Because the inquiry about this last aspect may take account of the subject matter of the agreement, the status of the parties to it, their relationship to one another, and other surrounding circumstances, not only is there obvious difficulty in formulating rules intended to prescribe the kinds of cases in which an intention to create contractual relations should, or should not, be found to exist, it would be wrong to do so. Because the search for the "intention to create contractual relations" requires an objective assessment of the state of affairs between the parties (as distinct from the identification of any uncommunicated subjective reservation or intention that either may harbour) the circumstances which might properly be taken into account in deciding whether there was the relevant intention are so varied as to preclude the formation of any prescriptive rules. Although the word "intention" is used in this context, it is used in the same sense as it is used in other contractual contexts. It describes what it is that would objectively be conveyed by what was said or done, having regard to the circumstances in which those statements and actions happened. It is not a search for the uncommunicated subjective motives or intentions of the parties.
7 Although conduct of the parties subsequent to an alleged contract is admissible as to whether a contract has been made - because subsequent conduct consistent with a contract may illustrate that the parties did intend to create binding legal relations - in this case the subsequent conduct of the parties in proceeding to distribute the Illawarra Realtor in IPMG's newspapers is equivocal, because it is equally consistent with their intent on 11 September having been to make an interim agreement as it is with their intent having been to make a final agreement.
The text of the document
8 The first matter of significance arising out of the express words of the side letter is the use of the word "substantially" in the first sentence, which suggests that although the substance of the agreement is to be found in the drafts attached, there may be some departure from it.
9 The second matter of significance is the use in the second sentence of the words "in respect of the publishing of the publication for the first and second editions". These suggest that the agreements are enforceable and operating for that limited purpose, rather than for all purposes.
10 The third is the use of the words "for presentation to each of the EAC's and IPMG's Boards, for execution" in the final sentence. Generally speaking, Boards do not execute documents. They may authorise the affixation of the company seal to documents, but the ideas of a board of directors executing a document is a curious one. In this case, EAC's Articles of Association, as is not unusual, required that a seal not be affixed without the authority of the Board. That, of course, does not necessarily require that each specific affixation be separately authorised, and it may be that there will be a standing authority to certain directors to affix a seal. But in any event, there is a distinction between a Board authorising the affixation of a seal, and a Board executing a document. Moreover, a Board of Directors is not lightly to be taken to have been relegated to the role of a mere cipher in respect of documents, execution of which is explicitly reserved to the Board. And quite apart from corporations, the notion of submitting a document to a party for execution does not import that the act of execution is a mere formality; it ordinarily involves approval - that is, a decision whether or not to execute - as well as the mere act of signing or sealing. Accordingly, uninformed by extrinsic evidence, I would not conclude that "for presentation to each of the EAC and IPMG Boards, for execution" meant that the role of the Boards was merely to authorise the affixation of a seal to an agreement which had already been made by executive officers and which the Board was not at liberty to decline to execute. Such words ordinarily would contemplate a role for the Boards in deciding whether or not the agreements should be executed; and thus that there was not intended to be a final and binding agreement until the agreements had been approved by, and executed by authority of, the Board.
11 A further observation to be made about the express terms of the side letter and the annexure to it is that, on any view, there were some issues outstanding. This is apparent not only from the contemplation in the third sentence of the side letter that the parties would negotiate in good faith to finalise the documents, but also from the documents themselves which, in some respects, remained incomplete, not only in that amendments upon which consensus to that point had been reached were yet to be engrossed, but more significantly there were some aspects upon which there had as yet been no consensus. It is of particular significance that these included the provisions of schedules 3B, C and E in the Publishing Management Agreement. Schedule 3B covered press fees payable to EAC, 3C covered salaries payable to EAC, and 3E covered call centre fees payable to EAC. These all formed part, at least, of the remuneration to be derived by EAC from the proposed joint venture. Attributing to the parties an intention to make a Masters v Cameron class 4 agreement would involve attributing to them the intention that, if they were not subsequently able to agree on that remuneration, EAC would go without it. Viewing the situation objectively, that is an unlikely intention.
The contractual context
12 It is relevant to consider the context in which the agreement was made. First, Newco, the joint venture vehicle, did not yet exist; as Newco was intended to be a party to at least some of the documentation, this was one reason why the formal agreements could not yet be made.
13 Secondly, the first edition had already been published and distributed on 7 September. That, at least, created a perceived need on the part of IPMG to make a binding agreement at the earliest possible opportunity, because IPMG was concerned that it was exposed in distributing the Realtor without having any binding agreement in place. This perceived need was reinforced by a dispute between the parties as to whether their earlier negotiations between them on 11 August of the same year had produced a binding and enforceable agreement. However, this need could be satisfied at least to some extent by a side letter, if it was not possible for final agreement to be reached, so ultimately this does not really assist in ascertaining whether the parties intended to make an interim or a final agreement.
14 Next, a proposal that the parties enter into a trial arrangement, to see whether or not a joint venture was workable and satisfactory, had been rejected. It was submitted that that suggested that the parties were unlikely to have intended an interim agreement. However, what was rejected was not a short term interim arrangement while the final documentation was sorted out, but a much longer term (twelve month) trial, to see whether the joint venture would work to the satisfaction of both parties. The concept had been a trial of the venture, rather than a short term interim agreement pending finalisation of a final agreement. The side letter involved no trial, but an arrangement pending finalisation of documentation which seemed likely to be agreed. They are different concepts. Rejection of the first does not indicate rejection of the second. Moreover, as will be seen from the analysis of the negotiations below, the parties continued to contemplate an interim arrangement by side letter after the concept of a trial had been rejected.
15 Finally, there are the negotiations that had taken place between the parties up to and including 11 September 2006, and in particular the references that had been made in them to the role of the EAC Board and to the potential use of a side letter. Because these were negotiations of which both parties knew, the mutual references in them to a side letter provide aid in understanding what role the parties intended a side letter to fulfil when they ultimately came to execute it.
16 On 26 June 2006, IPMG's solicitor, Mr Peters, submitted to EAC's then CEO, Mr Carson, a draft Memorandum of Understanding. Mr Carson replied with some comments on the draft on 7 July 2006. On 12 July, Mr Dennis of IPMG, sent an email to Mr Carson that plainly contemplated that the proposed amendments would be submitted to the Board:
In the knowledge that you have your Board meeting tomorrow afternoon, would it be possible for me to get together with you tomorrow morning to take you through our proposed changes? If we can work towards agreeing the changes prior to your meeting it should demonstrate to your Board members our joint determination to work together to achieve a mutually acceptable outcome.