Judgment
1This prosecution is brought by Inspector Ian Batty of the WorkCover Authority of New South Wales against Autopool Pty Ltd t/as Gilbert & Roach under s 8(1) of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000 ("the Act") by way of an amended Application for Order.
2It is alleged the defendant, being an employer, on 14 November 2008, at the RTA Inspection Facility at Twelve Mile Creek, near Hexham, in the State of New South Wales ("the premises"), contravened s 8(1) of the Act in that it failed to:
ensure the health, safety and welfare at work of all its employees and in particular, Michael Webb, contrary to section 8(1) of the Act. .
Particulars of the Charge
The risk
1.Webb was exposed to a risk of being struck by a heavy combination vehicle, namely a "B-double" consisting of a Kenworth prime mover bearing registration no VV 29 GZ; an A trailer bearing registration no 215 QHY; and a B trailer bearing registration no VT 85 IP, whilst repairs were being performed on that vehicle at the RTA Inspection Facility.
Particulars of the defendant's acts and omissions
Particulars of the defendant's failings in relation to the provision of equipment for use in Breakdown Servicing
2.The defendant failed to provide Webb with purpose manufactured wheel chocks designed for use with heavy vehicles of the size and weight of the vehicle under repair or servicing.
3.The defendant failed to ensure that plant provided for use by its employees at work, namely blocks of wood provided by the defendant for use by its employees as "wheel chocks" were safe and without risk to health when properly used.
4.The defendant should not have used of blocks of wood as wheel chocks for heavy vehicles.
Measures which the defendant should have taken but failed to take in relation to the provision of equipment for use in Breakdown Servicing
5.The defendant should have used purpose manufactured wheel chocks, designed for use with heavy vehicles of the size and weight under repair.
6.The defendant should have provided sufficient purpose manufactured wheel chocks, designed for use with heavy vehicles of the size and weight under repair, as were necessary to ensure that they were available for use at its Hexham workshop as and when required, including for use in the provision of breakdown services.
7.The defendant should have provided Webb with purpose manufactured wheel chocks designed for use with heavy vehicles of the size and weight of the vehicle under repair.
Particulars of the defendant's failings in relation to system of work with respect to the conduct of Breakdown Servicing
8.The defendant failed to provide a system of work with respect to the conduct of breakdown servicing, including the conduct of breakdown repairs on heavy combination vehicles that was safe without risks to health of its employees, in particular, Michael Webb.
Measures the defendant should have taken but failed to take in relation to its system of work with respect to the conduct of Breakdown Servicing
9.The defendant should have undertaken a formal, written hazard identification and risk assessment prior to the commencement of breakdown repair or servicing work, which included identification of the terrain on which the subject vehicle was to be serviced, for the purpose of ascertaining, amongst other hazards and risks, whether there was a risk of the subject vehicle rolling away and whether, having regard to the size, weight and location of the vehicle under repair and the work to be performed on the vehicle under repair, the controls available were sufficient to control the risk of the vehicle rolling away during the performance of repair or servicing work.
10.The defendant should have put in place purpose manufactured wheel chocks, designed for use with heavy vehicles of the size and weight of the vehicle under repair to chock the wheels of the vehicle under repair, prior to commencing repair or servicing work.
11.The defendant should have undertaken any aspect of repair work or servicing of heavy vehicles, which required the brakes of the vehicle under repair to be released, with the wheels of the vehicle under repair chocked with purpose manufactured wheel chocks designed for use with a heavy vehicle of the size and weight of the vehicle under repair in place, so as to reduce or eliminate the risk of the vehicle rolling away.
12.The defendant should have isolated the vehicle under repair or servicing work from persons not involved in the performance of that work.
13.In the alternative, the defendant should have controlled third party personnel requested to assist in the course of repair or servicing work during the course of their involvement in the work, including:
(a)the provision of clear instructions identifying the role that the third party was to undertake in the repair or servicing work; and
(b)the provision of clear safety instructions regarding the role that the third party was to undertake in the repair or servicing work;
14.The defendant should have provided mechanics rostered to perform breakdown repair and breakdown servicing work with a written inventory or checklist of equipment, which was to be carried on the breakdown service vehicle then in use; such inventory to include reference to the availability for use in the course of breakdown repair and servicing work of purpose manufactured wheel chocks designed for use in chocking the wheels of a vehicle of the sizes and weight of the vehicle to be repaired or serviced.
15.The defendant should have provided mechanics rostered to perform breakdown repair and breakdown servicing work with a written, formal risk assessment document and required its completion by each mechanic prior the commencement of any breakdown repair or servicing work, such as the "Gilbert and Roach Breakdown Risk Assessment Checklist" [Copyright 2009].
Particulars of the defendant's failings in relation to the provision of instructions with respect to the conduct of Breakdown Servicing
16.The defendant failed to provide such instructions with respect to the conduct of breakdown mechanical repairs and servicing of heavy vehicles as were necessary to ensure the health, safety and welfare at work of its employees, and in particular, Michael Webb.
Measures the defendant should have taken but failed to take in relation to the provision of instructions with respect to the conduct of Breakdown Servicing
17.The defendant should have instructed its employees that only purpose manufactured chocks, designed for use in chocking the wheels a vehicle of the size and weight of the vehicle undergoing repair or servicing work, were to be used.
18.The defendant should have instructed its employees that blocks of timber, not designed and manufactured for use as wheel chocks, should not be used to chock the wheels of vehicles undergoing repair or servicing work.
19.The defendant should have instructed its employees that any aspect of repair work or servicing of heavy vehicles, which required the brakes of the vehicle under repair to be released, was performed by its mechanics with the wheels of the vehicle under repair chocked with purpose manufactured wheel chocks designed for use with a heavy vehicle of the size and weight of the vehicle under repair in place, so as to reduce or eliminate the risk of the vehicle rolling away
20.[Intentionally blank]
21.[Intentionally blank]
22.[Intentionally blank]
Particulars of the defendant's failings with respect to the supervision of Breakdown Servicing
23.The defendant failed to provide such supervision with respect to the performance by its employees as was necessary to ensure the health, safety and welfare of its employees at work and, in particular, Michael Webb.
Measures the defendant should have taken but failed to take in relation to the provision of supervision with respect to the conduct of Breakdown Servicing
24.The defendant should have provided such supervision as was necessary to ensure that blocks of wood were not used as wheel chocks in the performance by its employees of repairs and/or servicing on heavy vehicles including:
(a)ensuring that blocks of wood were not made available for use as chocks, including the storing of blocks of wood for use as chocks in the defendant's tool store at the Hexham workshop;
(b)ensuring that blocks of wood were not used to chock the wheels of vehicles undergoing repair or servicing work in the defendant's workshop at Hexham;
(c)ensuring that sufficient purpose manufactured wheel chocks designed for use with heavy vehicles of the types routinely repaired in the workshop at Hexham and in the course of breakdown service and repair work were available in the workshop and the tool store to alleviate the need for blocks of wood to be used as wheel chocks;
(d)ensuring that the mechanic assigned to breakdown service and repair work had and obtained access to all the equipment necessary to conduct breakdown repairs and servicing, including purpose manufactured wheel chocks designed for use with a vehicle of the size and weight of the vehicle to be repaired or serviced.
25.As a consequence of the acts and omissions of the defendant, as particularised above, on 14 November 2008 Michael Webb was exposed to a risk of being struck by the subject heavy combination vehicle whilst repairs were being performed on that vehicle at the RTA Inspection Facility at Twelve Mile Creek near Hexham in the State of New South Wales.
3The defendant pleads guilty to the charges.
4Mr S Crawshaw SC with Ms A Mitchelmore of counsel appeared for the prosecution and Mr R Crow, of counsel, appeared for the defendant. The prosecutor relied upon an Agreed Statement of Facts with annexures, Factual Inspection Report of Inspector Batty; Transcript of proceedings in Morfea and Intercoast Refrigerated Transport dated 13 March 2012 (Mr Michael Webb's evidence) and Prior Conviction Certificate. The defendant relied upon the Affidavit of Michael Webb dated 27 October 2011; Affidavit of Robin Allan Blackburn Webb dated 27 October 2011; Affidavit of Marino Albert Gomez dated 27 October 2011; Report of Dr Peter Hart dated 19 September 2011; three colour photos and Safe Operations Procedure No 24 dated 1 February 2004 re Breakdown in Field predating the incident.
5There was an Agreed Statement of Facts which relevantly reads:
1.The defendant: Autopool Pty Ltd t/as "Gilbert & Roach"
2.The defendant was incorporated on 11 February 1963.
3.The defendant is, and was at all material times, a body corporate entitled to be prosecuted in and by its corporate name and style.
4.The defendant maintains and, at all material times, maintained its registered office at Suttons Motors Management, Level 1, 134 William Street, Woolloomooloo in the State of New South Wales.
5.The defendant, trading as Gilbert & Roach, carries on, and at all material times carried on business performing mechanical repairs on motor vehicles, including a heavy vehicle breakdown repair service, from a workshop located at 320 Pacific Highway at Hexham in the State of New South Wales.
6.At all material times the defendant was an employer.
7.At all material times the defendant employed Michael Webb (Webb) as a motor mechanic.
8.At all material times Webb worked as a mechanic based at the defendant's workshop at Hexham. Webb commenced work at the defendant workshop at Hexham as an apprentice motor mechanic in or about 2000 and remained in the defendant's employ, as a tradesman, after he completed his apprenticeship
Intercoast Refrigerated Transport Pty Ltd (ACN 100 873 774) (Intercoast)
9.Intercoast was incorporated on 12 June 2002.
10.Intercoast is, and was at all material times, a body corporate entitled to be prosecuted in and by its corporate name and style.
11.Intercoast maintains its registered office at Suite 20, Level 4, 1 Mona Vale Road, Mona Vale in the State of New South Wales.
12.Anthony Morfea is, and was at all material times, the sole director and the company secretary of Intercoast.
13.Intercoast carries on business, and at all material times carried on business, as a transport company, including the provision of long haul interstate freight transport services.
14.Intercoast is and, at all material times, was an employer.
15.At all material times Intercoast employed Gregory Keith Phillips (DOB 28.02.1978).
16.At all material times, Phillips was the holder of a Queensland Heavy Vehicle Driver Licence, Licence No. 39 785 000, effective 13 May 2008 which authorised Phillips to drive heavy combination vehicles, including a B-Double.
17.On or about 25 August 2008, Phillips commenced employment with Intercoast as a truck driver. Phillips' principle duties whilst working for Intercoast consisted of driving long haul heavy combination vehicles on various routes, including interstate routes.
The Incident
18.Phillips commenced the long haul journey immediately preceding the subject trip at approximately 3pm on Tuesday 11 November 2008. Phillips ceased long haul driving duties with respect to the long haul journey immediately preceding the subject trip at approximately 3.30 am on Wednesday, 12 November 2008.
19.On 12 November 2008 Phillips was rostered to drive a B-Double, identified by Intercoast as T60, carrying a load of dairy produce from Sydney to Brisbane, departing Sydney at 6pm EST. A B-Double is a heavy combination vehicle consisting of a prime mover and two trailers. The B-Double which Phillips was rostered by Intercoast to drive from Sydney to Brisbane on 12 November 2008 consisted of a Kenworth K104 Model Prime Mover bearing Victorian registration no. VV29GZ and two trailers.
20.At all material times the prime mover, registration no. VV29GZ, was fitted with a GPS transponder.
21.At the time of the subject incident, Phillips was driving a B-Double consisting of a prime mover bearing Victorian registration no VV29GZ, a Maxi-Tran A trailer bearing Queensland registration no. 215 QHY and a Maxi-Tran B trailer bearing Federal Interstate registration no. VT 85 IP.
22.In addition to the GPS transponder attached to Prime Mover, registration no. VV29GZ, the A trailer, registration no. 215QHY, was fitted with its own GPS transponder.
23.The GPS transponders fitted to the heavy combination vehicle enabled Intercoast to obtain, in real time, details of the location, status (including speed), heading and distance travelled by the subject heavy combination vehicle. This information was capable of being monitored by Intercoast on a computer in real time, or printed off, in what is described as an "Activity Report".
24.The Activity Report from the GPS transponder fitted to the prime mover bearing registration no. VV29GZ for the period between about 6pm Eastern Standard Time ("EST") and about 3.45am EST on 14 November, 2008 indicates the following:
(a)Phillips resumed long haul driving duties, departing from a depot at Arndell Park in the State of New South Wales, at approximately 7.09 pm EST on Wednesday 12 November 2008;
(b)Phillips had a break of approximately 1 hour and 1 minute, at Beresfield, from about 9.16 pm to about 10.17 pm EST on Wednesday 12 November 2008;
(c)Phillips had a break of approximately 5 hours, at Wang Wauk, from at about 11.53 pm EST on Wednesday 12 November 2008 to about 4.53 am EST on Thursday 13 November 2008;
(d)Phillips had a break of about 24 minutes, at Boambee Valley, from about 7.48 am to 8.12 am EST on Thursday 13 November 2008;
(e)Phillips had a break of approximately 2 hours and 29 minutes, at the depot at Tingalpa in Queensland, from about 1.15 pm to about 3.44 pm EST on Thursday 13 November 2008;
(f)Phillips had a break of approximately 1 hour and 37 minutes, at Stapylton in Queensland, from about 4.15 pm to about 5.52 pm EST on Thursday 13 November 2008;
(g)Phillips had a break of approximately 1 hour and 13 minutes, at Coffs Harbour, from about 10.06 pm to about 11.19 pm EST on Thursday 13 November 2008 whilst his vehicle was loaded with produce for delivery to Melbourne;
(h)Phillips had a break of about 10 minutes, at Possum Brush, at about 2.05 am to 2.15 am EST on 14 November 2008; and
(i)Phillips had a break of about 8 minutes, at Nerong, at about 3.10 am to 3.18 am EST on 14 November 2008.
25.At about 3:42 am EST on 14 November 2008 Phillips was driving the heavy combination vehicle in a southerly direction on the Pacific Highway towards the NSW RTA Inspection Facility near Twelve Mile Creek (the "RTA Inspection Facility"). At that time and place, sensors located on the highway north of the entrance to the RTA Inspection Facility, and connected to the NSW RTA Truck Scan computer system, identified a vehicle weight discrepancy and an Optical Character Reader [OCR] discrepancy with respect to the subject heavy combination vehicle.
26.As a consequence of the vehicle weight discrepancy and the OCR discrepancy, the Truck Scan computer system directed Phillips to drive the subject heavy combination vehicle into the RTA Inspection Facility.
27.At about 3.45 am Phillips drove the subject heavy combination vehicle into the RTA Inspection Facility.
28.After Phillips drove the subject heavy combination vehicle into the RTA Inspection Facility, RTA Inspectors Glenn Waddingham and Timothy John Smith, who were on duty at the RTA Inspection Facility that morning, saw the heavy combination stop outside the control room at the RTA Inspection Facility. Smith greeted the driver and informed him that Smith and Waddingham were going to perform an RTA regulation check. Smith asked the driver to produce his licence and his work diary [i.e. driver's logbook]. Phillips then handed his licence and his logbook to Smith, who in turn handed the licence and the logbook to Waddingham. Smith then proceeded to undertake an inspection of the heavy combination vehicle whilst Waddingham carried out a licence and logbook check.
29.In the course of his inspection of the heavy combination vehicle, Smith entered the registration number of the prime mover into the RTA computer system and then weighed the heavy combination. The weights of the heavy combination vehicle accorded with the Mass Loadings and Access Regulations. The measured mass of the heavy combination vehicle was 60.3 tonnes. The assessed gross mass of the heavy combination vehicle was 59.3 tonnes.
30.Smith then carried out a visual inspection of the heavy combination vehicle. During his inspection, Smith found that the three suspension airbags on the right hand side of the B trailer were deflated. Smith then prepared and issued a red label defect notice, no. HVN0081026, with respect to the defective air suspension on the B trailer, effectively grounding the heavy combination until the subject defect was repaired.
31.Whilst Smith was inspecting the heavy combination vehicle, Waddingham carried out a licence check of Phillips' licence and an examination of Phillips' driver logbook.
32.On examining Phillips' logbook, Waddingham found discrepancies in the entries in the logbook for the period 12 to 14 November 2008. Those discrepancies related to insufficient rest breaks, exceeding driving hours and a failure to make relevant entries for the 10 hour period immediately preceding the inspection. In particular, Waddingham examined pages Q371493163, 64 and 65. These pages disclosed that the longest continuous break in the 24 hour period commencing at 6 pm on 12 November 2008 was approximately 4.75 hours. These pages also disclosed that in the period between 6 pm on 13 November 2008 and the time of the interception of the heavy vehicle combination at the RTA Inspection Facility, at 3.45 am on 14 November 2008, Phillips' longest break was little more than 1 hour. In addition, these pages disclosed that Phillips had worked in excess of 12 hours in the preceding 24 hour period.
33.Waddingham then commenced preparation of an RTA Breach Report, Report No. TBR00044225, and an RTA Breach Continuation Report, Report No. 50514, in relation to the discrepancies he had identified in Phillips' logbook.
34.Waddingham spoke with Phillips regarding the discrepancies he identified in the Logbook:
Waddingham said:"Are you on standard 12 hours work or a fatigue scheme?"
Phillips said: "Standard 12 hours."
Waddingham said:"How many hours can you work for in a 24 hour period?"
Phillips said: "12 hours."
Waddingham said:"What is the minimum continuous rest break you must have in a 24 hour period?"
Phillips said:"6 hours."
Waddingham said: "Why have you not made any entries since leaving Yatala yesterday afternoon and what have you been doing since Yatala?"
Phillips said: "I forgot to fill it in. I drove this truck down to Coffs Harbour where I got loaded then had a shower and feed, I would have been there about 2 hours then I have driven down to here."
Waddingham said:"Did you drive there by yourself?"
Phillips said:"Yes."
Waddingham said:"Can you explain why you have exceeded your maximum 12 hours work in any 24 hour period for this 24 hour period and not had your minimum 7 hour continuous rest break for these two 24 hour periods?" (Periods shown to driver).
Phillips said:"I didn't know I had, I'm still trying to get my head around logbooks, they don't use them in the Northern Territory, I just pull over when I get tired."
Waddingham said:"Who instructs you to drive?"
Phillips said:"No one."
Waddingham said: "Who tells you where to pick up and drop off the loads?"
Phillips said:"The freight manager at what ever depot I'm at, no-one in particular, some of the depots have someone new there each time I'm there."
Waddingham said:"I will report this matter to the RTA."
35.Smith then directed Phillips to park the heavy combination vehicle in the designated parking area at the RTA Inspection Facility. Smith then saw Phillips drive the heavy combination to that area.
36.About 10 minutes after Phillips parked the heavy combination vehicle, in the designated parking area at the RTA Inspection Facility, Phillips returned to the control room (also known as the "pie hut") and got some hot water for coffee from Smith and Waddingham.
37.Smith and Waddingham left the RTA Inspection Facility later that morning at about 7.30 am. At that time the heavy combination vehicle was still parked in the designated parking area at the RTA Inspection Facility.
38.Phillips contacted Intercoast's overnight supervisors, based in Melbourne, and informed Intercoast that the heavy combination vehicle had been "grounded" and required repairs. Phillips also informed Intercoast's overnight supervisors that he was "out of hours" and was required to take a 7 hour break.
39.Intercoast contacted the defendant at Hexham and arranged for the defendant to send a motor mechanic to the RTA Inspection Facility to inspect and repair the subject heavy combination vehicle.
40.On 14 November 2008 Clinton Duncan, Webb's foreman at the defendant, assigned Webb to attend at the RTA Inspection Facility to inspect and repair the subject heavy combination vehicle. Webb was informed that the vehicle was grounded at the RTA Inspection Facility and required a replacement airbag.
41.On 14 November 2008 the breakdown service vehicle normally used by the defendant to undertake breakdown service tasks was unavailable. As a consequence, Webb used a company "ute".
42.The ute was not fitted out or maintained by the defendant as a road service vehicle. Therefore, prior to departing the defendant's workshop, Webb loaded the company ute with the tools and equipment he believed he would require for an airbag repair, including his toolbox, some wheel chocks and some stands. The chocks which Webb loaded were blocks of timber used as chocks. Webb also took a replacement airbag.
43.Webb arrived at the RTA Inspection Facility between about 9.30 am and 10 am on 14 November 2008.
44.Shortly after arriving at the RTA Inspection Facility, Webb approached the cabin of the prime mover, where Webb observed Phillips sitting in the driver's seat of the vehicle.
45.When Webb knocked on the door of the vehicle, Phillips alighted from the cabin and told the mechanic that the defect was on the "B" or rear trailer.
46.Following an inspection of the air suspension system, Webb ascertained that the trailer required a different type of airbag. Webb then told Phillips that he had to return to work [i.e., Hexham] to obtain the correct airbag.
47.Webb and Phillips then travelled to the workshop at Hexham to obtain the right airbag. Webb and Phillips then drove to SX Trailers at Sandgate to obtain some fittings which Webb needed to reconnect the air supply on the B trailer to the other airbags on the right hand side of that trailer.
48.In the course of the return journey to and from town, Phillips told Webb that he had only had a few hours sleep in a couple of days. Nonetheless, Webb observed after the event that Phillips did not appear to be fatigued and was "pretty coherent". On that journey Phillips also requested that Webb stop at a food outlet and Phillips bought some food and drink.
49.Upon their return to the parking bay at the RTA Inspection Facility, Webb commenced replacing the defective middle airbag, situated between the second and third axle of the triaxle B trailer of the subject heavy combination vehicle.
50.Webb placed his tools and the replacement parts on the ground on the offside of the B trailer. Webb then returned to the ute to get the wheel chocks, which he had loaded at the workshop that morning. The chocks were made from blocks of wood. The first chock had dimensions of approximately 90mm wide x 45mm high x 500mm long. Webb placed this chock in front of the front driver's side drive tyres of the prime mover. The second chock was made up of two wooden blocks which had similar dimensions to the first chock but the two blocks were joined together to form one chock 90mm high. The mechanic placed this chock in front of the driver's side steer tyre of the prime mover.
51.Webb then went underneath the B trailer and replaced the defective air bag.
52.Whilst Webb was replacing the defective airbag on the B trailer, Webb observed that the main air supply to the defective air bag had been bypassed using a range of airline fittings and that the main air supply to the three air bags on the driver's side of the trailer had been crimped off with "some cable ties". Webb then replaced the fittings that had been used to bypass the driver's side airbags and cut the cable ties to restore the air supply to all three airbags on the driver's side of the B trailer.
53.Webb then got out from under the B trailer and asked Phillips to get back in the cabin of the prime mover and to start the engine of the prime mover to fill the brake and suspension systems of the heavy combination with air. Webb asked the driver to depress the foot brake before starting the engine.
54.[LEFT BLANK TO RETAIN CONSISTENCY OF NUMBERING]
55.Webb saw Phillips get back into the cabin of the prime mover, place his foot on the brake pedal and start the engine of the prime mover. When Webb was satisfied that the air had built up to the correct pressure, he instructed Phillips to release the park brakes and then, in turn, to release the foot brake. Webb then saw Phillips release the park brake and, in turn, the foot brake.
56.As Phillips released the foot brake, Webb observed the heavy combination vehicle move forward less than an inch until it came hard up against the two wheel chocks and then Webb observed that the combination became stationary again. When interviewed after the accident by the prosecutor, Webb said he told the driver to "keep your foot hovering above the brake pedal, I want you to come right off". Webb observed that when the driver took his foot right off the brake pedal the vehicle stayed stationary. Webb then stayed by the cabin for about two minutes "just to make sure the brakes and everything had sorted itself out."
57.Webb left Phillips sitting in the cabin of the prime mover and went to the B trailer where Webb observed that the brakes were off and heard an air leak. He got underneath the back of the trailer and found a fitting that had not quite locked the air line in. Webb tightened the fitting and fixed the air leak.
58.Once he had stopped the air leaking from the suspension system, Webb moved back underneath the rear axle of the B trailer and watched the rear driver's side airbag inflate. Webb then climbed out from underneath the B trailer before re-positioning himself under the driver's side of the B trailer in front of the first axle to observe the front airbag on the driver's side to make sure it was unrolling properly.
59.Whilst in that position, he saw Phillips crouched down beside the B trailer with his hand on a valve attached on the side of the chassis rail. Webb then asked Phillips if he had moved the valve and Phillips "... indicated yes he had". Webb then asked Phillips to put the valve back to its normal running position.
60.Webb then looked around and saw that the rear axle airbags on the B trailer were overextended and that the middle axle airbags were starting to overextend. At that point, Webb saw the "first axle driver's side airbag unrolled, bounced the trailer and, and the vehicle started to roll forwards".
61.Webb then got himself out from underneath the B trailer.
62.The heavy combination rolled about 3 metres forward before coming to a standstill.
63.After Webb got out from underneath the B trailer, he observed that Phillips was trapped between the driver's door and the door sill of the prime mover with the door hard up against an adjacent steel light pole.
64.The Autopsy Report dated 20 April 2009 indicates that Phillips died as a consequence of traumatic asphyxia consistent with his entrapment between the driver's side door and the sill of the prime mover.
65.An analysis of femoral blood samples taken from Phillips during the course of the autopsy revealed the presence of delta-9-tetrahyrocannabinol less than 0.005mg/L, delta-9-THC acid 0.012mg/L and methylamphetamine 0.2mg/L. The traces of cannabinoids found in the blood samples are at levels which indicate that the cannabinoids are unlikely to have played any role in the subject incident. By contrast, the level of methylamphetamine is significant. A reading of 0.2mg/L is 4 times the upper level of the therapeutic range (0.05mg/L) and within the reported toxic range for methylamphetamine.
66.At the time of the subject incident, clause 64 of the Road Transport (General) Regulation 2005 (NSW) (the "Regulation") provided that in any period referred to in column 1 of the table below, a solo driver:
(a)must not work for more than the work time mentioned in Column 2 of the table; and
(b)must have the rest of that period off work, with at least the rest time mentioned in Column 3 of the table.
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4
Total period Maximum work time Minimum rest time Offence category
In any period of... A driver must not work for more than... and must have the rest of that period off work, with at least... If in that period a driver has... the following category of offence is committed...
5½ hrs 5¼ hrs work time 15 continuous mins rest time > 5¼ hrs work time minor risk
8 hrs 7½ hrs work time 30 mins rest time, in blocks of 15 continuous mins > 7½ hrs work time minor risk
11 hrs 10 hrs work time 60 mins w/consol_reg/rtr2005333/s39.html'>rest time, in blocks of 15 continuous mins ≤ 10¾ hrs work time minor risk
> 10¾ hrs http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol_reg/rtr2005333/s39.html'>work time substantial risk
24 hrs 12 hrs work time ≤ 12 hrs ¾ work time minor risk
> 12 ¾ but not > 13¼ hrs work time substantial risk
> 13¼ but not > 13½ hrs work time severe risk
> 13 ½hrs work time critical risk
7 continuous hrs stationary rest time < 7 but not < 6¼ continuous hrs stationary rest time minor risk
< 6¼ but not < 5¾ continuous hrs stationary rest time substantial risk
< 5¾ but not < 5½ continuous hrs stationary rest time severe risk
< 5½ continuous hrs stationary rest time critical risk