Liability of members of an unincorporated association
8 There was little evidence about the Club except that it is mainly a social club and has about 60 members. There was no evidence as to whether there are written rules of the Club. The trial judge found that the members of the Club had delegated their power to run the Club to a Committee. He found that Mr. Mazur had been authorised and directed by the Club's committee to arrange for the sheds to be demolished and that he had requested Mr. Hrybynyuk to undertake that work.
9 A member of an unincorporated association does not owe a duty of care to other members of the association if that is the only relationship between them: see Owen v. Northampton Borough Council [1992] 156 LGR 23 at 29; Prole v. Allen [1950] 1 All ER 476; Robertson v. Ridley & Anor. [1989] 1 WLR 872. Membership of an association's committee is not sufficient of itself to displace that basic principle. For a duty of care to arise between the members of an unincorporated association, it needs to be established on ordinary principles of negligence that a duty of care is owed in the particular circumstances.
10 This principle finds explication in Robertson v. Ridley. In that case, a member of an unincorporated association rode his motorcycle over a pothole in the driveway of the club premises, fell off and was injured. He sued the chairman and secretary who, on the club's rules, were "responsible in law for the conduct of the club". It was held that there was no duty of care owed by committee members to another member of the club for the state of the road merely arising out of the responsibilities imposed on the chairman and secretary by the club's rules. There was nothing else in the relationship of the plaintiff and committee members that gave rise to a duty.
11 The liability of a member of a committee of a voluntary association was considered in Prole, with a different outcome. Prole's case however, was different. The plaintiff, a member of an unincorporated association, fell down some unlit exit steps during club hours. There was a light near the steps that had been switched off by the club steward shortly before the accident. The steward, who was also the secretary of the club and one of the freeholders of the building, was held liable in negligence. As steward and secretary of the club, he had been appointed by the committee to look after the premises and to see that they were in a fit condition for use by members. His specific duties included turning the lights on and off.
12 It was held that, as steward of the club, he was in a different relationship to the members of the club from other members. He had been appointed the agent of each member to perform his duties reasonably and in that way owed a duty of care to each of the members to carry out his duties without negligence. The other committee members were found not to owe a duty of care to the plaintiff.
13 In Harrison v. West of Scotland Kart Club & Ors. [2000] Scots CS 284, the office bearers of the club were sued by a go-kart driver who was injured when he collided with the wall of a building. It was held that the action could proceed against the office bearers in circumstances where there had been a previous accident at the raceway and, the office bearers had been involved in the preparation and submission of plans for the raceway to the local authority and knew that unless there was some crash protection in the particular area where this crash occurred, there was a danger that a kart driver might lose control of the vehicle and collide with the building. The Court held that in such circumstances there was a prima facie case against the office bearers sufficient to enable the case to proceed. The Court said:
"The fact that the [office bearers] were at all relevant times members of the same club as the [plaintiff] does not give them any immunity: Owen v. Northampton Borough Council . Nor is it the fact that the [office bearers] were members or office bearers which fixes them with a duty of care: Prole v. Allen; Robertson v. Ridley . Rather it is their knowledge as outlined above coupled with their de facto assumption of the responsibility for taking executive decisions relating to track safety: Woolf LJ in Robertson v. Ridley ; Owen v. Northampton Borough Council ."
14 Mr. Hrybynyuk also relied upon the decision of this Court in Smith v. Yarnold [1969] 2 NSWR 410. In that case, a spectator at a greyhound race meeting conducted by the Taree Greyhound Racing Club was injured when a grandstand collapsed. The club was an unincorporated association and the management of its affairs was vested in the committee for the time being. The injured spectator was a contractual invitee having paid a fee for admission to the race meeting. He brought a claim against the members of the committee and the secretary of the club based both in contract and in negligence for breach of their duty as an occupier. The issue for the jury's determination was whether or not the committee members were the proper parties to be sued. The committee members had argued that all the members of the committee should have been sued.
15 Herron CJ observed at p.414 that "a claim in tort is not defeated because all tortfeasors are not sued" and held that there was sufficient evidence to establish that the club was the occupier of the racetrack. His Honour stated the law as to the liability of members of a club and committee members in the same terms as have been stated above. He added, at p.414 "As regards liability to a stranger, there is no distinction between a member of a committee and an ordinary member of the club, though members of a committee will be liable personally, to the exclusion of the other members, if they act personally".
16 There was no dispute between the parties here as to the application of these principles. The question was whether there was something in the circumstances that made Mr. Mazur liable beyond his membership of the Club. In this regard, Mr. Hrybynyuk conceded that Mr. Mazur was not sued because of his status as President of the Club. Rather, he was sued as the person who gave the direction for the demolition of the sheds. Mr. Hrybynyuk submitted that in the circumstances, Mr. Mazur was under a duty of the kind found to be owed by the principal to an independent contractor: see Rockdale Beef Pty. Limited v. Carey [2003] NSWCA 132.
17 In that case Mr. Carey, a stockman engaged as an independent contractor to work on Rockdale's feed lot, was injured when a steer ran suddenly into the path of the horse Mr Carey was riding, causing the horse and Mr Carey to fall. Mr. Carey was severely injured. Mr. Carey had originally been an employee of Rockdale. However, some time prior to the accident, Rockdale had changed its work arrangement and terminated the relationship of employer and employee and engaged Mr. Carey as an independent contractor. His duties remained the same, as did the overall control of the work that was carried out, that control remaining in Rockdale. Ipp JA, with whom Mason P and McColl J agreed, stated at [90]-[91]:
"90 Although he was an independent contractor, Mr Carey worked for no one apart from Rockdale and had done so for many years. The bargaining power of the parties was not equal. Mr Carey was as vulnerable to potential misuse as any employee. In Perre v Apand Pty Limited (1999) 198 CLR 180 the vulnerability of a specific plaintiff was regarded, generally, as being an important factor in determining whether a duty of care arises.
91 A defendant's control over the conduct that gives rise to the risk, a defendant's knowledge of the risk, and the relative inability of plaintiffs to protect themselves are also important factors in determining whether a duty of care arises (see, in particular, McHugh J in Perre v Apand Pty Limited at 226 to 229).