[10] The starting point for consideration as to penalty is the objective seriousness of the offence. That is a well established sentencing principle and was conclusively affirmed in the Full Bench decision in Lawrenson Diecasting Pty Ltd v WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector Ch'ng) (1999) 90 IR 464 at 474 as follows:
[I]t is important to reiterate that the primary factor to be considered when a judicial officer is determining the appropriate sentence to impose is the objective seriousness of the offence charged. In case of prosecutions under the OH&S Act, this proposition has often been expressed by saying that the 'true measure of penalty lies in the nature and quality of the offence' ...
[11] The principle of foreseeability as a factor in determining the objective seriousness of an offence as part of the sentencing process was considered in the Full Bench decision in Capral Aluminium Ltd v WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (2000) 49 NSWLR 610 at 646; 99 IR 29 at 62 as follows:
The question of foreseeability is relevant to the assessment of the seriousness of the offence. We consider that the appropriate approach is that of Walton J, Vice President, in Department of Mineral Resources of NSW (McKensey) v Kembla Coal and Coke Pty Ltd (1999) 92 IR 8 at 27:
Whilst the reasonable foreseeability of an accident may not be relevant to the question of liability under the Act (see Drake Personnel Ltd t/a Drake Industrial v WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector Ch'ng) (1999) 90 IR 432), the degree of foreseeability is a significant factor to be taken into account when assessing the level of culpability of the defendant. The existence of a reasonably foreseeable risk to safety which is likely to result in serious injury or death is a factor which will be relevant to the assessment of the gravity of the offence.
[12] On the issue of foreseeability, the Full Bench in Capral also stated at 646; 62 - 63:
The existence of a reasonably foreseeable risk of injury will necessarily result in the offence being more serious in nature. However, the absence of foreseeability does not necessarily render the offence as being nominal or not serious. In this regard the relevant approach is that set out in the judgment of Wright J, President, in Ferguson v Nelmac Pty Ltd (at 209 - 210) in these terms:
... reliance on 'hindsight' must be seen in an appropriate perspective in terms of culpability. It is a relevant consideration but the very terms of s 15 impose an obligation on an employer which is not confined to the taking of precautions only when there are warnings or signals of danger or when experience indicates that a risk to safety has arisen and requires remedy. So much is clear from the structure and language of the section which is premised on the requirement to 'ensure ... health, safety and welfare at work' and the decided cases which make plain the nature of the obligation.
[13] It is also necessary to consider the damage and injury suffered in the context of the evidence and "in light of the principles which have been laid down in relation to the relationship between the seriousness of injuries which have been suffered, or which may have been suffered, and the gravity of the offence" ( Capral at 650; 66). On that point the Full Bench in Capral stated:
We consider that the relevant principle can be stated in this way. The gravity of the consequences of an accident, such as the damage or injury, does not, of itself, dictate the seriousness of the offence or the amount of penalty. However, a breach where there was every prospect of serious consequences might be assessed on a different basis to a breach unlikely to have such consequences. The occurrence of death or serious injury may manifest the degree of seriousness of the relevant detriment to safety: Tyler v Sydney Electricity (1993) 47 IR 1 at 5, Inspector Hannah v Wonar Pty Ltd (1992) 34 AILR 377 at 378, Watson v Southern Asphalters Pty Ltd (1996) 83 IR 446 at 456, Wong v Melinda Group Pty Ltd (1998) 82 IR 118 at 131, WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector Hannah) v Albury City Council (1999) 90 IR 397 at 408 - 409, Lawrenson Diecasting Pty Ltd (at 476), WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector Ankucic) v McDonald's Australia Ltd (at 428) and Page v Walco Hoist Rentals Pty Ltd (No 2) (at [22]).
[14] The principles of general and specific deterrence are also relevant in sentencing. The approach to be taken on that issue was also dealt with in some detail in Capral at 643 - 645; 59 - 62. Without detailing all that the Full Bench had to say we consider the approach to deterrence in the sentencing process is encapsulated in the following passage from the Full Bench in Capral at 644; 60 as follows:
[B]oth aspects of deterrence are matters which should normally be given weight of some substance in the sentencing process; and although there may be exceptional cases (see, for example, Page v Walco Hoist Rentals Pty Ltd (No 2) [2000] NSWIRComm 39 at [40]-[43] we would expect such cases to be very rare, and where the relevant circumstances were held by the sentencing judge to be established, the judge must indicate with some precision the circumstances which had led to the exceptional course being adopted.
[15] In the context of the above well established sentencing principles it will also be necessary to have regard to those general matters going to aggravation, mitigation and other factors identified in s 21A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act relevant to the respondents before the Full Bench. As was said in R v Way at [56]:
[I]t is not to be overlooked that there is a well established body of principles that have been developed by the courts over a long period of time. By providing guidance in the form of a list of aggravating and mitigating factors in s 21A, the Parliament did not intend to overrule or disturb those principles or restrict their application. In so far as those principles refer to factors, whether objective or subjective, that affect the "relative seriousness" of the offence, they are expressly preserved by s 21A(1)(c).
Consideration
44 On 24 April 2004 there was a collective failure on the part of each defendant to implement a safe system of inspection, maintenance and servicing of the plant and equipment at the site, including the elevator EL02, to ensure that the plant and equipment was safe and without risks to health when properly used. Each defendant was also aware of the significant risk of an explosion of sugar dust occurring in the elevators.
45 On 8 December 2003, Mr B Huckle of H & B Plant Engineering referred to work having been carried out on one of the bucket elevators on 5 December 2003 which was due to the failure of the conveyor belt to track correctly. Mr Huckle observed that the belt was tracking hard to one side and over the edge of the roller at the top. After a number of adjustments, the belt still continued to track off. On 8 December 2003, Mr Huckle advised that he had referred the belt to Endless Belts for an opinion in regard to the belt conditions and to ascertain whether replacement was the only option. The belt was not replaced.
46 It was an agreed fact that the second defendant, failed to carry out adequate preventative maintenance on the elevator EL02, despite problems with the alignment of the belt in the bucket elevator prior to the incident. Mr Goot acknowledged that the drift sensor which was designed to indicate that the belt was drifting and that maintenance may be required, was not working or not working as it should have been.
47 The International Safety & Risk Management Group ("ISMA"), in their report, stated that the cause of the explosion was as follows:
Inside the head it appeared that belt and buckets have been running against the casing. There are in fact on this side two parallel tracings: one of the belt touching the casing and one of the buckets scratching it on a different but very close location. The belt also showed a carbonized edge at the point where it stopped after the incident, a proof that at that spot the hot casing could cause carbonisation of the belt.
There are clear traces of metal being scratched away at the point where the buckets had been touching the casing. The head also showed marks on the outside at the same locations, indication heat inside, caused by the belt rubbing the carbon steel casing and the stainless steel buckets edge scratching the casing.
All buckets clearly showed the marks where they have been scratching the casing: carbonised sugar and even material of the casing was still attached on some of the buckets: this material was magnetic (proof that is carbon steel) and looked blue black (possible proof that is has been very hot: at least 500C). The fact that the scratching points of most buckets after the incident still were black by carbonized sugar or metal parts, indicates the fact that just before the incident those points still were very hot: if they would be of an earlier event they would have been covered and thus obscured by sugar dust.
The direction of the flame in the downgoing leg also is directed down. In the upgoing buckets the direction is more difficult to distinguish.
48 A second expert's report by Safety Engineering Pty Ltd came to the same conclusion in respect of the cause of the explosion.
49 The risk, therefore, was the potential ignition of combustible sugar dust caused by friction of the conveyor belt not tracking correctly. The potential for conveyor belts to not track correctly was known to the defendants from December 2003.
50 Clause 62(1) of the Occupational Health & Safety Regulation 2001 provides:
62 Fire and explosion - particular risk control measures
(1) An employer must ensure that risks associated with fire or explosion at a place of work are controlled by:
(a) eliminating activities that have the potential to generate flammable or explosive atmospheres from the work process or, if elimination is not possible, minimising the potential for flammable or explosive atmospheres by providing adequate ventilation, and
(b) eliminating potential ignition sources, including naked flame, hot work and electrical equipment, and sources of static electricity, including friction, welding and slipping belts, from proximity to flammable substances, combustible dusts or waste materials, and
(c) enclosing work areas containing flammable or explosive atmospheres, and
(d) removing waste materials and accumulated dust on a regular basis, and
(e) providing for adequate storage, transportation and disposal of flammable substances, and
(f) any other measures necessary to control the risks.
51 Where the defendants were aware that a conveyor belt was not tracking correctly, thus giving rise to the potential of friction in an area where sugar dust was known to exist, or could be expected to exist, leads me to the view that the risk was reasonably foreseeable. This is, of course, a factor to be taken into account when assessing the level of culpability of the defendants.
52 A further particular of the charge in respect of the first defendant was that it failed to provide adequate training in the inspection and maintenance of plant necessary to ensure the safety of its employees at the site.
53 As to the failure to provide adequate training, it was acknowledged by Mr Matijasko, the maintenance supervisor, that he had not received any training about the servicing and maintenance of the elevator EL02, although he was required to inspect the buckets and the belt of the elevators almost every day to ensure the belt stayed in the same position and did not drift. He admitted that the belt in the elevator EL02 had drifted some 30 millimetres to one side and that, despite the drift, the elevator was still in operation because, in his opinion, it was stable.
54 The lack of training is one of the defendants' principal failures and if Mr Matijasko received proper training, he may have formed the opinion that the belt in elevator EL02, having drifted some 30 millimetres, was therefore unstable.
55 In my view, this is a serious matter. The risks associated with an explosion at a place of work are well known. It was an agreed fact that Mr Caruccio heard a loud bang and observed fire coming through the fire door and travel past him. Clearly, there was a risk of serious injury from this incident and it was fortunate that both Mr Caruccio and Mr Ryan, who was standing near the fire safety doors when the explosion occurred, were not injured.
56 I accept that a reason that the employees were not injured was because of the safety systems in place which required the separation of the workhouse containing elevators EL01 and EL02, from the workers feeding sugar into the elevators. Fire doors which were required to be kept shut were placed between the workhouse and where the workers loaded sugar into the elevators. The safety systems included the proper operation of explosion safety vents; maintaining the air surrounding EL02 and keeping the air free of sugar dust thereby ensuring there were no secondary explosions.
57 I am prepared to accept that there was a co-ordinated and coherent approach to safety by the defendants. The breakdown in the paper system, as acknowledged by Mr Goot was caused firstly by the lack of specific training in relation to belt drift and maintenance and secondly by the failure to detect that the sensors were not operating, or not operating appropriately.
58 Senior counsel submitted that as soon as the explosion occurred, the whole system closed down activating other fail safe mechanisms which then operated.
59 In my view, the measures that were available to overcome the risks were simple and straightforward. Clause 62(1)(b) of the Occupational Health and Safety Regulation 2001 emphasises the need to control risks associated with a fire or explosion at a place of work by eliminating potential ignition sources, including slipping belts, from proximity to combustible dusts. There were simple steps available to the defendants to ensure that the belt in EL02 tracked correctly by ensuring that the head drum had a proper crown to prevent belt drift and thus avoiding the consequent source of ignition caused inside EL02 by that belt drift.
60 There was no death or serious injury arising from the defendants' failure, but it is clear that the consequences could have been much more serious than was the case.
61 There was no issue that the penalty should reflect an amount for general deterrence. It is not necessary to do more than repeat the remarks of Hungerford J in Fisher v Samaras Industries Pty Limited (1996) 82 IR 384 at 388 (endorsed by the Full Bench in Capral Aluminium Limited v WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (2000) 49 NSWLR 610 at [71] - [80]):
… the fundamental duty of the Court in this important area of public concern ... [is] to ensure a level of penalty for a breach as will compel attention to occupational health and safety issues so that persons are not exposed to risks to their health and safety at the workplace.
62 In respect of specific deterrence, Mr Goot submitted that the Court should heavily discount or disregard the element of specific deterrence. I do not propose to disregard an element in the penalty in respect of specific deterrence. The second defendant continues to conduct the manufacture, storage and distribution of refined sugar and associated products at the site. The first defendant continues to provide its employees to the second defendant to enable the second defendant to conduct the manufacture, storage and distribution of refined sugar. Any industry in which there is the potential for an explosion presents risks to workplace safety. I propose to include an element in the penalty for specific deterrence in respect of both the defendants, although it will only be small given that I consider the incident surprised both defendants and that they are unlikely to re-offend in light of the remedial action taken.
63 There are a number of relevant subjective considerations. The evidence of Mr Athanitis leads me to the conclusion that there was a culture of occupational safety, maintenance and training systems in place before the incident. However, as I have referred to earlier, it was deficient in respect of specific training in relation to belt drift and the failure to detect that the sensors were not operating, or not operating properly. Although the extensive and elaborate paper systems in existence were found to be wanting with respect to their implementation in certain areas, I accept the systems included detailed work and review procedures; elaborate site induction; occupational health and safety training courses and focus workshops; emergency evacuation procedures; regular site safety meetings; comprehensive record maintaining systems and strict maintenance and cleaning measures; regular reports including atmospheric monitoring, hazard analysis and international risk management.
64 Overall, this is an impressive and largely effective system of safety. If an error or flaw occurred in the system, there was other failsafe mechanisms that came into operation. These systems of safety mitigate what otherwise would have been a very serious offence. The existence and implementation of these systems shows that the defendants had a high regard for safety at the site. In this regard, the Full Bench in Morrison v Powercoal Pty Ltd (No 3) (2005) 147 IR 117 observed at [83]:
[83] We accept on the evidence presented in these proceedings, however, the corporate respondent was generally a responsible employer with a high regard for the safety of its employees. Its occupational health and safety systems and procedures were designed to cope with what is an exceptionally dangerous industry. The existence of a system of work that evidences a defendant's concern with, and regard for, safety may mitigate the seriousness of an offence: see, for example, Department of Mineral Resources (NSW) v Kembla Coal & Coke Pty Ltd (1999) 92 IR 8 at 25; WorkCover Authority (NSW) v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd (1998) 83 IR 427 at 429; and WorkCover Authority (NSW) v Fernz Construction Materials Ltd (No 2) (2000) 100 IR 23 at 34.
65 It is clear that the defendants moved swiftly to commission a report from experts into the cause of the incident. This was provided by ISMA and its recommendations implemented. In addition, the defendants commissioned an audit of the safety regime at the site by Risk Management and Safety Systems Pty Ltd. The defendants also commissioned external monitoring and risk assessment reports in relation to atmospheric monitoring; hazard analysis; dust explosion risk; dust suppression and packing and in respect of the bulk loading areas. All recommendations were immediately implemented. The SHE and the SHEMS systems referred to in the evidence of Mr Athanitis were upgraded, together with the second defendant's safety and environmental policy. A new health and safety committee's constitution, dated 15 February 2005, was introduced. Induction training and updating emergency procedures also occurred.
66 In addition, the second defendant has expended $2.8 million on remedial works on the elevator EL02, and associated equipment, which has been critically reviewed and substantially rebuilt. A new approach to preventative maintenance and dust management has been adopted since the incident. Hazardous area plans and explosion protected electrical equipment registers have been completed for all of the second defendant's sites. The defendants also conducted a conference in November 2005 to critically examine the incident and the lessons learned in order to educate others how to eliminate risks of these types of events in the future.
67 Neither defendant has any prior convictions and co-operated fully with WorkCover. I regard both defendants as being entitled to a finding of good industrial citizenship.
68 The prosecution acknowledged that each defendant entered a plea of guilty at an early stage and was entitled to a specific discount to reflect the utilitarian value of the plea.
69 Although each defendant pleaded guilty to an amended application for order, the pleas were entered at the first opportunity before the Court after the charges were framed in their present form.
70 In its guideline judgment in R v Thomson; R v Houlton (2000) 49 NSWLR 383 the Court of Criminal Appeal held at [160]:
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