3 An amended Agreed Statement of Facts was tendered and relevantly states:
1. At all material times the Prosecutor was an Inspector duly appointed and empowered by Section 48 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1983 to institute proceedings in the within matter.
2. At all material times NORTHPOWER was a body incorporate pursuant to Schedule 1, Part 2 of the Energy Services Corporations Act 1995, whose principal office is situated at 9 Short Street, Port Macquarie, in the State of New South Wales.
3. At all material times the defendant employed Michael Rennes, 46 years of age, as a Technical Officer. He worked within the maintenance group and had qualifications as a fitter and turner.
4. At all material times the defendant owned and operated a 66,000 Volt ("66KV") Substation located at Borthwick Street, Inverell in the State of New South Wales ("the site").
5. At approximately 8.20 am on 27 May 1999, Michael Rennes suffered an electric shock resulting in full thickness burns to 50% of his body, right arm, right side of torso, left knee and left foot when he was undertaking work at the site.
6. At about 8:40 am an ambulance arrived. After some treatment Mr Rennes was taken to Inverell Base Hospital and thereafter transferred to the Royal North Shore Hospital. He was in hospital for about 2 months and out of work for 3 months. He returned to work in August 1999 commencing one hour one day per week for three weeks and gradually increased to full time. Currently Mr Rennes is in full time employment with the defendant company performing restricted work. He cannot attend to any heavy lifting work, nor welding, though he is a welder by trade. He is not able to work long periods on the metal laser. Currently he suffers with numbness to lower right arm and has difficulty with lifting heavy objects and grasping small objects. He suffers with lower back muscle pain and sometimes needs them to be manipulated. Mr Rennes currently needs complete cover up of his body when going in the sun.
7. At the time of the accident Mr. Rennes was attending the site to assess requirements for construction of a work platform from which maintenance could be carried out on 66KV Circuit Breakers at the site. As different circuit breakers exist throughout Northpower a visual inspection was needed.
8. Mr. Rennes was accompanied by Mr. Tony Williamson, Technical Officer, who gave him access to the site. They first went to Circuit Breaker 6B01, then moved to the 6B27 Circuit Breaker where Mr. Rennes lifted his tape measure to show the height of the work platform. Mr. Williamson, standing approximately six feet away, turned and saw the tape being held near the 'live' centre section of the circuit breaker yelled out "No" and then turned and ran from the circuit breaker. Whilst running away he heard the circuit breaker operate and turned to see Mr. Rennes lying on the ground on his back. He gave Mr. Rennes attention while calling out to Graeme Emerson to call 000. Mr. Emerson was an electrical worker who was at the site clearing tree branches.
9. Inspector Brian Parfitt and Inspector Brian Dell attended the accident site on 28 May 1999. Photographs were taken by Inspector Dell and a Factual Inspection Report was prepared by Inspector Parfitt. An inspection was undertaken on 2 September 1999 by Inspector Forster and a further Factual Inspection Report was prepared.
10. Mr. Rennes was authorised for entry into Substations in the old Northern Rivers area for which he received training and a familiarisation course. Mr. Williamson as an authorised person was to provide access to the site, explain the guidelines for access to substations and supervise Mr. Rennes while on the site.
11. The defendant's Policy document "Electrical Safety Rules, Document no. SWP 01 001" dated 17 July 1997 at page 18 states "Danger can arise when making measurements in the vicinity of High Voltage Conductors. Steel Tapes, metal reinforced linen tapes and long steel rules can be very dangerous and shall not be used in High Voltage Electrical Stations or on Transmission lines. Most linen tapes are metal reinforced and for this reason, shall not be used in the vicinity of Live Conductors or within High Voltage Electrical Stations. Fibreglass tapes shall be used in such locations."
12. A procedure document of the defendant entitled "Procedure: Worksite Hazard & Risk Control Assessment, document no. SWP 02 001, Revision 2", dated 14 January 1999 at p.19, point 6 states "Metal measuring tapes, or fabric tapes having a metal reinforcing thread woven in the fabric are conducting objects and may only be used where at least minimum safe working clearances can be maintained."
13. A further procedure document entitled "Form: Service Provided Pre-Task Risk Assessment, Safe Working Practices for Service Providers within Substations, SWF 02 012, Revision 1" dated 23 December 1998 on page 6 states "Metal measuring tapes, or fabric tapes having a metal reinforcing thread woven in the fabric are conducting objects and may only be used where at least minimum safe working clearances can be maintained."
14. The policy and risk assessment sheets were developed at different times by different groups and created an anomaly in relation to the use of measuring tapes. Mr. Williamson used the risk assessment documentation regularly and was more familiar with the minimum safety requirements of the risk assessments rather than the higher safety standard of the Policy.
15. Since the accident the defendant has totally banned the use of any conducting measuring tapes within zone substations. All the worksite risk assessments that referred to zone substations have had the clause referring to metal tapes altered to reflect the ban. A hazard alert was issued immediately after the accident to all Northpower staff advising of the circumstances of the accident and enforcing a ban on the use of conducting tapes in zone substations according to the Policy. The Safe Working Plans now reflect Policy. Training of staff and service providers has been altered to reinforce the ban.
16. Also since the accident, non-electrically qualified persons are required to conduct a full risk assessment prior to entry into any zone substation, whether accompanied by an electrically qualified person or not. All authorities for non-electrical persons to enter substations issued prior to the formation of Northpower have been reviewed and staff have been retrained and reassessed for authorisation. Policy has been altered to ensure that all staff entering zone substations must now contact system control upon entry and exit. A capital works program was commenced for a single point of entry at all zone substations including the subject site. The single point of entry allows access to be monitored and provides a final point to remind staff entering substations of the basic safety requirements for any work to be done within the enclosure, and a place for warning signs.