Inspector Hoare v Pridham
[2011] NSWIRComm 103
At a glance
Source factsCourt
Industrial Relations Commission (NSW)
Decision date
2011-03-16
Before
Backman J
Catchwords
- (2003) 122 IR 199 Inspector Stephen Cooper v Kwik-Seal Pty Ltd and anor [2006] NSWIRComm 48 Kirk v Industrial Relations Commission
- Kirk Group Holdings Pty Ltd v WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector Childs) [2010] HCA 1
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Catchwords
Judgment (6 paragraphs)
Judgment 1Gordon James Pridham, the defendant, pleaded guilty to an offence under s 8(1) of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000 (OHS Act 2000). At the time of the offence, Mr Pridham was the managing partner of Gebel Aquasafe (Gebel), a family partnership, which undertook the manufacture of fibreglass tanks at a factory located in Leeton. The offence arose as a result of an incident on 28 June 2007 at the Leeton factory where Scott Pickford and Darren Mickan suffered crush injuries when a suspended inverted fibreglass tank fell from its support pinning them between the fibreglass tank and the handrails of a scissor lift. 2The amended Application for Order particularised two risks. First, a risk that a suspended inverted fibreglass tank could fall, striking or crushing employees working underneath a suspended load. Secondly, a risk that employees were exposed to injury when using 332 line chemical resistant laminating resins containing styrene in a confined space. The second risk arose during the course of the incident in circumstances where Mr Pickford and Mr Mickan were inside the inverted tank, laminating its interior while using the laminating resin containing styrene. 3As managing partner of Gebel, Mr Pridham's functions included, but were not limited to, responsibility for occupational health and safety issues. He visited the Leeton site from time to time and was aware of the usual method of work at the site for the manufacture of the fibreglass tanks. At the Leeton site, Mr Pridham's son, Anthony Pridham, also a partner of Gebel, managed sales and production. At the time of the incident he had attended the site approximately three times in twelve months. Employed at the site was Stuart Attwood in the role of foreman and supervisor. In his roles, Mr Attwood attended the site at the beginning and end of each shift. His duties included allocating various tasks to other employees at the site, relaying orders from management to other staff, and generally implementing Gebel's occupational health and safety management system. Mr Attwood was acting in the role of site supervisor at the site in the absence of more senior management. At the time of the incident he had been employed by Gebel for about 15 months. 4Mr Pickford was a trainee labourer at the premises. At the time of the incident he had been employed by Gebel for five days. Mr Mickan was a supervisor at the site and at the time of the incident had been employed for some four months. 5The task being undertaken by Mr Pickford and Mr Mickan at the time of the incident involved laminating the interior of the tank. Gebel's normal practice for undertaking this task was to place the tank on its side in two half stages to allow for curing prior to rolling. The chemicals involved in this laminating process included acetone, the 332 line chemical resistant laminating resin, and andox lcr-s. Acetone is a hazardous substance and is classified as an irritant to the eyes. The 332 line chemical resistant laminating resin containing styrene, which was the major ingredient, is also classified as a hazardous substance, and is harmful when inhaled. It is also an irritant to both eyes and skin. A material safety data sheet (MSDS) for the resin recommends the chemical be used, "in a well ventilated area". It advises that, in the event of inhalation risk, "wear organic vapour respirator ... In confined spaces where the concentration of vapour exceeds or may exceed the TWA an air supply respirator must be used", and, "Wear overalls, chemical goggles, impervious gloves, leather boots with rubber soles". Gebel had a copy of the relevant MSDS on site which was accessible to employees. Gebel had also completed a risk assessment form in June 2005 that identified risks associated with applying resins such as the 332 line chemical resistant laminating resin. It listed risks associated with inhalation (dizziness, nausea, loss of concentration, and ultimately loss of consciousness). Controls set out in the risk assessment included limiting the amount of exposure to not less than 15 minutes, not more than four times per day. Other controls required the use of local exhaust ventilation and the use of a mask or respirator, impermeable protective gloves, protective eyewear, clean overalls, and safety boots. 6At the time of the incident, the usual method for laminating a tank was not employed. According to the prosecutor, the injuries to the two workers arose as a result of a new method of work which was unsafe and distinguishable from the usual method, which it was readily conceded was not unsafe. The usual method involved, amongst other matters, ensuring that the tank was placed in a specially constructed cradle which would have prevented any risk of the tank falling on the workers. According to the prosecutor, the new method for laminating the tank was devised by Mr Anthony Pridham the evening before the incident when he instructed the injured workers to suspend or hang the tank from a chain attached to the ceiling and to laminate the tank from the inside using a scissor lift. This method invoked the necessity to rig the tank from the roof in circumstances where no consideration was given to rigging procedures, or to necessary training. No explanation was forthcoming as to why Mr Anthony Pridham may have thought the new method was more effective than the usual established method. It should be noted, at this point, that at the time that this new method was devised and implemented the defendant was neither informed about the new method, nor was he present at the site, at the time of the incident. 7In order to illustrate the unsafe features of this new method it is necessary to resort in some detail to the circumstances which gave rise to the incident. 8At about 12.05pm on the day of the offence, Mr Pickford and Mr Mickan commenced the lamination of an internal "top" join of a partially assembled fibreglass reinforced plastic tank. During this process, the tank was suspended approximately 1.5m-1.8m off the ground in an inverted position from an overhead gantry crane. The weight of the tank was approximately 380-390 kilogrammes. Both workers were working inside the inverted tank on the platform of a scissor lift under the suspended load. By raising the scissor lift platform, they were able to access the internal top join to carry out the lamination works. 9The task of lamination included the grinding of bolts and the use of resin and fibreglass sheeting to adhere and seal the base of the tank to its walls in order to form one piece. At the time of the incident the base effectively was the top of the tank. The inverted tank was slung by the overhead gantry crane. The hook attached to the sling was attached directly to a single eye bolt, two washers, and a nut. The eye bolt was located in the centre of the inverted base of the tank. There was no shackle in use between the hook attached to the sling and the eye bolt. 10As earlier noted, Mr Anthony Pridham had instructed the workers to undertake the internal lamination of the tank employing this new process of suspending the tank via the use of the gantry crane and scissor lift. On the evening prior to the incident he had instructed the workers to take some precautions when carrying out the lamination works inside the inverted tank. These precautions consisted of not lifting the tank more than 150mm while the workers were inside, using protective PPE equipment and ensuring that a two-way radio was used. A verbal risk assessment was undertaken by Mr Anthony Pridham but no documented risk assessment was done in respect of this new method. No safe work method statement was prepared and, in particular, no specific consideration was given as to a safe method for rigging the tank, nor was there any specific consideration of the risks that might arise from carrying out the work in a confined space, nor the risks arising from working with resins including the best methods to address those risks. 11Mr Pickford and Mr Mickan could not reach the interior of the tank from within the cage of the scissor lift platform. They were therefore required to apply fibreglass to the tank interior by leaning over the cage with arms fully stretched in order to rotate the interior. They were also working without an extraction hose. They were wearing safety glasses, but not full goggles. 12After some 20 minutes, fumes from the resins appeared at the top of the inverted tank. The workers exited the tank by descending the scissor lift and shortly after returned to the tank wearing breathing apparatus. At this time, they attempted to remove the fumes from the interior of the tank with an extraction hose. Mr Attwood apparently suggested to them that they should place empty 44-gallon drums underneath the outside edge of the base of the inverted tank. Shortly after, while still in the process of completing the lamination, Mr Pickford and Mr Mickan were spinning the load and applying the resin when the suspended tank fell pinning both of them between the tank and the handrails of the scissor lift. Attempts by co-workers to lift the base of the tank by hand were not successful. One attempt to lift the tank by the co-workers allowed Mr Mickan to slip out from between the tank and the scissor lift before the co-workers had to drop the tank. Mr Pickford was also able to free himself from being pinned between the tank and the scissor lift at that time. When the tank was dropped, the side caught Mr Mickan's right arm which became pinned between the interior of the tank and the railing of the scissor lift platform. Mr Mickan was able to reach out to the controls of the scissor lift with his left arm. The controls, however, had been damaged by the falling tank and they came apart in Mr Mickan's left hand as he attempted to descend the scissor lift. Mr Pickford had also attempted to reach the controls of the scissor lift but found that he was unable to descend the lift. Mr Attwood managed to get underneath the tank and access the controls for the scissor lift so that it started to descend. At that point, the tank came to rest on the ground by which time Mr Pickford and Mr Mickan were on the floor of the scissor lift platform. The co-workers abandoned any further attempts to lift the tank and began to cut their way into the barrel of the tank which enabled both Mr Pickford and Mr Mickan to exit through one of the holes. 13Shortly after, both workers were conveyed to Leeton District Hospital. Mr Mickan suffered multiple bruises and abrasions, right arm nerve injury with neuropraxia and right-hand weakness. Mr Pickford suffered facial contusions, multiple abrasions, lacerations to lip, lower back injuries and concussion. Both workers were off work for several weeks.