I do not rely on the contention for the respondent that clause d, dealing with a specific matter, narrows the meaning of clause 16 and limits its subject matter. No doubt a principle is stated by Lord Alvanley C.J. in Hesse v. Stevenson[1] that "however general the words of a covenant may be if standing alone, yet if, from other covenants in the same deed it is plainly and irresistibly to be inferred that the party could not have intended to use the words in the general sense which they import, the Court will limit the operation of the general words. The question therefore always has been, whether such an irresistible inference does arise." I cannot see my way to apply that doctrine in order to alter the meaning of clause 16, because I see nothing either in the subject matter or in the context to cut down irresistibly the plain meaning of the words of that clause. There is no dominating consideration to affect the interpretation of the clause as it stands. I could not, for instance, exclude the power of resumption for making new railways. Clause 16 expressly applies to resumption for "any public purpose or purposes whatsoever" - no words can be wider or more explicit, and they unquestionably include the resumption that has taken place in this case. But, while the meaning of clause 16 is unaffected by clause d of the schedule, the effect of the latter clause on the rights of the parties in cases falling within it is quite another question, and is the question that arises here. It will be observed from what has been said that clause d is, in point of construction, prior to clause 16, and is a clause specially inserted in writing for this particular lease. Each of these circumstances gives it, in case of conflict, superior force in comparison with clause 16. The circumstance that it is prior gives rise to a principle of construction which I indicated in Leggo v. Brown & Dureau Ltd.[2] on the authority of Forbes v. Git[3]. The circumstance of clause d being in writing raises another consideration supported by the case of Glynn v. Margetson & Co.[4], acted on by Griffith C.J., O'Connor J. and myself in Ryan v. Fergerson[5]. The conflict or inconsistency which exists is not total, but is a qualification, applicable to the circumstances predicated in clause d. As in Ringstad v. Gollin & Co. Pty. Ltd.[6], on the authority of Forbes v. Git and in parallel circumstances, I read the two clauses so as to reconcile them as far as possible, and in so doing I necessarily give controlling force to clause d where it applies. I bring to the interpretation of the two clauses, that is, to discover the meaning of the words of the respective clauses themselves, the methods ordinarily employed. But as to their construction, that is, their mutual legal effect when read in conjunction, to which the maxim Generalia specialibus non derogant properly applies, as explained fully in Bank Officials' Association (South Australian Branch) v. Savings Bank of South Australia[7], I apply the law laid down for Crown grants in Feather v. The Queen[8] and Viscountess Rhondda's Claim[9]. In the result, I take the effect of the two clauses so far as relevant to this case to be as follows: - Resumption of the land for railway purposes is permissible under clause 16, with or without notice, and, if with notice, then the length of the notice may be less than six months, and may be independently of the Victorian Railways Commissioners. In that case the lessee would be entitled under clause 16 to be compensated for "the value of its interest in the land so resumed," that is, for the value represented in money of the unexpired term of the lease, whatever that connotes. But by the special term of clause d, if the Crown at the instance of the Victorian Railways Commissioners gives not less than six months' notice of resumption - I presume to permit the lessees to make other arrangements - then the Crown is not bound to pay "any money or compensation for the said land or such part thereof as will have been resumed" - whatever that connotes. But I have no doubt the two expressions connote the same thing. If the one expression includes buildings, &c., so does the other; for I see nothing in any of the special references to buildings, &c., which attach rather to clause 16 than to clause d. In view of some aspects of the argument, I do not desire to say more on that point.