4 The prosecutor tendered an agreed statement of facts. The statement provided details of the incident as follows:
8 At all material times the Defendant owned a machine called a Roto-mixer which had two augers feeding into the top of the Roto-mixer. The Roto-mixer was located in the feed mill at the site. Between the augers was a steel mesh work platform approximately two (2) metres in length, one and a half (1.5) metres wide and approximately 2.7 metres above ground level. The ground below consisted of a cement floor. There was a handrail around one side of the platform about 1.1 metres high and made from 40 mm round water pipe and a mid-rail approximately seven hundred (700) millimetres high made from thirty (30) millimetre round water pipe. On the other side of the work platform was an auger. Each auger was driven by an electric motor mounted at the back.
9 On 3 December 2000 there was a stoppage of an auger feeding into the Roto-mixer. Mr Griffiths, whose responsibility on that date was to supervise the feed mill, had instructed Mr Greentree to attend the site as Mr Griffiths suspected that the motor on the auger was burnt out and would need to be replaced. Whilst Mr Griffiths instructed Mr Greentree to carry out this work, he did not specifically instruct Mr Greentree as to how the work was to be performed.
10 Mr Mathers, who was ordinarily Mr Greentree's direct supervisor, saw Mr Greentree at approximately 9am on 3 December 2000. Mr Mathers was informed by Mr Greentree that he had replaced the electric motor on the auger and was returning to the workshop to obtain a set of tong testers. Mr Mathers was told by Mr Greentree that he believed the auger was blocked and he would unblock it. Mr Mathers assumed at the time that Mr Greentree was trying to free a blocked auger.
11 Whilst the Defendant had a lock-out procedure for all machinery, there were no specific systems in place regarding clearing blockages of machinery. It was part of Mr Greentree's normal duties for the Defendant to clear blockages in machinery such as the auger of the Roto-mixer.
12 Due to the nature of the product contained in the auger (urea), it was not uncommon for blockages to occur, especially during wet weather.
13 Mr Bruce Porter walked towards the mill in which Mr Greentree was working when he heard a thud from behind him. Mr Porter turned around and saw Mr Greentree lying on the ground on the cement floor below. Mr Porter ran to check on Mr Greentree, shook him and received no response. Mr Porter noticed a pool of blood under Mr Greentree's head.
14 Following the fall, Mr Griffiths returned to the mill and climbed up onto the raised work platform to investigate. Mr Griffiths found a pair of stillsons with a piece of rolled hollow section ("RHS") approximately two (2) metres in length on the auger leaning sideways towards the mill on the side of the auger trough.
15 It is assumed that Mr Greentree put the stillsons on the auger and used the RHS as an extension in an attempt to try and free the blocked auger.
16 Whilst it was not the Defendant's normal practice to use a stillson to free an auger, the Defendant had no documented system in place for the clearing of blockages of the auger. It was common practice for a screwdriver to be used to free the flutes of the auger.
17 It was common practice for Mr Greentree to carry out such maintenance work on his own, without any direct supervision because of his position as maintenance foreman.
18 When Mr Mathers returned to the mill following the accident, the auger tops were off and Mr Greentree had removed the side plate off the macro bin and let some of the material contained within fall to the cement floor to try and free up the macro drive.
19 To gain access to the raised work platform, Mr Greentree would have climbed to the steel mesh platform by means of a steel ladder. The work platform was approximately 2.7 metres about the cement floor.
20 Whilst Mr Greentree had received induction training on commencement of his employment with the Defendant, the induction training was based on an induction booklet called "The Employee Induction Booklet - Mill Employees, Maintenance Employees". That booklet contained no reference to the hazards associated with working at heights and the necessity to have appropriate fall protection for work at heights over two (2) metres.
21 Mr Greentree had completed confined spaces training which involved the use of harnesses, however, the Defendant had not provided Mr Greentree with any information, instruction or training regarding the use of harnesses whilst working at heights.
22 Following the accident, an ambulance was called to the site and Mr Greentree was transported by ambulance to the Defendant's private airstrip and then flown to Tamworth Base Hospital. Mr Greentree was later transferred by Westpac rescue helicopter to John Hunter Hospital in Newcastle. Mr Greentree suffered severe head injuries in the fall and died on 10 December 2000 as a result of those injuries.
23 The Defendant had no system in place which was safe and without risks to health for the carrying out of maintenance work on the Roto-mixer to clear blockages on that machine.
24 At the time of the accident, Mr Greentree was working at heights with no fall protection (other than as described above at paragraph 8).
25 At the time of the accident, Mr Greentree was working without any supervision to ensure that he implemented a safe system of work for the clearing of blockages.
26 Following the accident the Defendant commissioned Quirindi Engineering Pty Ltd to replace and extend the existing safety platform around the Roto-mixer and macro bin in the mill. A mesh catwalk, handrails and an access ladder were installed at the cost to the Defendant of $9,790.00.