Ground 1 - Did the Minister's decision lack jurisdiction on the basis that he relied on evidence of the applicant's criminal record obtained without consent?
66 Ground 1 states as follows:
1. The respondent cancelled the applicant's visa based on evidence of his criminal record. This had been unlawfully or improperly obtained by or on behalf of the respondent, causing the respondent to act without jurisdiction in cancelling the visa.
Particulars
1.1. The respondent's finding that the applicant failed the character test prescribed by section 501(6)(e) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ['the Act'] was based on evidence of the applicant's criminal record held in Queensland and Western Australia, and by the Australian Federal Police.
1.2. The applicant did not consent to the respondent acquiring evidence of his criminal record.
1.3. There is no evidence adduced by the respondent showing that, in acquiring the applicant's criminal record without his consent, the respondent complied with any procedure required by relevant data protection legislation in Queensland, Western Australia, and the Commonwealth.
1.4. The respondent did not, in issuing a Notice of Intention to Cancel to the applicant, and in subsequently cancelling his visa, 'reasonably suspect that the applicant did not pass the character test' where the evidence upon which the suspicion was based was illegally or improperly obtained.
1.5. In the circumstances the respondent had no jurisdiction to cancel the applicant's visa.
67 This ground is elaborated upon in the applicant's lengthy written submissions at [1]-[34].
68 Following the making of oral submissions at the hearing, I made further orders for the parties to put on additional written submissions concerning ground 1.
69 The particular issue, in relation to which further submissions were required, was whether there had been a breach of the Australian Privacy Principles (APP) made under the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth), having regard to the manner in which the Department requested and obtained a copy of the applicant's criminal record from the Queensland Police Service on 14 and 15 September 2016, and in relation to the Department's request to the AFP on 22 September 2016 for a National Police Check in relation to the applicant and the AFP's provision of a National Police Certificate to the Department in response to that request.
70 A further issue also appeared to arise, namely, whether, if there was a breach of the APP by an officer of the Department in relation to either of the requests for information as to the applicant's criminal record, any such breach was relevant to the validity of the Minister's decision to cancel the applicant's visa.
71 The Minister makes the following detailed submissions as to the first breach issue:
4. It is not in dispute that an officer of the Department, Mr Mullan, requested the Criminal Records section of the Queensland Police Service to provide a copy of the applicant's criminal record: see Annexure 'PJC-1' to the affidavit of Peter John Corbould affirmed on 30 April 2018 (Mr Corbould's affidavit) at page 7.
5. It is also not in dispute that as a result of that request the Queensland Police Service provided a copy of the applicant's Queensland criminal record to Mr Mullan on 14 September 2016, and that Mr Mullan in turn provided that criminal record to the Department's National Character Consideration Centre (the NCCC): see Annexure 'PJC-1' to Mr Corbould's affidavit at pages 5-9.
6. On 22 September 2016 Ms Villarino from the NCCC made a request to the AFP under the APPs for a National Police Check in relation to the applicant: see paragraph 3 of Mr Corbould's affidavit and Annexure 'PJC-1' at pages 11-14.
7. The AFP provided a National Police Certificate to the NCCC on 5 October 2016, and a copy of that National Police Certificate was provided to the Minister as Attachment A to the Submission from the Department concerning the possible cancellation of the applicant's visa: see Court Book at page 3 [16] and pages 13-15.
8. At the relevant times the Department was an 'enforcement body' pursuant to para (ca) of the definition of that term in s 6 of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) (the Privacy Act) and the definition of 'Immigration Department' in s 6 of that Act.
9. The prohibition in APP 3.3 against the collection of sensitive information about an individual without their consent does not apply if APP 3.4 applies. APP 3.4(d)(i) provides that the subclause applies in relation to sensitive information about an individual (defined as including a criminal record) if the APP entity is an enforcement body and, if the entity is the Immigration Department, 'the collection of information is reasonably necessary for, or directly related to, one or more enforcement related activities conducted by, or on behalf of, the entity'. The term 'enforcement related activity' is also defined in s 6 of the Privacy Act and relevantly includes:
'(f) the prevention, detection, investigation or remedying of misconduct of a serious nature, or other conduct prescribed by the regulations'.
10. Subsections 501(2) and (3) of the Migration Act provide that the Minister may cancel a visa if the Minister reasonably suspects that the person does not pass the character test. Pursuant to ss 501(6) and (7) of that Act, a person does not pass the character test if the person has a substantial criminal record, which includes the person having been sentenced to a term of imprisonment for 12 months or more, or being sentenced to two or more terms of imprisonment where the total of those terms is 12 months or more.
11. Accordingly, the investigation of a person's criminal record to determine if they have a substantial criminal record which would authorise the Minister to cancel their visa is an enforcement related activity within the meaning of paragraph (f) of the definition of that term in s 6 of the Privacy Act.
12. Here, Mr Mullan had been advised by the Queensland Police Service that the applicant had received a 9 year custodial sentence for child sex offences in 2000 and, accordingly, Mr Mullan was permitted by APP 3.4(d)(i) to give a notice to the Queensland Police Service seeking information as to the applicant's criminal record for the purpose of considering whether the Minister reasonably suspects, or is satisfied, that the applicant does not pass the character test, by reason of him having a substantial criminal record. The collection of that information was reasonably necessary for or directly related to, the enforcement related activity in para (f) of the definition set out in paragraph 9 above.
13. In his email to the Queensland Police Service requesting a copy of the applicant's criminal record, Mr Mullan noted that the Department was an 'enforcement body' under the Privacy Act and that the Department collected sensitive information under APP 3.4(d)(i) and may request the disclosure of information from APP entities (including police) under APP 6.2(e) in relation to the Department's enforcement related activities and investigations. Mr Mullan's email sought a copy of the applicant's criminal record so that consideration could be given to cancellation of his visa, an enforcement related activity.
14. The subsequent request by NCCC officer, Ms Villarino, to the AFP for a National Police Check in relation to the applicant was also permitted by APP 3.4(d)(i), as officer Villarino had formed the belief that the information requested was reasonably necessary for enforcement related activities conducted by or on behalf of the Department.
15. One of the enforcement related activities to which Officer Villarino referred was 'detecting, preventing, investigating and prosecuting breaches of visa, immigration and citizenship law'. This clearly relates to paragraph (f) of the definition of enforcement related activity in s 6 of the Privacy Act as set out in paragraph 9 above.
72 As to whether a breach would, in any event, result in the Minister's initial decision being invalid, the Minister submits:
16. Further, and in any event, even if there was any breach of the APPs as a result of either or both of the requests to the Queensland Police Service and the AFP for the applicant's criminal records, any such breach could not result in the Minister's decision to cancel the applicant's visa being affected by jurisdictional error.
17. The respondent contends that compliance with the provisions of the Privacy Act and the APPs is not a prerequisite to the making of a valid decision. In Goldie v Commonwealth of Australia (2000) 180 ALR 609; [2000] FCA 1873 his Honour French J observed at [86] that s 16 of the Privacy Act provides that an agency shall not do an act or engage in a practice, that breaches an Information Privacy Principle (IPP). However, his Honour then referred at [87] to the fact that the Privacy Act itself provides for complaints to be made to the Privacy Commissioner in respect of alleged breaches, and the investigation and determination of such complaints, including a declaration as to entitlement to a specified amount by way of compensation. His Honour further observed at [87] that under s 55 of the Privacy Act the Commissioner or the complainant may commence proceedings in the Federal Court for an order to enforce a determination.
18. In Abbasi v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1274 the applicant's third ground of judicial review alleged that disclosure of information by the Department to the Tribunal was in breach of IPP 11, and the Tribunal could not lawfully use the material obtained in this manner (at [50]).
19. His Honour Beaumont J concluded at [67] that the third ground was not made out because an inference should be drawn of consent to disclosure of the information to the Department or the Tribunal. His Honour further stated at [67] that he agreed with the decision of French J in Goldie at [85]-[87] that the provisions of the Privacy Act are self-contained, and that he would have refused relief on discretionary grounds in any event.
20. An issue also arose in SZLWQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 1406; (2008) 172 FCR 452 as to whether any breach of the Privacy Act or IPP 11 would establish jurisdictional error by the former Refugee Review Tribunal, and whether, in light of the comprehensive provisions in the Migration Act under which that Tribunal was established and conducted its proceedings, the Privacy Act and IPP 11 had any application (at [23]).
21. His Honour Buchanan J at [31] agreed with the Federal Magistrate below that there was no breach of IPP 11 because the appellant had consented to the disclosure of her information. Buchanan J then noted at [32] that the Minister had also argued that compliance with the Privacy Act was not a prerequisite to the making of a valid decision by the RRT because requirements for a valid decision are set out comprehensively in the Migration Act and because the Privacy Act contains its own remedial provisions which are 'self-contained'.
22. Buchanan J then stated at [32] that that submission was supported by reference to the judgment of French J in Goldie at [85]-[87] and the concurrence of Beaumont J in Abbasi at [67]. His Honour then concluded in SZLWQ at [32]:
'Although it was not necessary for the FMCA to examine this issue, I agree with Mr Kennett's submission that the argument advanced by the appellant to the FMCA was legally unsound and provided no basis for the relief that she there sought.'
23. Likewise here, the Court should conclude that compliance with the Privacy Act and the APPs was not a prerequisite to the making of a valid decision by the Minister to cancel the applicant's visa pursuant to s 501(2) of the Migration Act, and that even if the Court was to find that there had been a breach of the IPPs, that does not provide any basis for any relief in relation to the Minister's decision.
73 The applicant's position is best stated in his submissions made in reply to those of the Minister:
Introduction
1. The Minister's issues. The issues addressed by the respondent ['the Minister'] in the Further Outline of Submissions filed on his behalf are not responsive to the primary issue raised on behalf of the applicant ['Mr Hunt'], and on which the Minister was given leave to make further submissions: namely that evidence of Mr Hunt's criminal record, relied upon by the Minister in finding that he did not satisfy the character test in section 501(6) of Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ['the Migration Act'], was obtained without Mr Hunt's consent, in breach of Australian laws, and is accordingly inadmissible in this Court in support of the Minister's claim that his visa was cancelled in accordance with the provisions of section 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958.
A. The admissibility issue
2. The absence of consent by Mr Hunt. It is common ground that Mr Hunt had not consented to the Minister's Department accessing his criminal record as held by authorities in Queensland, the Commonwealth and Western Australia
3. The questions raised: In the circumstances:
3.1. Was Mr Mullan authorised to request Mr Hunt's criminal record from the Queensland Police Service?
3.2. Was the Queensland Police Service authorised to provide Mr Mullan with Mr Hunt's criminal record?
3.3. Was Ms Villarino authorised to request Mr Hunt's criminal record from the Australian Federal Police?
3.4. Was the Australian Federal Police authorised to provide Mr Hunt's Criminal Record to the Minister's Department?
3.5. If the evidence of Mr Hunt's criminal record before him was the fruit of a poisonous tree, can the Minister in the present judicial review proceedings rely upon that that evidence in support of a claim to have cancelled Mr Hunt's visa in accordance with the provisions of section 501 of the Migration Act, or is that evidence inadmissible under the provisions of section 138 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ['the Evidence Act']?
Fruit of a poisonous tree
4. Justice Frankfurter plants the poisonous tree. The metaphor appears first to have been coined by Justice Frankfurter in Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939) ['Nardone']. In Australian jurisprudence it appears to have been more frequently adopted in the form: 'fruit of a poisoned tree.' The original version is to be preferred. In this form counsel alluded to it briefly in DWN042 v The Republic of Nauru [2017] HCATrans 203, a migration case. The principle to which it refers arises more commonly in the criminal law context, although as permitted by section 138 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), it also arises in civil proceedings.
5. Intercepted telephone messages as poisoned fruit. The petitioner came before the Supreme Court for the second time seeking review of dismissal of his appeal against convictions for frauds on the revenue. In the earlier case the Court had reversed the convictions on the first trial because they were procured by evidence secured in violation of the Communications Act of 1934. This evidence consisted of intercepted telephone messages, constituting 'a vital part of the prosecution's proof.'
6. Use of information obtained as a result of the unlawful phone tapping. Conviction followed a new trial, and the main question on the appeal below, and the only question open before the Supreme Court was whether the trial judge had improperly refused to allow the accused to examine the prosecution as to the uses to which it had put the information that the earlier case had found to have vitiated the original conviction.
7. Breach of ethical standards and destruction of personal liberty. Justice Frankfurter, delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court, noted that in the earlier case the Court found that the logically relevant proof that Congress had outlawed, it outlawed because 'inconsistent with ethical standards and destructive of personal liberty.' To forbid the direct use of methods thus characterized, but to put no curb on their full indirect use, would only invite the very methods deemed 'inconsistent with ethical standards and destructive of personal liberty.'
8. The burden of proof. The initial burden on the accused. His Honour wrote:
'The burden is, of course, on the accused in the first instance to prove to the trial court's satisfaction that wiretapping was unlawfully employed. Once that is established -- as was plainly done here -- the trial judge must give opportunity, however closely confined, to the accused to prove that a substantial portion of the case against him was a fruit of the poisonous tree. This leaves ample opportunity to the Government to convince the trial court that its proof had an independent origin.'
9. Mr Hunt had to prove lack of consent. In the present case the burden was on Mr Hunt to prove that his criminal record, protected 'sensitive information' under Queensland's Information Privacy Act 2009, had been accessed without his consent. It was then for the Minister to prove that, even without his consent, the 'sensitive information' had been lawfully sought by Mr Mullan, and lawfully provided by the Queensland Police Service. The information would be otherwise inadmissible under the provisions of section 138 of the Evidence Act.
Mr Hunt's criminal record
The Queensland Police Service record
10. Mr Mullan acquires information about Mr Hunt's criminal history from an unidentified source. There is no evidence as to how Mr Mullan came by the disinformation from the Queensland Police Service that Mr Hunt had received a nine year custodial sentence for child sex offences in 2000: Affidavit of Peter John Corbould dated 30 April 2018, PJC-1, p. 7. But that is the information upon which he based his request to the Criminal Records Section of the Queensland Police Service on 14 September 2016: Affidavit of Mr Corbould, Annexure PJC-1., p. 7. On the evidence adduced by the Minister, there was no lawful basis for him to make the request, and no lawful basis upon which Queensland Police could accede to this casual and illegitimate request. Mr Hunt's record was protected by Queensland's Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld) and its prescribed Information Privacy Principles ['IPP'].
11. Prohibited disclosure. Under IPP 11, an agency must not disclose personal information to a third party, unless:
11.1. the individual is reasonably likely to be aware that it is the agency's usual practice to disclose that type of personal information to the third party;
11.2. the individual has expressly or impliedly agreed to the disclosure;
11.3. the disclosure is necessary to lessen or prevent a serious threat to the life, health, safety or welfare of an individual, or to public health, safety or welfare;
11.4. the disclosure is authorised or required under law;
11.5. the disclosure is necessary for law enforcement purposes;
11.6. The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation has asked the agency to disclose the information; or
11.7. the disclosure is necessary for research or statistical purposes.
'[E]nforcement related activity' in section 6 of the Privacy Act
12. '[E]nforcement related activity under the Privacy Act. The Minister has submitted at [9] of his Further Submissions that the prohibition of the collection [sic] of sensitive information in the Australian Privacy Principles did not apply in the present case because the Department was engaged in 'enforcement related activity'. The statutory definition in section 6 as relied upon by the Minister includes:
'(f) the prevention, detection, investigation or remedying of misconduct of a serious nature, or other conduct prescribed by the regulations'.
13. No evidence of misconduct on the part of Mr Hunt. The Minister has led no evidence as to the misconduct, serious or otherwise, on the part of Mr Hunt, that Mr Mullan was investigating at the time directed his inquiry to the Queensland Police Service. Mr Hunt at the time held a current visa and was a lawful non-citizen. The Minister has not provided evidence of any conduct prescribed under the regulations that might call for 'enforcement related activity' on the part of Mr Mullan, or any other officer of the Department, either when Mr Mullan approached the Queensland Police Service seeking his criminal record, or at any subsequent time.
14. Absence of evidence. There is no evidence of the legal basis on which Mr Mullan made his inquiry of the Queensland Police Service, leading to the information that he gave to the Criminal Records Section in support of his request for a copy of Mr Hunt's criminal record, and no evidence of the basis on which the Queensland Police Service could lawfully have provided that information.
15. The Queensland record as fruit of a poisonous tree. On the evidence the initial false information was unlawfully obtained, from which it follows that the copy of Mr Hunt's criminal record in Queensland was fruit of a poisonous tree, and inadmissible under section 138 of the Evidence Act to support the Minister's finding that Mr Hunt did not pass the character test under section 501(6) of the Migration Act, and to validate the cancellation of his visa under section 501(2).
The Australian Federal Police record
16. The Department's request to the Australian Federal Police. In Ms Villarino's request to the Australian Federal Police she claimed to 'have formed the belief' that the information requested was reasonably necessary for 'detecting, preventing, investigating and prosecuting breaches of visa, immigration and citizenship law': Affidavit of Mr Corbould dated 30 April 2018, PJC-2, p. 12. On the evidence adduced by the Minister, that belief can only have been based on the illegally obtained information emanating from Mr Mullan, and passed on to her by other officers of the Department. Further, at the relevant time, Mr Hunt, as the holder of a valid visa, was not in breach of any 'visa, immigration and citizenship law', and, without the illegally obtained information, there was no basis for any investigation.
The sentencing observations of the District Court Judge
17. The Minister has called no evidence as to how his Department came by the transcript of the sentencing remarks of the District Court Judge: CB pp. 20 to 23. Insofar as they record the sentence imposed upon Mr Hunt they also qualify as 'sensitive information'. Mr Hunt denied having consented to the Minister's access to this data: Affidavit of Lance Jeremy Vernon Hunt dated 29 March 2018 at [4] to [6]. The issue of whether it had been accessed lawfully was raised in the Outline of submissions filed and served on 8 April 2018 at [2] to [3]. The Minister has engaged with the issue in either his written or his oral submissions. In those circumstances that evidence is also inadmissible under the provisions of section 138 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth).
B. Breach of Australian Privacy Principles does not result in jurisdictional error in the Minister's decision
18. The Minister's further submissions. Although the issue raised at at the hearing was the admissibility of evidence of Mr Hunt's criminal record, in his Further Submissions counsel claims that breach of privacy principles does not lead to jurisdictional error in the Minister's decision, and refers to three cases in support of that submission.
74 The applicant's submissions also address, in some detail, Goldie v Commonwealth of Australia and Others (2000) 180 ALR 609; [2000] FCA 1873; Abbasi v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1274; and SZLWQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship and Another (2008) 172 FCR 452; [2008] FCA 1406.
75 The applicant's submissions conclude:
69. Personal privacy is a right not a privilege, guaranteed by statute for all Australian residents, and a right not to be overridden by the Executive in informal arrangements reached by bureaucrats. If Mr Hunt's sensitive data is not safe from illegitimate intrusion, nobody's data, including health data, is safe.
70. Mr Hunt's consent was required, but was not given.
71. If personal data is accessed unlawfully, it is inadmissible under section 138 of the Evidence Act 'unless the desirability of admitting the evidence outweighs the undesirability of admitting evidence that has been obtained in the way in which the evidence was obtained.'
72. The Minister has led no evidence, and made no submission in relation to the matters that may be taken into account in determining admissibility under section 138(3)(a) to (h).
73. The Minister had the power to revoke the cancellation of his visa after receiving Mr Hunt's letter setting out his personal circumstances, a power to be exercised as a party in the proceedings commenced by Mr Hunt with regard to the provisions of section 37M of the Federal Court Act 1976, and his responsibility as a model litigant.
76 I turn now to my consideration of this privacy ground. The Privacy Act of the Commonwealth is designed to effect the regulation of privacy and the handling of personal information. The objects are set out in s 2A as follows:
The objects of this Act are:
(a) to promote the protection of the privacy of individuals; and
(b) to recognise that the protection of the privacy of individuals is balanced with the interests of entities in carrying out their functions or activities; and
(c) to provide the basis for nationally consistent regulation of privacy and the handling of personal information; and
(d) to promote responsible and transparent handling of personal information by entities; and
(e) to facilitate an efficient credit reporting system while ensuring that the privacy of individuals is respected; and
(f) to facilitate the free flow of information across national borders while ensuring that the privacy of individuals is respected; and
(g) to provide a means for individuals to complain about an alleged interference with their privacy; and
(h) to implement Australia's international obligation in relation to privacy.
77 Part IIIB deals with privacy codes. Division 2 deal with codes of practice about information privacy, called APP codes. The act of "an interference with the privacy of an individual" is mentioned by the Act.
78 The breach of a registered APP code is also mentioned by the Privacy Act. By s 6B(1), an act or practice breaches a registered APP code if, and only if, it is contrary to, or inconsistent with, the code.
79 An "organisation" to which the Privacy Act may apply, by s 6C(1), does not pick up a State or Territory authority or a prescribed instrumentality of a State or Territory. By s 6C(3), a State or Territory authority is defined to include a Minister, a Department of State and a body established or appointed for a public purpose or under a law of a State, with some exceptions.
80 Section 26A provides that an APP entity must not do an act, or engage in a practice, that breaches a registered APP code that binds the entity.
81 Section 26C states what an APP code is.
82 The Privacy Act allows for special rules in relation to an "enforcement body", which is defined by s 6, para (ca), to include the Immigration Department.
83 An enforcement body also means, by para (m), "another prescribed authority or body that is established under a law of a State or Territory to conduct criminal investigations or inquiries".
84 An "entity" includes an agency or an organisation. An "agency" includes a "Department".
85 In this case, the Minister accepts that the Department was affected by the Privacy Act and the APP. The Minister submits the Department is an "enforcement body" pursuant to (ca) of the s 6 definition. That is demonstrably correct.
86 The Department, which is also an APP entity as defined in the Privacy Act, was required by Sch 1 of the Act, cl 1.3, to have a clearly expressed up to date APP privacy policy about the management of personal information by the entity.
87 APP 3 deals with the collection of solicited personal information. APP 3.1 provides that if an APP entity is an agency (which the Department here is), it must not collect personal information (other than sensitive information) unless the information is reasonably necessary for, or directly related to, one or more of the entity's functions or activities.
88 In this case, the particular information that the Department has collected - the criminal record of the applicant - is "sensitive information". That is because s 6 defines that term, at para (a)(ix), to include an individual's criminal record.
89 In those circumstances, the collection of the criminal record of the applicant by a member of the Department for use by and within the Department, including by the Minister, for the purpose of making a decision such as the impugned decision, is not the subject of the prohibition on the collection of personal information that would otherwise apply pursuant to APP 3.1.
90 APP 3.4 provides that the subclause applies in relation to sensitive information about an individual if, amongst other things:
(d) the APP entity is an enforcement body and the entity reasonably believes that:
(i) if the entity is the Immigration Department - the collection of the information is reasonably necessary for, or directly related to, one or more enforcement activities conducted by, or on behalf of, the entity; ...
91 The term "enforcement related activity", which is also defined by s 6 of the Privacy Act, plainly covers the exercise of the power by the Minister to cancel a person's visa in circumstances such as the present. The term is relevantly defined to include:
(f) The prevention, detection, investigation or remedy into misconduct of a serious nature, or other conduct prescribed by the regulations; …
92 I accept the Minister's submissions in that regard.
93 I do not accept the applicant's submission that the Minister or the Department could only obtain information where there was demonstrated "misconduct". In context, the power to undertake activity in relation to the exercise of powers under the Migration Act to cancel a visa is well within the activity described in para (f).
94 The complaint of the applicant is not so much with this analysis of the operation of the Privacy Act and the application of the APP to the Department's activities in requesting the applicant's criminal record, but with the circumstances in which the Department initially became aware of the applicant and that the applicant had a criminal record; and conduct of aState of Queensland official in imparting knowledge about the applicant to a member of the Department and providing a copy of the record to that member.
95 The broad submission made is that, if it can be demonstrated that the imparting of that knowledge and the provision of the criminal record by a State official to the Department was in breach of Queensland privacy law, then the criminal record, in the hands of the Department, constituted the "fruit of the poisonous tree" such that the Court should find that the Minister was not entitled to regard the criminal record ultimately obtained from the AFP.
96 The evidence or other information surrounding the provision of information concerning the applicant's conviction by a person employed by the State of Queensland to an official of the Commonwealth is, generally, rather hazy. It is not entirely clear how an officer of the State of Queensland came to inform an officer of the Department about the applicant's relevant conviction. It seems, however, that armed with some awareness of a conviction further inquiries were made by the Commonwealth officer of the Department.
97 In my view, on the facts as they have been set out above, no officer of the Department acted contrary to the APP. The record of the applicant was, under the Commonwealth Privacy Act, regularly obtained.
98 The application has made submissions about the operation of Queensland privacy law to support his "poisonous fruit" argument. However, even if contravention of that law could be shown, I accept the correctness of the decision in Goldie, above, which has been considered rightly decided in Abbasi and SZLWQ. (I note that Goldie was reversed on appeal but not in relation to this question.) The result is that I cannot see any basis upon which a "poisonous fruit" argument, as put on behalf of the applicant, can apply in this instance. There is nothing to suggest that the decision made by the Minister here lacked a jurisdictional basis. I do not see any basis to conclude that the Minister's decision was infected with jurisdictional error because of the possible breach of Queensland privacy law.
99 I should add that I do not consider that the provisions of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) upon which the applicant relies to claim a court has a discretion not to adduce evidence unlawfully obtained, has any application in these factual and administrative circumstances.
100 For these reasons, the first proposed ground for review by the applicant must fail.