1 The defendant has pleaded guilty to a breach of s 50(1) of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1983 ("the Act"). An agreed statement of facts was tendered in the following terms:
"1. At all material times the Prosecutor was an Inspector duly appointed and empowered by Section 48 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1983 to institute proceedings in the within matter.
2 At all material times KEVIN PATRICK POWER (the Defendant) of 3-11 Aintree Close, Charlestown in the State of New South Wales was a director of Yonti Formwork Pty Limited (ACN 081 038 511) (formerly known as Tableforms Aust Pty Ltd) ( Yonti Formwork ).
3. At all material times, Willtara Constructions Pty Ltd ( Willtara ):
3.1 was the principal contractor and project manager at a construction site at 51-53 Bourke Road, Alexandria in the State of New South Wales ( the site )
3.2 contracted Yonti Formwork to supply, erect and dismantle formwork at the site
3.3 contracted Ularay Pty Ltd (Ularay) to carry out concrete pouring at the site.
3.4 Employed Stephen Coffey as a Site Manager.
4 At all material times Yonti Formwork:
4.1 was a formwork contractor;
4.2 was contracted by Willtara to supply, erect and dismantle formwork at the site.
4.3 contracted with Burgess and Arnott Pty Ltd to provide structural engineering certification of formwork supplied and erected at the site.
4.4 employed Douglas Crane as Site Manager at the site.
5 At all material times Burgess & Arnott:
5.1 conducted an engineering consultancy.
5.2 sub-contracted to Grava Consulting the task of formwork inspection and structural engineering certification at the site.
5.3 employed Robert Grava (Grava) to carry out the duties of inspecting engineer, including the inspection and certification of formwork on construction sites.
6 On 28 October 1999 formwork collapsed whilst concrete was being poured. This area was identified as pour one, level one ( pour one, level one ). As a result of the accident the following workers suffered injuries:
6.1 Mr Graham Earnshaw, a 40 year old self employed contractor who sustained a cut to the right arm, left knee and bruising to the chest.
6.2 Mr Kalolo Kupu Matavesi, (Matavesi), a 47 year old employee of Ularay who sustained a cut to his right knee and ringing in his ear.
7 The formwork used on the site was described as the Multiform formwork system. The system incorporated a table form that comprised of four vertical frames approximately 5.5 metres high arranged to form rectangle tables of variable size. These were arranged along a grid of six rows running east - west at approximately 6 metre intervals.
8 On the western boundary of pour one, level one, the formwork was erected on top of an earth cutting approximately 1,200 mm deep and the outer most legs were placed approximately 600 mm from the edge of this earth cutting on unstable sand. This section of formwork supported a large perimeter beam which when placed with concrete required substantial founding at the base of the frames.
9 On the northern boundary footing had been cut into the excavated face to enable the formwork frames outer most legs to be founded at the reduced ground level on the base soil providing a more appropriate founding for the formwork erected along this boundary.
10 On 19 October 1999, 9 days before the accident, Grava, as inspecting engineer undertook an inspection of formwork assembly at pour one level one. At the time of the inspection the formwork assembly on the western boundary was incomplete.
11 On 19 October 1999, Grava issued a structural engineering's certificate stating that the formwork assembly conformed with AS1170 and AS3610 subject to correction of the listed defects in the engineer's report. This action breached Regulation 86 of the Construction Safety Regulations 1950 as the report was issued nine days before the concrete pour and failed to consider the whole formwork assembly which was yet to be completed.
12 There was no re-inspection undertaken by Grava, nor was any inspection requested by Willtara, Yonti Formwork or Grava Consulting.
13 There were prolonged periods of heavy rainfall experienced in the area of the site during the period between the formwork inspection on 19 October 1999 and the pouring of concrete on 28 October 1999 which effected the foundations of the formwork.
14 On 27 October 1999 Yonti, through its Site Manager Mr Crane, sent a memorandum to Stephen Coffey of Willtara advising of the potential collapse of the formwork due to the effects of the stormwater. Mr Crane also proposed to Mr Coffey that several columns be poured prior to undertaking the concrete pour. Willtara declined this sequence of work.
15 At approximately 6.00am concreting workers from Ularay ( the concreters ) arrived at the site to prepare pour one, level one. The prepared formwork for pour one, level one was approximately 5.5 metres above ground level and located on the north western sector of the site ( the formwork ). The foreman of Ularay, Matt Tomasic (Tomasic), held discussions with Stephen Coffey and Douglas Crane, and both persons advised him that the formwork was ready for the pouring of concrete. Tomasic then directed the pump operators to set up the pump lines while he commenced checking the desired levels for the finished concrete floor.
16 At approximately 8.10am the pouring of concrete commenced (the concrete pour). On completion of pouring approximately 20 cubic metres of concrete, Tomasic checked the pour levels against the desired levels which were found to be correct. The concreters then poured another 20 cubic metres and again Tomasic checked the levels. He then stopped the concrete pumps immediately after noticing that the formwork deck had dropped approximately 20 millimetres. Matavesi noted that further concrete was added to that which had been expected to be needed and this was poured as an attempt to correct the observed slump in levels.
17 Stephen Coffey confirmed that the formwork deck level had dropped 20 millimetres and entered into a discussion with Tomasic as to what measures were to be taken concerning the movement of the formwork deck. At approximately 8.20am a section of the formwork assembly along the western boundary beam started to collapse causing approximately 20 persons who were working in the immediate area to run away from the collapsing section of formwork ( the accident ).
18 On 28 October 1999 Senior Inspector Jim Moore and the Prosecutor attended the premises and observed as follows:
18.1 At the main entrance to the site from Bourke Road, Alexandria, the right side entrance gate there were two signs. The sign on the left read "Willtara Constructions, Builders Licence 56503C, A.C.N. - 050 335 987, 5 Talvera Road North Ryde 2113". Etc. A smaller sign to the right of the first sign read "No Entry" and displayed a no entry symbol".
18.2 On the site fence adjacent to the left main entrance gate to the site from Bourke Road, was a large sign, which read "Architects: Krikis Tayler Architects 9922 3680".
18.3 On entering the site, at the left of the main gate were amenities sheds and portable offices. Adjacent to the amenities were several stacks of table form modular soffit sections.
19 On 1 November 1999 Gary Truswell, Consultant Engineer of Gary Truswell & Associates Pty Limited Consulting Engineers produced a written report to Willtara which found as follows:
19.1 The weight of the wet concrete when poured triggered the collapse of the formwork.
19.2 That the extended legs of the formwork along the western boundary cutting were unstable due to the positioning of the formwork and the sand base of the formwork. It could be seen that the formwork installers had recognised this danger along the northern boundary as the footings had been cut into the excavated face to enable the formwork outer most legs to be founded at the reduced ground level on a soil foundation which was stable.
20 On 1 November 1999 Mark Bartel, Consultant Engineer of Network Geotechnics Pty Ltd produced a written geotechnical report for Willtara which found as follows:
20.1 The footings of the formwork along the western boundary were located on top of and about 0.5 metres from the edge of the existing 1.3 to 1.5 high cut batter.
20.2 The footings to the formwork should not have been founded adjacent to excavations unless adequate structural support had been provided for the excavation.
20.3 The footings should have been founded with medium dense to dense sands at about 0.3 metres below the existing bulk excavation level and proportioned for an allowable bearing pressure of 100Kpa.
20.4 The allowable bearing pressure of the footings of the formwork that collapsed at the site was approximately 70Kpa which was well below the required bearing pressure.
21 In June 2000 Dan Leavy, Senior Engineer of WorkCover Authority of New South Wales produced a written report after inspecting the site on 28 October 1999 which found as follows:
21.1 The formwork assembly collapsed because the legs of the formwork on the western boundary were placed in an unsuitable position on unstable foundations. The collapse was triggered once the formwork was loaded with the additional weight of the concrete, machinery and workers.
21.2 The design of the formwork assembly was unsuitable for the concrete pour. Testing reports from Low & Hooke (Australia) Pty Ltd, contracted to test the equipment in 1986, show that the formwork system had not been tested in the configuration used at the time of the accident. A singe test proposed on the formwork system in its taller configuration was aborted due to it failing in a strong gust of wind.
21.3 The structural engineering certification process of formwork at the site failed to comply with Construction Safety Regulations 1950, in particular regulation 86(16) which states that:
"A person must not pour concrete into the formwork for a suspended slab or beam unless a qualified engineer:
(a) has inspected the formwork to ensure it complies with Clause 5.3.4 of AS 3610 which relates to the adequacy of components of a formwork assembly; and
(b) has certified in writing that the requirements of that clause have been satisfied."
21.4 Grava, the inspecting formwork engineer, failed to comply with clause 5.3.4 of AS 3610 - 1995 - Formwork for Concrete as required by the Construction Safety Regulation 1950. The certificate was issued by Grava and Grava Consulting on behalf of Burgess & Arnott on 19 October 1999, nine days before the formwork assembly was completed. The formwork that failed along the western boundary on the date of the accident had not been erected at the time this certificate was issued. As a result, Grava was unable to properly appraise the complete formwork assembly.
21.5 Grava Consulting and Grava failed to revisit the site once the formwork assembly had been completed to assess that the whole assembly, including checking whether the foundations were safe after heavy rain and whether listed defects in the report, had been rectified.
21.6 Grava Consulting and Grava should not have issued the certificate with the legs of the frames founded so close to the edge of the cutting along the western boundary which breached AS 3610 which states:
"The formwork shall be founded on material that has adequate strength, stability and stiffness to comply with the formwork documentation."
The formwork documentation in clause 4.7 of AS 3610 specified identifying such items as the foundation material, its safe bearing value and limitations on settlement and recommends referral to geotechnical reports for this purpose.
21.7 The inability of the soil adjacent to the cut face to support the formwork assembly was identified at the inspection of the site by Grava on 19 October 2001 but inadequate steps were taken by Willtara and Yonti Framework to correct the defects listed on the certificate pour to directing the concrete pour.
21.8 Surface water produced by heavy rain at the site prior to the collapse weakened the top soil on which the formwork was founded by increasing its water content and reducing its sheer strength and bearing capacity.
21.9 The inadequate supervision of the work on site by Willtara and Yonti Formwork contributed to the accident because Grava should not have been instructed to attend the site and certify the formwork while it was still incomplete.
21.10 Directions by Willtara and Yonti Formwork to go ahead with the concrete pour should not have proceeded until the entire formwork system had been assessed and certified as being in accordance with the relevant sections of AS 3610.
21.11 Willtara and Yonti Formwork failed to use the practice of cutting pockets in the soil to allow the frames of the formwork legs to be founded on firm level soil along the western boundary, as was used in the case of the northern boundary.
21.12 An appropriately qualified person of Willtara and Yonti Formwork should have been monitoring the effects of the concrete pour.
22 As a result of the Prosecutor's investigations and inspections, the following was found:
22.1 Tests were carried out on the multiform formwork system by Low & Hooke (Australia) Pty Ltd in 1996 but they were inadequate because tests were carried out at the shorter frame configuration. The test results were not applicable to the taller configuration used for the construction project at the site.
23 Since the accident Willtara and Yonti Formwork have provided documented safe work method statements to the WorkCover Authority.
24 It is alleged that the Defendant, KEVIN PATRICK POWER of 3-11 Aintree Close, Charlestown in the State of New South Wales, being a director of Yonti Formwork Pty Limited ( Yonti Formwork ) (ACN 081 038 511) (formerly known as Tableforms Australia Pty Ltd), contravened Section 50(1) of the Occupational Health & Safety Act 1983 on 28 October 1999, in that Yonti Formwork, an employer, breached Section 16(1) of the Occupational Health & Safety Act 1983 on 28 October 1999 at a site located at 51-53 Bourke Road, Alexandria in the State of New South Wales, in that it failed to ensure that person not in its employment were not exposed to risks to their health and safety arising from the conduct of its undertaking while they were at its place of work, in particular Graham Earnshaw and Kalolo Matavesi. In particular, Yonti Formwork failed:
24.1 To conduct an adequate risk assessment of the hazards involved in carrying out a concrete pour at the site on 28 October 1999 ( the concrete pour ).
24.2 To adequately assess the load bearing capacity and structural soundness of the formwork prior to carrying out the concrete pour.
24.3 To ensure a safe system of work for persons not in its employment carrying out the concrete pour.
24.4 To ensure that the formwork used at the site in which the concrete pour took place (the formwork) complied with AS 3610 - 1995 Formwork for Concrete.
24.5 To ensure that the formwork was inspected and certified by an engineer in accordance with Regulation 86 of the Constructions Safety Regulations 1950 prior to the concrete pour.
24.6 To take adequate steps to correct the defects in the formwork after obtaining the engineer's report and becoming aware that the structure, design and foundations of the formwork were unsafe prior to the concrete pour.
24.7 To implement a safe system of work for the concrete pour.
24.8 To implement appropriate measure to ensure the formwork foundations were made safe after obtaining the engineer's report and before the concrete pour, after becoming aware of water saturation from heavy rains adversely affecting the stability of the formwork foundations.
24.9 To carry out adequate investigations and inspections prior to the concrete pour despite known concerns about safety of the formwork.
24.10 To carry out supervision or adequate supervision prior to and at the time of the concrete pour.
24.11 To ensure the formwork complied with the WorkCover Code of Practice with respect to the erection of formwork in a safe manner."