15 It is too well established to require elaborate reference to authority that general definition clauses, such as those appearing in the Interpretation Act, are intended to elucidate, not to defeat, the evident purposes of the legislation to which the definitions are made to apply. Accordingly, the definitions themselves must be interpreted reasonably in the context of the relevant legislation into which they are imported.
16 Nevertheless, one must not be too ready to find that a word or phrase defined in the Interpretation Act does not have the meaning ascribed to it in an Act or instrument to which the Interpretation Act applies. Parliamentary Counsel pore over every word of a draft Act or Regulation: in that exercise, the Interpretation Act is always the first resort of reference. Accordingly, if a word in an Act or Regulation defined in the Interpretation Act is to bear a meaning different from that definition, the question is not "does the section or regulation still make sense if the word has a different meaning", but is, rather, "does the context and purpose of the section or regulation clearly require a departure from the definition of the word in the Interpretation Act". That is a fairly high hurdle to jump.
17 In answering this question, the purpose of the particular section or regulation may certainly be gleaned from a consideration of the Act or Regulations as a whole, while always bearing in mind, nevertheless, that the same word used in different contexts and in different parts of an Act or Regulation may have different meanings: see generally Duperouzel v Cameron [1973] WAR 181, at 182-3; Knightsbridge Estates Trust Ltd v Byrne [1940] AC 613, at 621; Hall v Jones (1942) 42 SR(NSW) 203, at 208; Blue Metal Industries Ltd v R.W. Dilley [1970] AC 827, at 846; Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (NSW) v Mutton (1988) 79 ALR 509, at 512-513.
18 In Regulation 20(1) there is to be found the clearest of intentions that "individual" where secondly appearing in sub-clause 20(1)(c) is to have the same meaning whenever the word is used in that Regulation and that the meaning is as defined in s.21 Interpretation Act, i.e. "natural person".
19 This is so because "individual" where secondly appearing in paragraph (1)(c) appears as part of a phrase which must be taken as a whole, namely, "an individual referred to in paragraph (b)". An "individual referred to in paragraph (b)" is one of the four classes of "individuals" who may be authorised as carers under Clause (1) and that clause makes it quite clear that each class of individual must be subject to assessment under Clause (3) in order to qualify for authorisation as a carer.
20 Clause (3) provides three requirements for assessment of carers. The requirement in paragraph (b) that an individual must satisfactorily complete a course of training as a carer, and the requirement in paragraph (c) that the individual must be subjected to "employment screening" make it obvious that the "individual" who is to comply with those requirements can only be a natural person. Mr Taperell of Counsel, who appears for the Plaintiff, concedes that this must be so.
21 It follows that Regulation 20(1)(b), in referring to an "individual", is referring to a natural person. Likewise, it follows that the phrase "individual referred to in paragraph (b)" appearing in Regulation 20(1)(c), given its ordinary reading, refers to a natural person. Is there anything in the Act or Regulations which clearly shows that that is not the result which Parliament intended?
22 Mr Taperell frankly and properly concedes that he can point to nothing in the Act or the Regulations which clearly indicates the requisite contrary intention. His argument is founded solely on commercial convenience. He says that Regulation 20(1)(c) encompasses "employees" within the classes of permitted authorised carers and that it is a commonplace fact of commercial life that many employees are employed by companies. Mr Taperell says that "individual referred to in paragraph (b)" simply means one who is in the position contemplated by paragraph (b), that is, an entity, not an employee, which is contracted to provide care services by a designated agency.
23 I am unable to accept this argument. The word "individual" is deliberately used in Regulation 20(1)(c); it causes no violence whatsoever to the meaning and effect of any part of Regulation 20 to give the word the same throughout the Regulation.
24 Mr Taperell was not able to suggest any reason of policy under the Act which would be frustrated if "individual" where secondly appearing in Regulation 20(1)(c) meant "natural person", nor any reason of policy under the Act which would be assisted if "individual" included "corporation".
25 Indeed, to the contrary of Mr Taperell's submission, I discern a clear policy in Regulation 20 that a designated agency, dealing as it does in the highly sensitive area of child care, should, in authorising carers, be required always to deal directly with natural persons whose antecedents, character and qualifications may much more directly be appreciated than if the dealing is carried out through interposed corporate structures.
26 It is consistent with such a policy that the "individual" referred to in Regulation 20(1)(b) be a natural person who is engaged by the designated agency not as an employee but as an independent contractor.
27 For these reasons, I conclude that "individual" where secondly appearing in Regulation 20(1)(c) does not include "corporation".
Order