Prosecutor's evidence
10Ms S Gul solicitor, who appeared for the prosecutor, tendered an agreed statement of facts which provided:
...
3.Raydaz was a corporation owned and run by Mr Raymond Anjoul ("Raymond Anjoul"), the sole director, secretary and employee. Raydaz undertook the business of residential building, renovation and repair work.
4.At all material times, Raydaz controlled a construction site located at 227 - 231 Pennant Hills Rd, Carlingford ("the site").
5.At all material times, the site was owned by Trackk as trustee for Veg Family Trust ("Trackk"). Mr Pierre Anjoul ("Pierre Anjoul") was the sole Director and Secretary of Trackk.
6.Pierre Anjoul is Raymond Anjoul's brother. He would attend the site on average 3 to 4 times per week but did not have any supervisory responsibilities.
7.At all material times, the construction work on the site was subcontracted out to various parties. In addition to his role as project manager, Raymond Anjoul acted as site supervisor and foreman.
8.Samr Allah ("Allah"), also known as Hussein Jafar, was a sole trader, operating a business known as "Samir Mobile Crane." No formal company structure had been arranged except the registration of the business name.
9.Allah is Iraqi born and moved to Australia as a refugee. His English is poor. He holds a heavy vehicle license but no crane license. WorkCover records show that in 2008 Allah underwent 11 training sessions in order to gain his crane licence, including some with assistance in written and spoken English. Allah twice failed the assessments and did not get a license as a result.
10.Ameer Hassan ("Hassan"), also known as Ali, operated a business named "Ali's Mobile Crane". Ali's Mobile Crane was not registered in any form and had no ABN or ACN. Hassan owned a small flatbed truck with a "hi ab" attachment on it.
11.At all material times, Ali's Mobile Crane did not possess or operate a crane. Ali's Mobile Crane acted as a tout for "Samir Mobile Crane." Hassan states that he had a number of business cards printed up, and took them to building sites touting for business. If he received a call for mobile crane work, he would attend the site to observe the specifics of the job, and then show Allah where the site was. Allah would then arrive at the site on the organised date with the crane. Hassan's English was superior to Allah's and he therefore communicated with the contractor.
12.At all material times, Advanced Carpentry Pty Ltd ("Advanced Carpentry") was engaged by Raydaz to complete all framework and roofing work at the site.
13.At all material times, Mr Charbel Sassine ("Sassine"), also known as Charlie, was the director for Advanced Carpentry.
14.At all material times, Stratco Pty Ltd ("Stratco") was a corporation which undertook the business of manufacturing and supplying metal building material. It conducted its business from 15 Liberty Road, Huntingwood NSW.
15.At all material times, Dennis Kew ("Kew") was the director and sole employee of Deno Pty Ltd ("Deno"). Deno was the owner and operator of a 1998 UD 8-tonne flat-bed truck with Hiab crane.
16.Deno had a non-exclusive contract with Stratco and on 18 November 2009 had been engaged by Stratco to deliver product to locations around the Sydney metropolitan area.
The crane
17.At all material times, Samir Mobile Crane operated a 1981 model yellow Nissan Mobile Crane with a 12 tonne lifting capacity ("the crane").
18.At all material times the crane was affixed with a registration plate which did not belong to the crane. The crane was not road registered. A partial mobile phone number was scrawled onto the side of the crane in felt marker. There was no other form of identification attached to it. The only reliable indentifying feature was its VIN number, KW30M08243.
19.The crane was in a poor state of repair on the day of the incident. There were various rusty components. The crane did not have plant registration with WorkCover.
The incident
20.Prior to the incident, Raymond Anjoul received a business card from Hassan on one of Hassan's cold calling visits to construction sites. Raymond Anjoul called Hassan and instructed Hassan to deliver a load of bricks on his smaller "hi ab" truck.
21.Prior to the incident, Sassine ordered metal roofing sheets from Stratco and arranged for them to be delivered to the site on 18 November 2009.
22.Some time prior to 18 November 2009, Raymond Anjoul was advised by Sassine that Sassine needed a crane to lift the metal roofing sheets onto the roof.
23.Raymond Anjoul called Ali's Mobile Crane and asked Hassan to organise a 55 tonne crane to attend the site on the morning of 18 November 2009. This arrangement was not recorded.
24.Raydaz arranged for Hassan to be the crane provider and operator and was not aware of Hassan's subcontracting arrangement with Allah. There were no formalised subcontracting arrangements between Raydaz and Hassan nor were there between Hassan and Allah.
25.On 18 November 2009, Raymond Anjoul rang Pierre Anjoul to advise him that he was running late. He asked Pierre Anjoul to open the site. He did not give Pierre Anjoul any detailed instructions regarding the arrangements with Advanced Carpentry and Ali's Mobile Crane that morning, nor did he have any formalised site management systems in place.
26.Kew arrived at the site at about 6.30am in order to deliver metal roofing sheets. Kew was not site inducted and received no instructions at the site. It was a policy of Stratco that a) contractors not work outside their role and responsibilities of simply delivering the load and b) if anything other than delivery was required, the contractor must contact the appropriate supervisor for a determination and c) that contractors report site specific hazards to the site supervisor.
27.The roofing sheets were loaded in 300kg pallets in order that they could be safely lifted.
28.Allah arrived at the site some time after 7am and set up the crane "parking in" Kew's truck. As a result, Kew could not leave the site until the crane was moved. Allah did not bring levelling timbers with him and utilised some off cuts from the site as timbers in order to set up the crane. He did not establish a proper exclusion zone, or conduct any pre operational checks.
29.Allah did not bring a dogman with him and an impromptu "dogging" system was organised on the spot whereby Sassine directed the loads onto the roof. The loads were lifted short of their intended mark as the crane was a 12 tonne crane, not the 55 tonne crane that Raymond Anjoul had been expecting. A fly jib was used to land the loads.
30.Once the loads were landed, Kew needed to leave the site, but his truck remained parked in by the crane. Kew, along with Pierre Anjoul and Allah, assisting in packing up the crane in order to leave the site.
31.The fly jib would not retract. As a result the boom could not be locked into place and the crane could not move out of its position.
32.Various individuals, including Kew, Pierre Anjoul and Allah all tried to jimmy the fly jib into place with metal bars. The pins and springs locking the fly jib to the boom into place were rusted and damaged.
33.The fly jib dislodged from the boom and fell onto Kew crushing his legs. The fly jib also grazed Pierre Anjoul's arm as it fell, causing superficial injuries.
34.As a result of being struck by the boom, Kew sustained fractures to his left femur, pelvis and ankle, torn ligaments in the right leg, lacerations to the elbow and head and eviscerated testicles.
35.An ambulance attended the site and transported Kew to hospital where he underwent surgery to his legs, testicles and pelvis. He has since undergone various other surgeries and was forced to sell his truck due to his ongoing ill health.
Systems of Work Prior to the Incident
36.Raydaz did not have a documented Site Safety Management Plan in place at the site.
37.Raydaz did have a documented site induction system for the site. Kew and Allah were not inducted to the site.
38.Raydaz conducted toolbox talks, but did not conduct one on 18 November 2009.
39.It was the policy of Raydaz that all sub contractors provide a Safe Work Method Statement ("Safe Work Method Statement") to it, but Raydaz did not obtain a SWMS from Allah.
40.Raydaz did not complete a risk assessment in relation to the crane. It did not obtain a risk assessment from its contractor, Allah for the use and dismantling of the crane. Raydaz did not make enquiries regarding the working order of the crane.
41.The system of supervision employed by Raydaz was reliant on Raymond Anjoul. If he was not present on site there was no on site supervision.
42.Samr Mobile Crane had no safety systems in place in relation to the crane. There were no Safe Work Procedures in place for the operation or dismantling of the crane and pre-operational checks completed on the crane.
43.The crane was in a poor state of repair with no essential maintenance done for some time. The crane had not undergone its ten year inspection or any other safety inspections.
44.Allah did not hold a crane licence.
45.The crane owned and operated by Samr Mobile Crane was not registered with WorkCover, and it was not road registered
46.Samr Mobile Crane did not use a dogman. The system of work relating to dogman employed by Samr Mobile Crane was to have Allah undertake the role of operator and dogman.
47.Samr Mobile Crane did not complete any SWMS in relation to dismantling of the crane as Allah did not know what a SWMS was.
48.Samr Mobile Crane did not complete any risk assessments in relation to dismantling of the crane.
49.Appropriate timbers were not used to level the crane and there was no exclusion zone set up.
50.Samr Mobile Crane allowed Kew and others to assist in the dismantling of the crane without providing any training or instruction.
Systems of Work Following the Incident - Raydaz
51.Following the incident, Raydaz:
a.engaged the Master Builder's Association and formalised a Site Safety Management Plan;
b.formalised a Site Safety Management Plan for the site;
c.documented a "site safety walk-through" system;
d.implemented systems to ensure that any cranes coming onto the site are crane safe accredited;
e.engaged Pace Cranes to undertake an assessment of the crane prior to it being removed from site to ensure it could travel;
f.improved the system for obtaining and reviewing SWMS.
52.The defendant has co-operated with the WorkCover investigation of this matter.
11An agreed statement of facts in identical terms was relied upon in respect of the charge brought against the personal defendant.
12The prosecutor also tendered the following documents:
1.ASIC Current and Historical Extract for Raydaz Design Pty Ltd [ACN 079 132 282].
2.Factual Inspection Report of Inspector Kwok dated 14 December 2009.
3.24 colour photographs taken by Inspector Kwok dated 18 November 2009 showing the construction site, the mobile crane BB.62.GK with the fly jib on the ground and rust surrounding part of the locking pin of the jib.
4.Technical Report of Inspector Terry Fouques, Engineering Team dated 24 December 2009.
5.Samir Mobile Crane business card.
6.WorkCover New South Wales Certificate of Prior Convictions showing no prior convictions for the defendants.
13Mr Terry Fouques, Senior Inspector, Engineering Team, WorkCover in his technical report dated 24 December 2009, relevantly observed:
6.Inspection of the end of the main boom of the mobile crane revealed four location holes drilled in the cat head of the boom for the purpose of accepting the fly jib locking pins to secure the fly jib to the main boom. (see photo #5)
7.Each pin mechanism was fitted with spring loaded pawl type locking arrangement for the purpose of locking the fly jib pins into location holes in the cat head section of the main boom. (see photo #6)
8.Further inspection of the locking pawls revealed the springs were not functional as they were broken and the end of the pawl arm in one case was sheared off. (see photo #7)
9.Further inspection of the entire mobile crane revealed the following at the time of the inspection:
No item registration was available for the crane.
No maintenance, inspection or servicing records were available for the crane.
The electronic load indicator fitted inside the cabin of crane was a retro fit unit and the wiring to the unit appeared to be incomplete.
The anti two blocking device was incomplete and not connected.
The crane was showing various areas of surface rust throughout the jib, gearbox and wire ropes.
The slew ring bolts of the crane were of various lengths with one to two millimetres variation.