it had been off line for a period of time to ensure that any sediment which had formed and could have led to residual filter pressure, was averted. The permanent perspex barrier was extended to the roof.
24. After the accident, the defendant prepared a new written procedure for the task performed by Franze entitled Operating Supaflo Filter - PKC - 11306 RF-SL-1-9 ("the New Supaflo Procedure"). The New Supaflo Procedure includes instruction on how to safely operate the machine and requires that the technician ensure that the perspex barrier is in place prior to accessing the control panel in order to acknowledge the alarm and end the filter cycle.
25. After the accident, the defendant prepared a new written procedure for the task performed by Franze entitled Operation of Raw Slimes Handling Area - PKC - 9547 RF-SL.1.1 ("the New Slimes Procedure"). The Slimes New Procedure alerts technicians to the hazard of electrolyte splashes when working with electrolyte and slimes.
26. The alleged offence committed by the defendant under s.15(1) of the Occupational Health & Safety Act 1983 is that on 14 August 2001 at the premises, the defendant failed to ensure the health, safety and welfare at work of its employees, including Franze, in that Franze, while engaged in work involving the operation of the Supaflo filter press, which was situated within the precious metals plant of the premises, the machine blew slimes containing, among other things, sulphuric acid, into the right side of his face causing serious injury to him by reason that:
(a) The defendant failed to provide and maintain a system of work that was safe and without risk to health in relation to the work involving operation of the machine in that:
(i) there were no adequate protective devices in place to screen emissions of hazardous substances at all material times when workers were in the vicinity of the machine;
(ii) location of control switches for the machine in close proximity to it when it was prone to such emissions of hazardous substances, was inappropriate;
(iii) no proper risk assessment had been conducted in relation to the work of processing of hazardous substances in the machine;
(iv) the conduct of work, involving the operation of the machine when a proper risk assessment had not been conducted identifying the dangers from such emissions of hazardous substances, was unsafe; and
(v) it failed to prevent or adequately control the worker's exposure to hazardous substances by measures other than the provision of personal protective equipment.
(b) the defendant failed to provide and maintain plant, to wit, the machine, in a condition that was safe and without risk to health in that it was prone to spontaneous emissions of hazardous substances from it; and
(c) the defendant failed to provide such information, instruction, training and supervision in relation to work involving the operation of the machine in the processing of slimes as was necessary to ensure the health and safety at work of its employees.
As a result of the said failures, Claude Franze was injured.