Hun v Aljazeera International
[2023] FCA 1546
At a glance
Source factsCourt
Federal Court of Australia
Decision date
2023-12-06
Before
McEvoy J
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Judgment (7 paragraphs)
The applicant's submissions 8 In submitting that he should have his costs on a party and party basis, the applicant refers to r 40.04 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) and the usual position that where a party obtains an order in its favour following the hearing of an interlocutory application, costs should follow the event. The applicant contends that it is appropriate to determine the question of costs at the conclusion of any significant interlocutory application so that the parties may have an awareness of their accumulating costs liabilities in the proceeding: Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72 at 97 [67] (McHugh J); Taylor (liquidator), in the matter of Heading Contractors Pty Ltd (in liq) v Heading (No 2) [2021] FCA 925 at [8], [10] (Charlesworth J). 9 The applicant submits, however, that the ordinary rule in r 40.13 of the Rules should be dispensed with in this instance and costs be payable forthwith. Rule 40.13 of the Rules provides that if an order for costs is made on an interlocutory application then the party in whose favour the order is made must not tax those costs until the proceeding in which the order is made is finished. The applicant refers to Watson v Kriticos (Costs Payable Forthwith) [2022] FCA 4, where Perram J summarised the principles in relation to when r 40.13 may be dispensed with at [7] as follows: The exercise of the discretion may be justified in a number of circumstances, including where (FKP v Spirits at [9]): (a) the final determination of the proceeding is far away: Allstate Life Insurance Co v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (No 13) [1995] FCA 1459 at [5]; (b) a party has been required to incur significant costs over and above those which it would have incurred had the opposing party acted in handling the proceeding with competence and diligence: Life Airbag Company of Australia Pty Ltd v Life Airbag Company (New Zealand) Ltd [1998] FCA 545; (c) following a successful amendment application, a case is essentially a new proceeding: McKellar v Container Terminal Management Services Ltd [1999] FCA 1639 at [19] and [40]; (d) a discrete issue has been resolved: Australian Flight Test Services v Minister for Industry, Science and Technology [1996] FCA 1425 at [7]; or (e) there is some reason to think that interlocutory disputation is draining the ability of one side to conduct the litigation: Clipsal Australia Pty Ltd v Clipso Electrical Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 37 at [12]. 10 The applicant submits that the discretion to dispense with r 40.13 of the Rules should be exercised in this instance, having regard to the overarching purpose of facilitating the resolution of disputes as quickly and inexpensively and efficiently as possible. He relies on six matters in support of this position, namely: (a) the final determination of the proceeding is months away; (b) the applications dealt with a distinct and discrete issue in each proceeding which is now resolved, will not need to be revisited, and so the costs of those applications are separate and distinct from the other costs in the proceeding. The applicant says that they are capable of being calculated accurately and easily and are ripe for an order that they be taxed and payable immediately; (c) the respondents have been "resoundingly unsuccessful" in the applications and that the contentions argued were "ambitious"; (d) the applicant incurred significant costs in successfully resisting the applications, including costs of both senior and junior counsel. The applicant notes that the applications raised a number of contested questions of law and the respondents subpoenaed large volumes of material from Department of Home Affairs and adduced this material in evidence; (e) the respondents have the benefit of the applicant having paid over $500,000 in security for costs of the proceedings and so the demands of justice militate strongly in favour of the applicant being permitted to tax forthwith his costs of the applications; and (f) the applicant is a natural person involved in two defamation proceedings against two presumably well-resourced sets of respondents, and where there is a statutory cap on the damages he is entitled to recover. The applicant submits that the cost of litigation is a significant burden, and that the ongoing burden is a reason to order that costs be payable forthwith.