This risk scenario substantially encapsulated what actually occurred at the collapse site. The dilemma that arises from this is that determination of the risk relied on observation in the field, presumably including the geological mapping, and mitigation involved response to those observations, including convergence monitoring.
As already mentioned in Section 5.2, and discussed in Sections 6.6 and 6.7 below, there is no evidence that the geological mapping was used to deal with the risk set out above.
Notwithstanding the matters set out above, it is important to consider whether, if Type 2 support had been installed, the crown collapse would not have occurred. An absolute answer to the question cannot be given because the answer partly depends on what was meant by the Designer's phrase "installed as the excavation proceeds". If the presumption is made that the Type 2 pattern rockbolts were installed from the roadheader boom, and within about 2m of the tunnel face, it is considered probable that the buckling-type collapse of the crown would not have transpired. However, stress induced spalling of pieces of rock would probably have occurred between the rockbolt face plates.
42 Included in the prosecution's tender bundle was a record of the evidence given by Mr Bleuler at the Coronial Inquest. Relevantly, Mr Bleuler's evidence was that he was not aware that pattern bolting had not been installed in the MVT-1 East tunnel after chainage 1100 until after the rock fall. He said that he should have been made aware of this by Mr Rheinberger with whom he was in daily contact. A system had been put in place for this to occur if an issue arose. Mr Bleuler's evidence was that he was never informed by Mr Rheinberger that the tunnel would proceed with structural support less than that set out in the construction drawings.
43 Mr Bleuler maintained a personal diary in which he recorded all discussions and meetings that he had in respect of the project. If there were to be a change in the mandatory support Type rock bolts, this would have required a sign off from the designer and Mr Bleuler would have noted this in his diary. He was not informed that Type 2 bolts were not being inserted from chainage 1100, and/or that this was not recorded on the site visit reports by Mr Rheinberger.
44 Mr Bleuler's evidence was that he did not see the daily mapping sheets, except when he had a scheduled inspection with Mr Rheinberger when he wanted him to look at something. Mr Bleuler was not forwarded copies of the face mapping sheets or the 15m mapping sheets. This meant that he did not see the 15m mapping sheets of the MTV-1 East tunnel at any time after cross passage 4 until the time of the rock fall, nor did he see the daily mapping sheets, although Mr Rheinberger was informing him on a daily basis of the geology of the tunnel as he believed it to be. Furthermore, he was not informed whether or not BHBB was adhering to the anticipated support types set out in the construction diagram.
45 On earlier occasions during the construction of the tunnel, Mr Rheinberger had informed Mr Bleuler that there was a lack of bolting, or no bolting present. On each occasion, Mr Bleuler took the matter up with Mr Peter Arz, Technical Director of BHBB, and Mr Arz would take the matter up with his own manager and the issue would be resolved. This did not occur (in respect of the lack of Type 2 bolting at chainage 1100). Mr Bleuler's evidence was that the CSS Work Plan required Mr Rheinberger to review and assess ground support installed, on a daily basis, and confirm that the support was in accordance with the design documentation. Mr Bleuler accepted that there was no documentation or record confirming that the ground support installed was in accordance with the design documentation. His evidence was that, in hindsight, he should have put in a column or a heading confirming the support was occurring and where it was not, recording that the support pattern was incomplete.
Defendants' evidence
46 Mr Scott read an affidavit of Mr Anthony Barry, who was the New South Wales Regional Manager for Connell Wagner at the time of the incident in 2004. He was also a director of Connell Wagner and a member on the Boards of each defendant. Mr Barry was not required for cross-examination.
47 Mr Scott also tendered the following material:
(i) reports of Professor E T Brown, Senior Consultant with Golder Associates Pty Ltd, Consulting Engineers dated March 2009, July 2009, August 2009 and September 2009;
(ii) report prepared by Mr Leslie Bruce McQueen, Engineering Geologist, employed by Golder Associates Pty Ltd dated 8 May 2009;
(iii) proposal by BHBB representative, Mr Albrecht Mueller, for the Introduction of an Instruction for Rock Support information document to be introduced dated 20 June 2003;
(iv) BHBB Job Safety Analysis ("JSA") Worksheet dated 4 November 2003 (JSA No 32) with job/task described as installation of rock bolts with wombat;
(v) BHBB Job Safety Analysis Worksheet dated 3 December 2003 (JSA No 44/2003) with job/task described as drilling and installation of bolts (by hand);
(vi) letter from Mr John Callaghan, Project Principal, CW-DC Pty Ltd to Mr Gregory Miltenhoff, Independent Verifier's Representative, Hyder Consulting (Australia) Pty Ltd dated 29 March 2005. This letter enquired whether Hyder Consulting had undertaken an audit of the rock support installed by the constructor across the whole of the CCT Project;
(vii) extract of part of Mr Rheinberger's statement given to WorkCover Inspector on 1 December 2004;
(viii) part of statement given to WorkCover Inspector by Mr Bleuler on 25 January 2005;
(ix) extract of evidence given by Mr Nigel Pohio at the Coronial Inquest on 20 July 2007;
(x) extract of the transcript of evidence given by Mr Kokiri Kihirini Ronaki at the Coronial Inquest on 16 July 2007.
Evidence of Mr Barry
48 Mr Barry stated that he commenced employment with Connell Wagner, now known as Aurecon, in 1985. He set out his qualifications and positions held, together with the history of Connell Wagner, which was formed in 1975 and initially known as Consuldata Pty Ltd. The company became known as Connell Wagner in 1994. It provides multi-disciplinary consulting practices, including dedicated design consultancy services. CW-DC was first established in 2001 to provide highly specialised consulting services to design and construction contractors in the infrastructure market. It is a wholly owned subsidiary of Aurecon. CW-DC does not employ any staff, but it seconds employees from Aurecon to carry out the requirements for its design and construction projects. Staff provided to CW-DC for a project were employed by Aurecon.
49 Mr Barry set out the background to the CCT Project. In 2002, the CCM was announced as the successful tenderer for the CCT Project. CCM immediately engaged a joint venture between BHBB, two international constructors, to construct the tunnel. BHBB engaged CW-DC to carry out design work on the CCT Project pursuant to a Consultancy Agreement. A Design and Construct Contract ("the D&C Contract") was entered into between BHBB and CCM on 18 December 2002. Neither Connell Wagner nor CW-DC was a party to the D&C Contract.
50 Connell Wagner supplied labour to CW-DC for the CCT Project so that CW-DC could perform its duties as set out in cl 2.1 Scope of Services - The Consultant in Sch 2 in the Consultancy Agreement with BHBB. A copy of this clause was annexed to Mr Barry's affidavit.
51 Mr Barry stated that CW-DC's primary role on the CCT Project was the provision of investigation (geotechnical and pre-design survey) and the design documentation of most of the civil engineering aspects of the CCT Project. Connell Wagner supplied a DM team to CW-DC on a basis agreed to by BHBB, and for which BHBB was prepared to pay. The role of the DM team was set out at Sch 3 of the Consultancy Agreement. This was a collaborative effort between CW-DC employees and those of BHBB. Part of the design process undertaken by the DM team involved the use of the "CHAIR in Design" philosophy - Construction Hazard Assessment and Implication Review ("CHAIR"). The CHAIR Review Methodology was attached to CW-DC's CCT Project specific OHS Management Plan and was annexed to the affidavit.
52 CW-DC also provided BHBB with a CSS team. The CSS team was led by Mr Bleuler, the CSS Manager for CW-DC. Mr Bleuler had over 30 years of international tunnelling experience, having been involved in more than 80 separate tunnelling projects. Between 1 April 2003 and 28 July 2004, Mr Bleuler attended the CCT Project site on approximately 149 occasions to meet with BHBB Management and on approximately 163 occasions to conduct inspections at the request of BHBB Management or the CSS team. Mr Rheinberger (CW-DC's Senior Geologist) was assisted by two geologists, Messrs Hartcliff and Ayshford.
53 During negotiations with CW-DC and BHBB regarding resources, Mr Barry said in or around May 2003 that Mr Arz expressed concern to Mr Bleuler over the lack of BHBB's budget and lack of resources to cover all of the activities of the CCT Project. Mr Bleuler submitted a new budget which sought to increase his involvement on the CCT Project to 40 hours per week. He also sought two additional geologists and one additional engineer. On 11 July 2003, at a further meeting with BHBB Management, Mr Bleuler was advised that his hours would not be increased and would remain at 20 per week. He was also advised that the budget would be increased to allow for one additional geologist.
54 It was Connell Wagner's practice on major projects, prior to the construction stage services being provided, to develop a Work Plan. The purpose of such a document was to instruct relatively inexperienced engineers and onsite personnel as to the work and responsibilities that they were to undertake. The plan was revised on several occasions, although it did not form part of the contract between BHBB and CW-DC.
55 The Consultancy Agreement between BHBB and CW-DC provided for an independent verifier to carry out regular inspections of construction and to review construction test plans and commissioning plans to verify that they were consistent with the design intent and design assumptions. This role was carried out by Hyder Consulting (Australia) Pty Ltd ("Hyder Consulting").
56 The MVT-1 was not part of the original design for the CCT Project. It came about in August 2002 when the RTA asked BHBB and CCM to effect changes to the ventilation of the CCT. The MVT-1 was to be a dedicated ventilation tunnel to carry exhaust and not traffic. For this reason, it was significantly narrower than the mainline tunnel, being 5.1m wide and 5.5m high with a total roof area of approximately 12,500sqm. In February 2003, CW-DC was asked by BHBB to extend the scope of its services and prepare the relevant design drawings for MVT-1. The design of MVT-1 incorporated the Concept Design Report, the Preliminary Design Report, the Detailed Design Report, the Final Design Report and the Final Design Report which was marked "Issued for Construction" ("IFC").
57 Each set of Design Reports contained a series of design drawings which set out drawings of a particular tunnel and the support that CW-DC expected the constructor to install at each relevant chainage in the particular tunnel, design issues and design lot assessment including BHBB's responsibilities, risk assessment and safety, technical specifications, outstanding items and review of comments.
58 At each and every stage of the design process, BHBB, the RTA and Hyder Consulting received interim Design Reports. A table of the Final Design Report was annexed to the affidavit.
59 The Final Design Report included two specifications:
(a) the Cross City Tunnel - Tunnel and Shaft Rock Reinforcement Specification, dated 1 October 2003 ("the Rock Reinforcement Specification"), and
(b) Cross City Tunnel - Tunnel and Shaft Excavation and Primary Support Specification, dated 1 October 2003.
60 The Rock Reinforcement Specification provided a description of temporary and permanent rock bolt support requirements, but did not mandate whether temporary or permanent bolts had to be installed during the construction process, with the exception of the following clauses:
3.1 General
...
(f) The Contractor [BHBB] shall be responsible for temporary additional support measures as they relate to safety of works aspects mainly. Temporary bolts shall therefore be installed as determined by the Contractor.
(g) Locations for random bolting shall be as required to provide a safe working environment and shall be as directed by the Contractor in consultation with the Designer.
61 The Rock Reinforcement Specification also stated at paragraph 1.2(b):
The contractor shall furnish and install rock reinforcement where shown on the Design Drawings.
62 Mr Barry stated that he would have expected that BHBB was under a strict requirement to install what was shown on CW-DC's design drawings, namely Type D bolts in the pattern and locations shown. On 20 July 2003, Mr Mueller of BHBB issued a notice on Project Centre to Mr Bleuler of CW-DC, that an instruction for rock support system be adopted. Mr Mueller instructed BHBB employees that a document titled "Instruction for Rock Support" be completed by BHBB and signed by representatives from BHBB and CW-DC if they wished to depart from the design, in order to get "sign-off". This system was adopted for only a short period of time and was not pursued by BHBB prior to 29 July 2004.
63 On 18 April 2004, the excavation of MVT-1 commenced from chainage 976. MVT-1, from this chainage, was driven in two separate directions: east and west. The tunnel heading in an easterly direction was known as MVT-1 East. The question of how BHBB would construct each tunnel in the CCT Project, including MVT-1 and what equipment they wanted to use to do this, was outside the contractual parameters of the Consultancy Agreement. The other tunnels in the CCT Project, with the exception of MVT-1, were wide enough for BHBB's crews to fit two large machines side by side, one being a roadheader and the other a robolter. This allowed BHBB to excavate part of the face of the tunnel (with the roadheader) and then immediately bolt (with the robolter) the roof of the tunnel above the recently excavated section as the excavation proceeded. However, this construction method was not possible in MVT-1 because of its narrow profile. CW-DC, according to Mr Barry's evidence, expected that BHBB would develop an appropriate method of installing the permanent support required by CW-DC's design.
64 CW-DC raised a query at three separate stages of the design process (through its Design Reports) as to the ability of BHBB to install roof support using a bolt machine (a robolter) in MVT-1, given that it was a single driven tunnel. CW-DC noted in the Detailed Design Report and the Final Design Report the following:
3.14 Outstanding Items
Receipt of the following information may result in changes to the design:
The following information is required to progress the design for the Bypass Vent Tunnel:
· BHBB's requirement for construction equipment passing bays (BHBB)
3.14 Outstanding Items
Receipt of the following information may result in changes to the design:
The following information is required to progress the design for the BVT:
· BHBB's requirement for construction equipment passing bays (BHBB)
...
4.2 Information Required:
The following information is required to progress the design for the Bypass Vent Tunnel:
· BHBB's requirement for construction equipment passing bays (BHBB)
65 Mr Barry stated that he understood that no response was provided by BHBB, the RTA or Hyder Consulting. BHBB proceeded to issue the Final Design Report as "IFC" ("Issued for Construction") with that question unanswered. BHBB decided to install temporary roof bolts from the boom of the roadheader with a handheld bolting machine. Mr Barry said that during the Coronial Inquest into the death of Mr Shores, he became aware of minutes of a BHBB internal meeting, in which Mr Pat Doyle, Executive Director of Construction for BHBB, raised questions as to what means were in place to prevent the person installing bolts from the platform from being struck by a rock fall. A copy of the minutes dated 27 June 2003 were annexed to the affidavit. BHBB gave effect to the work method decision of installing roof bolts by the creation of a Job Safety Analysis ("JSA"). The original BHBB JSA (No 32) for the task of "Installation of rockbolts with wombat", dated 4 November 2003, stated that the potential hazard is being "struck by rock fall". The control measure for this risk was stated as follows:
Bar down loose rock, check for drummy areas. Pay attention to rock conditions whilst drilling. Access to face and around bolting operation to be restricted, safe egress whilst drilling and work from underneath previously supported ground towards the face.
66 A further BHBB JSA (No 44) for the task of "Drilling and Installation of bolts (by hand)", dated 3 December 2003, stated that it applied specifically to work location "MVT-1". This JSA identified the same control measure, but for the omission of the words "work from underneath previously support (sic) ground towards the face." During the Coronial Inquest, Mr Barry said that he became aware that BHBB individuals, and the joint venture itself, were to be paid bonus payments if they completed the construction of MVT-1 at an earlier than agreed date. CW-DC was not privy to any such arrangement between BHBB and the CCM.
67 Mr Barry detailed the general occupational health and safety system at Connell Wagner as at 29 July 2004. It had adopted a "systems based" approach, using the Australian and New Zealand Standard AS/NZS 4801 OHS Management System Elements for guidance. This Standard was published in 2002. Its Occupational Health Safety and Rehabilitation ("OHS&R") Management System was certified on 18 November 2002 as complying with the requirements of the Standard. Connell Wagner's OHS Management Systems were formally adopted by CW-DC in February 2002. A copy of the relevant Board paper and minutes were annexed to the affidavit.
68 The Connell Wagner OHS&R Management System comprised the following documentation:
(a) Connell Wagner OHS&R Manual;
(b) Project Specific OHS&R Management Plan; and
(c) Occupational Health and Safety Documents:
(1) OHS Policy;
(2) Safe Working Guidelines; and
(3) OHS&R Forms and Checklists.
69 Mr Barry set out the OHS&R requirements found in the 2004 Manual, which was annexed to his affidavit. On 29 November 2002, CW-DC submitted to BHBB its Project Management Plan which was prepared specifically for the CCT Project. It detailed resources and responsibilities to be implemented for the CCT Project including:
(a) Management Responsibility;
(b) Subcontracting;
(c) Risk management and Safe Work Methods:
(d) Inspection and testing;
(e) Incident Reporting, Rehabilitation, First Aid and Emergency Plan;
(f) Corrective Action;
(g) Hazardous Substances and Manual Handling;
(h) Training;
(i) OHS&R Records;
(j) Design OHS&R Plan, Design OHS Verification and Verification Responsibilities; and
(k) Safety Performance Monitoring.
70 The Project OHS&R Management Plan also outlined the investigation (geotechnical, engineering and survey) and design aspects of the work to be undertaken by CW-DC on the CCT Project. Annexed to the affidavit was the Project OHS&R Management Plan, together with the extensive Appendices.
71 Connell Wagner's Occupational Health and Safety Policy was also annexed to the affidavit. It included safe working guidelines, which addressed numerous working conditions, together with OHS&R forms and checklists. All Connell Wagner employees received induction training upon commencement of their employment. Copies of general OHS induction documents dated June 2004 and the Office Safety Handbook dated July 2000 were annexed to the affidavit. The information in this material was also accessible on the Connell Wagner intranet. Employees were also required to participate in a Quality, Health and Safety Induction and received a further Induction Training Handbook, a copy of which was annexed to the affidavit.
72 Connell Wagner employees who attended construction sites in New South Wales were also required to undertake specific induction training which included New South Wales Construction Induction and Risk Assessment for Supervisors and Managers. In addition to the induction training, employees who attended the CCT Project were given further induction and training through "safety huddles" and CCT Project Induction Training. Mr Rheinberger conducted "safety huddles" (also known as "toolbox talks") for the CSS team in the William Street site office on a weekly basis. CW-DC site based employees, Mr Ayshford and Mr Hartcliff undertook the WorkCover NSW OHS General Induction for Construction on 16 September 2003. Mr Rheinberger undertook this course on 19 November 2001. All CW-DC site-based employees including Mr Ayshford, Mr Hartcliff and Mr Rheinberger, attended the BHBB Project Induction. A copy of the "BHBB Cross City Tunnel - Project Induction" dated 6 November 2002 was annexed to the affidavit.
73 All CW-DC employees also attended the BHBB Zone Inductions carried out by respective BHBB Zone OHS Managers. Mr Rheinberger (and some other members of the CSS team) attended a Construction Stage Services Site Inspection Briefing WorkShop with some members of the DM team on 30 April 2003. Mr Bleuler presented on the Construction phase organisation and on the CW-DC Safety Induction.
74 Mr Barry detailed the safe work practices relevant to Connell Wagner and CW-DC employees working on the CCT Project. This included the geologists undertaking a three week supervised on the job training. During this time the less experienced geologists were instructed by the more experienced CW-DC personnel including where to work and stand in the tunnels and how to safely undertake their duties. Mr Bleuler prepared a "Site Inspection Safety Guide" which was annexed to Mr Barry's affidavit. A Project Review Committee was established by the Boards of Connell Wagner and CW-DC to oversee the CCT Project. The committee met on a quarterly basis. Each Work Area Leader of the CCT Project was required to present to the Committee. A Request for Information ("RFI") process was introduced. Throughout the CCT Project, BHBB made 2500 separate queries of CW-DC in the form of RFI's, both as to the design and construction of the CCT Project.
75 Each Monday Mr Bleuler and Mr Rheinberger would attend a monitoring meeting with BHBB employees and the subcontractor surveyors on site. On Tuesday mornings Mr Bleuler would attend a Management Meeting with Mr Arz of BHBB. The purpose of this meeting was to discuss issues arising during the week on the CCT Project. Mr Bleuler also attended design meetings with Mr Arz and representatives of Hyder Consulting to present alternatives to the design. Connell Wagner also had Health and Safety Committees which met bi-monthly and were comprised of employees and a management representative. Minutes were taken at each meeting. Sub-committees were also established to review safety incidents and identify opportunities for improvements. An example was the Incident Review Sub-Committee which was established in June 2004. External and internal audits were also undertaken of the CCT Project. On 30 March 2004, Mr Hugh King, Quality Manager for BHBB undertook an audit of CW-DC's Construction Stage Services requirements based on the CSS Work Plan. This was the fourth audit conducted with CW-DC and the first to address CW-DC's Construction Stage Services. The audit covered the range of services included in the Work Plan including geological mapping, monitoring, testing and inspection on site. No corrective action request records were raised by BHBB from the audit, with BHBB noting "a high degree of compliance was demonstrated." On 10 December 2003, CW-DC undertook its own audit of the CCT Project.
76 Mr Barry detailed the action taken following the incident involving Mr Shores. He stated that approximately two hours after the incident, Mr Rheinberger and Mr Scott Smith, the Site Engineer, met the NSW State Coroner at the site and escorted him down MVT-1 East.
77 On 30 July 2004, Mr Barry expressed his condolences to BHBB. On 2 August 2004, Mr Barry arranged for all Connell Wagner employees who had any connection to the CCT Project to meet in its boardroom. The employees were advised of the assistance Connell Wagner would provide. For several months after the incident, employees were encouraged to see counsellors.
78 CW-DC was unable to gain access to its site offices on the CCT Project between 30 July 2004 and 10 August 2004. Subsequently, after job safety analysis and safe work method statements were developed by the CSS team, CW-DC undertook inspections of the tunnels and provided two Reports to BHBB identifying outstanding action items detected during the inspections. The Inspection Reports were annexed to the affidavit. Dr Harry Asche, employed by Connell Wagner, undertook an analysis into the potential cause of the rock fall and provided this to WorkCover on 21 February 2005. BHBB made changes to its own work instructions which included that shift bosses and site engineers were to confirm the length and type of bolts to be installed and the excavation advance distances. CW-DC carried out a review of its work and issued a JSA/SWMS relating to the task of "Geotechnical Mapping and/or Inspection of Driven Tunnel Works" dated 23 August 2004. A copy of this document was annexed. Training was undertaken in respect of the JSA/SWMS that was introduced.
79 Upon recommencement of work in MVT-1 East, BHBB installed Type 2 Support using a robolter from chainage 1100 to chainage 1230. It also installed, as a minimum, Type 2 Support for the remainder of the MVT-1 East with two Roadheaders on which BHBB had fitted an overhead canopy to protect crew members attempting to insert rock bolts using hand held equipment from the platform of the Roadheader. This canopy was known as a Falling Objects Protection System ("FOPS").
80 CW-DC provided BHBB with a detailed construction sequence which provided that support had to be installed with a maximum distance of four metres between the last row of bolts and the tunnel face. This was a greater distance than previously detailed in the IFC Final Design Report. The increased distance was a consequence of the operator needing to stand further from the rock face when undertaking rockbolting utilising hand held rockbolting equipment.
81 CW-DC developed and implemented two new forms at the request of BHBB for the remainder of the CCT Project; namely:
(a) a Site Instruction Form to be used by CW-DC to identify non-conformances by BHBB in the tunnels on the CCT Project (14 of which were subsequently issued by CW-DC to BHBB); and
(b) A Supplementary Rock Support Form to be used by CW-DC to identify areas where additional support was required. Copies of these documents were annexed.
82 One of the main changes issued by CW-DC following the incident was the issue of a "buddy system" for its CSS personnel when they were required to enter any of the tunnels on the CCT Project. This involved CW-DC's geologists being accompanied by a geotechnical engineer.
83 In addition, BHBB instructed that a night shift be introduced by CW-DC so as to allow joint inspection of the tunnels by BHBB's and CW-DC's engineers. Mr Bleuler retired from the CCT Project in August 2004. His role of CSS Manager was taken up by Mr Bodner. BHBB increased Mr Bodner's hours on the CCT Project to 40 per week.
84 Mr Barry stated that he was aware that on or around 5 June 2006, WorkCover issued a request for input into a proposed Code of Practice for Tunnelling in New South Wales. Connell Wagner prepared a detailed response to WorkCover's request. The subsequent Code of Practice reflected a substantial proportion of its response. A copy of the response was annexed.
85 Following the CCT Project, CW-DC successfully tendered for the design and construction support role on the Eastlink Project in Melbourne. The Eastlink Project was also a design and construct project with a number of similarities to the CCT Project. Mr Barry detailed the processes that CW-DC introduced in respect of this project, particularly a shared responsibility between the designer and constructor for the ongoing selection of support types as the construction progressed. CW-DC sought to learn from the CCT Project and implemented an improved system of communication between all people on the Project. The fundamental principle agreed between the parties was to encourage face crew to increase support as a unilateral decision when the rock quality deteriorated.
86 A Permit to Excavate form was introduced if it was proposed that there be a decrease in roof support. CW-DC developed specific training for the tunnel crews which dealt with geotechnical issues particular to the Eastlink tunnel. Annotated digital photographs were taken on a daily basis which provided geotechnical information in areas of potential concern to employees. A significant difference between the work performed by CW-DC on the Eastlink Project and that performed on the CCT Project was that, on the Eastlink Project, the geological mapping was undertaken by a contractor, not by CW-DC. A dedicated tunnelling engineer and an engineering geologist were based in the tunnel on a fulltime basis at the suggestion of CW-DC. The Independent Verifier was given greater authority on this project and could physically stop the constructor from working in the tunnel. The Eastlink project progressed over 600 days without a Lost Time Injury. Following the Eastlink Project CW-DC has been involved in two other large tunnel projects in New Zealand.
87 Mr Barry set out the current health and safety management systems of Aurecon. Its OHS&R Management System continues to be certified as complying with the requirements of AS4801:2001. Registration was reissued on 19 March 2009. The requirements of Aurecon's OHS&R Manual 2005 were set out by Mr Barry and a copy was annexed to his affidavit. Project specific OHS&R Management Plans are developed in respect of each project. A substantial review of Aurecon's health and safety performance was undertaken in May 2009. Following the review, a revised Aurecon Health and Safety Policy was approved by the Aurecon Board.
88 In August 2008, Mr Barry participated in the Federal Safety Commissioner's inaugural CEO Forum. Annexed to the affidavit was a document titled "Leading the Way" and "Companies Committed to the Leadership Charter Federal Safety Commissioner's CEO Forum 21 August 2008." Aurecon is the only consultant currently committed to the Leadership Charter.
89 Aurecon continues to implement Safe Working Guidelines that address safety issues. The company has reviewed amended OHS&R forms and checklists. It has embarked on a series of key business changes and rejuvenation activities affecting a number of areas including its safety culture. Safety Culture experts were engaged to enable Aurecon to gauge their performance improvement. Aurecon also uses a Health and Safety Contract Assessment Tool to verify the health and safety obligations in contracts and the relevant project team's role in meeting those obligations as defined in the contract to determine if they are met, exceeded, or not met. Health & Safety Project Assessment & Report is an audit checklist that is customised to suit each Project's specific needs. A Safety Management Review Checklist has been developed to require Project Principals and Project Leaders to undertake a review of their Project using the checklist. A checklist for reviewing a Safe Work Method Statement was developed to aid the Project Leader to review contractors' Safe Work Method Statements.
90 In 2006, Aurecon initiated a substantial project to enhance its approach to safety in design. A copy of a document titled "Safety in Design Guidance Notes" was annexed to the affidavit.
91 Mr Barry detailed Aurecon and CW-DC's contributions to the community. This includes community programs, education initiatives and charitable organisations across Australia and internationally. Key initiatives include "Melbourne Cares". This involves a learning strategy to connect young people from disadvantaged backgrounds with organisations in Melbourne's CBD with the aim of increasing opportunity and encouraging students to think about new options for their work and life.
92 Aurecon organises or participates in the following:
i. Bridge Building Competition. This is a competition for Year 8 and 9 students to encourage them to engage with engineering activity and see the different roles that engineering can play in the community. It operates across Australia and New Zealand.