...the Act imposes a strict or absolute liability on employers in relation to safety at the workplace. It is quite consistent with that approach that where a corporation is the employer that strict liability applies to those who are the operative minds of the corporation, namely the directors. There is nothing incongruous or unlikely about such an approach. The legislature has, however, provided a limited defence by allowing liability to be avoided if the director demonstrates that he or she was not in a position to influence the conduct of the corporation in relation to the contravention or, being in such a position, used all diligence to prevent the contravention by the corporation. Those defences focus upon the contravention and, in a sense, recognise that in the "real world" (so heavily relied upon by the defendant) there may be situations where, for a variety of reasons, a director was not able to influence the conduct of the corporation. Hypothetical examples are of necessity artificial but it is not beyond the realms of possibility that a director may have been in a minority on the Board in urging a more costly but effective system of safety that the other directors were not prepared to adopt or, as suggested by the prosecutor, at the relevant time a director was on leave of absence or suffering some other disability when a particular policy decision was taken and may not have been informed of that decision. Indeed, in Newcastle Wallsend a defence was established where, at the relevant time, the defendant did not hold a position of authority to influence the conduct of the corporation although he did so at another relevant time. Those examples are sufficient to indicate that there is an opportunity for the sub-section (1)(a) defence to be availed of by a director but it is no answer to say that the defences are narrow and limited. Much the same comment might be made in relation to the general defences found in s 28. The limited nature of these defences is understandable having regard to the public purpose served by safety legislation, especially having regard to the objects of the Act set out in s 3, namely, (a) to secure and promote the health, safety and welfare of people at work; (b) to protect people at a place of work against risks to health or safety arising out of the activities of persons as work; (e) to ensure that risks to health and safety at a place of work are identified, assessed and eliminated or controlled; (g) to provide a legislative framework that allows for progressively higher standards of occupational health and safety to take account of changes in technology and work practices; and, (h) to protect people (whether or not at a place of work) against risks to health and safety arising from the use of plant that affects public safety. To secure these objectives the legislature has adopted a system of strict or absolute liability of employers and has adopted provisions like s 26 to emphasise responsibility of persons in the corporate structure to ensure the safety of workplaces.
[63] None of the limited examples cited in the above extract are applicable to the present circumstances, nor have the defendants contended otherwise. Even if s 26(1)(a) was not of such limited application as suggested by Haylen J, I would find based on the conclusions which I have earlier drawn as to the respective roles of each of the three directors that they have each failed to establish defences under s 26(1)(a). Each defendant submitted that they were not in a position to influence the corporation because they lacked the expertise in the very specific area of electrical cabling and in circumstances where the business had been operating without incident for a lengthy period of time and where the defect in the electrical cabling installation, which only became apparent at the time of the accident, could not have been known or predicted or foreseen. In relation to the corporate defendant's contravening conduct as particularised, the evidence suggests that the electrical cabling was installed some 30 years before the accident but that no records were available which might have indicated that the installation at any stage had been maintained. The three directors might have lacked expertise in relation to matters of electrical cabling but they had the authority to enquire into the history of maintenance of the cabling and whether, with regard to risks to safety, there were any risks associated with the cabling or, whether relevant risks had been assessed or identified, and whether the cabling needed to be, or could be rendered more safe by the fitting of some safety device such as an RCD. None of these actions would have required any prior knowledge or foresight (or expertise) as preconditions which had to be present before enquiries could be instituted. Each director, as one of three directors of the corporate defendant, was in a position to make decisions about safety matters in particular. According to their evidence when specific safety matters (such as the installation of fire stairs and the removal of a trip hazard) were brought to the their attention by management they provided the funds. They did not however, having employed persons whom they considered to be competent and experienced managers, initiate any further steps or make any enquiries to ensure that persons at the premises, in particular Master Morgan would be protected from risks of injury to safety, while at those premises. I therefore find that each defendant has failed to establish a defence on the balance of probabilities under s 26(1)(a) of the 2000 Act.
[64] The defendants' submissions in relation to the defence under s 26(1)(b) have been made in conjunction with their submissions in relation to the defence under s 26(1)(a). The legislative scheme under s 26(1) requires that both defences be given separate consideration. If a defendant has relied upon, but fails to make out the defence under s 26(1)(a), then s 26(1)(b) falls next for consideration as to whether a director, being in a position to influence the conduct of the corporation in relation to its contravention, has used "all due diligence" to prevent the contravention.
[65] The Court's attention was not directed to any authorities that have considered the provision, or more specifically, that have focused on the meaning of the words "all due diligence". In State Pollution Control Commission v Kelly (1991) 5 ACSR 607, Hemmings J considered the meaning of "all due diligence". In that judgment an individual defendant, a director, faced a charge under s 10(1) of the Environmental Offences and Penalties Act 1989 (repealed on 1 July 1999), a provision almost identical to s 26(1) of the 2000 Act. The director, Mr Kelly, raised the defence that he, being a person in a position to influence the conduct of the corporation in relation to its contravention, "used all due diligence to prevent the contravention by the corporation". His Honour considered that the expression "all due diligence" required the taking of appropriate precautions aimed at preventing the conduct of the corporation which led to the contravention (at 609). The expression "all due diligence", his Honour said, depended upon the circumstances of the case but, "contemplates a mind concentrated on the likely risks". In Inspector Kumar v Ritchie , Haylen J considered whether the defence of all due diligence under s 26(1)(b) was made out in circumstances where the defendant was ignorant of the various risks to safety and of the processes necessary to obviate the risks, commenting that in those circumstances it was "quite impossible" to make a finding that the defendant had used all due diligence. Haylen J found that the evidence before him did not disclose "a director's mind concentrated on the risks of the operation..." (at [177]).
[66] The application of the above considerations to the evidence here does not reveal directorial minds concentrated on the likely risks to safety involved in running a business or in addressing procedures or processes to expose any risks to safety. According to the defendants they had no knowledge of, and would have been unable to predict any risks to safety arising from the electrical cabling installation located in the semi-enclosed area near the pool and they did not possess the relevant expertise which would have, or might have, enabled them to identify and address those risks. Instead the defendants have maintained that it is sufficient for them to make out the defences under s 26(1) by taking the actions that they did, namely, employing competent managers whom they believed possessed the relevant experience and expertise. But this measure only amounts to a preliminary step and, in my view, more is needed in order to have taken appropriate precautions to the extent required to make out the defence that they used all due diligence to prevent the contravention of the corporation.
[67] Nor in my view does "all due diligence" (or "...being in a position to influence", the contravening conduct of the corporation) require as a minimum or threshold requirement that the directors have played a "significant and hands on role" in the corporate defendants operations or that they have responsibility for day-to-day decision making. Reliance on the Full Bench judgment of Daly Smith Corporation does not assist the defendants in this regard. The case is not authority for some threshold requirement of directorial liability, namely that the director must have a direct and substantial (a "hands" on) role in the company operations in order to attract liability. Much will depend on the circumstances of each individual case. Liability will be attracted where, as here, circumstances reveal that the directors played a limited direct role in the operation of the business, preferring to leave the decision-making, relevantly in relation to safety matters, to the management team but without at the same time making consistent and on-going enquiries aimed at ensuring that management was both capable and competent of discharging the corporation's statutory obligations as to safety.
6 The defendants come before the Court for sentence following the hearings and the findings of guilt against the individual defendants, and the corporate defendant's plea of guilty.
7 The risk to Master Morgan's safety at the corporate defendant's premises arose from the exposure to live electrical current. As outlined above, Master Morgan sustained an electrical shock after placing his feet on a corroded section of the pipe which collapsed under his weight and went through insulation layers surrounding the active wire, causing the pipe upon which he was standing to become electrified. Master Morgan later died of injuries consistent with electrocution. He was 13 years of age at the time.
8 This was a very tragic accident, some direct causes of which were the failures on the part of the corporate defendant to conduct a risk assessment in relation to the electrical cable which provided power to the pool and to implement a maintenance programme for the cable. The evidence, detailed in the judgment, disclosed that the pipe's condition and the interior cabling had deteriorated to a hazardous state in the absence of any maintenance of the assemblage at any time from the date of installation, which according to records was sometime in 1971 when the pool was installed (at [24] of the judgment). The tragic consequence of those failures, could have been prevented by fitting a residual current device (RCD) to the hotel's main switchboard, a measure which was in fact implemented by the corporate defendant following the accident in December 2002. Although the fatal accident, as a consequence of the breach of the Act, does not impact on the penalty imposed, it is a measure of the seriousness of potential consequences which may flow from a breach, in this case, the hazardous nature of live electrical circuitry and the risk to persons located in the vicinity of that circuitry. These matters, in my view, elevate the objective seriousness of the offences into the serious category.
9 The defendants submitted that the risk to safety could not be, "readily foreseen" on the day of the accident because the pipe did not pose an obvious risk to safety until such time as Master Morgan stood on it and it collapsed, damaging the internal cabling. In my view, the submission misconceives the nature of the risk. The relevant risk arose not because the pipe collapsed but because of the corporate defendant's failure to assess the risk arising from live electrical circuitry, and its failure to implement a programme of maintenance in relation to that circuitry. This risk to safety was both obvious and reasonably foreseeable. Obvious, because the dangers associated with live electrical circuitry are well-known and notoriously associated with serious, often fatal, consequences. Reasonably foreseeable, because no risk assessment had been conducted, no RCD fitted, and the assemblage had not been maintained by the corporate defendant.
10 Ron Roberts, the previous proprietor of the hotel, prepared an affidavit for the defendants in the sentence hearings. According to him he purchased the hotel from the Ambassador Group, which had undertaken significant renovations to the property prior to the purchase. The renovations, however, were never completed, apparently because the sub-contractors were not paid for the work. Because of non-payment, the sub-contractors confiscated all plans and diagrammes of the hotel complex including the original plans of the hotel's construction in 1968. He said he made numerous attempts to access the plans without success. He said he was approached on two different occasions by sub-contractors suggesting that they could perform necessary work on the premises because they had access to the plans. The defendants relied on this material during the sentence proceedings as relevant to the issue of foreseeability. Mr Roberts, they contended, had a well established reputation in the hotel industry at the time the corporate defendant purchased the hotel complex, and, the hotel appeared to be running smoothly and appeared to be properly maintained. The Court was informed that the defendants made some independent attempts to obtain the hotel plans but only succeeded in obtaining architectural drawings. No plans depicting the electrical circuitry at the premises were obtained.
11 It is difficult to see how any of this material assists the defendants. Without access to any of the plans depicting the electrical circuitry, the need to undertake a risk assessment and a maintenance programme should have been, in the circumstances, of critical importance. At the time of the offence, fitting a residual current device to a switchboard was a common and a well-known safety feature. The defendants conceded in written submissions that fitting such a device prior to the offence, "could have … minimised if not eliminated (the risk)." This material only reinforces the conclusion that the risk to safety was reasonably foreseeable.
12 Fitting a residual current device was not a requirement under the relevant standard (AS 3000) until 1991. Nor at the time of the offences was there a requirement for the retrospective fitting of such a device under the standard. Nevertheless it was a common and readily available measure which could have been installed by the corporate defendant at any stage prior to the offence. Equally, the undertaking of a risk assessment and the implementation of a maintenance programme were measures readily available to the corporate defendant. Neither measure required particular expertise or knowledge of electrical circuitry. These matters contribute to the objective seriousness of the offences.
13 This is not to say that the defendants were indifferent to matters of safety. Prior to the incident the evidence suggested that the corporate defendant either employed or engaged experienced and specialist staff and workers to run the hotel. In addition, all safety issues to which the defendants' attention had been specifically directed, received prompt attention. This matter was addressed and acknowledged in the judgment at [38]. In addition the corporate defendant had in place, prior to the offences, measures to address risks to safety associated with the pool, including fencing and signage. The pool surrounds were also regularly inspected and maintained up to May 2002. An internal maintenance team was responsible for safety matters and external contractors were engaged when it was determined that safety issues lay outside the expertise of the maintenance team. These matters serve to mitigate the otherwise objective seriousness of the offences.
14 The defendants chose to make no submissions in relation to specific and general deterrence. Both principles are of paramount importance, in my view, given the circumstances of the offences.
15 The corporate defendant, operated, and continues to operate, in the hospitality industry. The three individual defendants were directors prior to, and at the time of, the offences. Approximately 50 staff were employed by the corporate defendant and the premises occupied some three acres of land. The hospitality industry, in which the corporate defendant operates, is labour intensive. It employs and engages workers from diverse backgrounds with various skills and occupations. The nature of the industry is such that it offers a wide range of services to the public which include business, entertainment and recreational services. There is a high turnover of persons who patronise the industry's facilities. All these matters attest to the critical importance of proper risk management. This includes the identification of risks to safety associated with electrical equipment, for example, which is used extensively in the industry, and the control of those risks. The very serious dangers associated with working with, and being in the vicinity of live electrical circuitry requires a comprehensive assessment of risks so that a safe environment is assured for both hospitality workers and members of the public who use the facilities. The failure to adhere to these requirements may result in prosecution, conviction and the imposition of heavy penalties under the occupational health and safety legislation.
16 The application of specific deterrence is also important to all defendants in these proceedings. The corporate defendant continues to operate in the industry. Messrs Herbert and Chang remain as two of its directors. According to Neil Gordon, the corporate defendant's general manager, Mr Wadley resigned as a director on 10 January 2007. In the absence of information as to Mr Wadley's current occupation, and given the defendants' decision not to make any submissions on the application of the principle, there is no reason to suggest that the principle should not be invoked against Mr Wadley.
17 In mitigation of the objective seriousness of the offences, the defendants have put in place a number of safety measures designed to ensure public and worker safety at the premises, following the offences. The measures have been set out in Mr Gordon's affidavit filed in the proceedings on 1 November, 2007. First, the corporate defendant's maintenance team has been restructured with specialist work, which includes electrical work, now being performed by qualified contractors. Two systems are utilised by the team for reporting and carrying out maintenance tasks. For major tasks a register is kept at reception which is checked twice daily. For minor tasks, a whiteboard located in the maintenance shed is updated at the completion of each housekeeping shift and checked by maintenance staff during their shift. Secondly, an OH&S committee was formed in 2006. It meets monthly and comprises six persons. Minutes of the meetings are forwarded to Mr Gordon and reviewed at the monthly management meetings. John Bates, the corporate defendant's operations manager, has primary responsibility for the day-to-day implementation of OH&S policies and procedures. Mr Bates has a diploma in occupational health and safety.
18 Thirdly, the corporate defendant has implemented significant changes to its safety management. These changes include the implementation of the AHA Hazard Free Hotel OH&S model (AHA) in 2003 and the provision of a comprehensive manual to each work group employee. In 2003 LecSafe Australia Pty Limited was retained to carry out a full electrical safety inspection and testing of all electrical appliances and equipment at the premises. Fifteen employees undertook a Hospitality Operations Certificate III Program which included OH&S modules and competencies. A new pool fence was also installed to meet revised pool wall height requirements. In 2004 P.R.I.D.E Coaching Network was engaged to develop and implement standard operating procedures and workplace improvements for tasks undertaken at the hotel premises. In late 2005, after a determination that the AHA model was too general and cumbersome for application at the premises, a decision was made that Mr Bates conduct a review of the existing OH&S system and integrate it with the corporate defendant's procedure manual developed with P.R.I.D.E Coaching. In November 2005, Mark Mellor, a licensed contract electrician, conducted electrical testing at the premises. His test results, which are annexed to Mr Gordon's affidavit, included testing of the pool equipment and work shop. In February 2006, OH&S Asset Management conducted an annual electrical testing and tagging of all electrical appliances. All items identified as requiring repairs were taken out of service and repairs completed.
19 The corporate defendant, currently, has a number of OH&S procedures in place at the premises. These include:
(i) OH&S Policy Statement