For the reasons prepared by Slicer J, which I have had the advantage of perusing in draft form, I agree that this appeal should be dismissed. I wish only to add a few words on the contention in ground 15 that having reached the tentative conclusion that he might make findings against the appellant that he had acted dishonestly and that his evidence in the Supreme Court hearing had been deliberately untruthful, the learned trial judge ought to have given the appellant the opportunity to respond and to be heard with respect thereto before the proceedings were brought to a final conclusion. In proceeding to announce his findings and thereupon to impose the penalty of striking the appellant off the Roll of Practitioners, it is claimed that the learned trial judge denied the appellant natural justice.

While these proceedings are not punitive and call for such of the orders open to the Court pursuant to the Legal Practitioners Act 1993, s76(1) as the Court considers "is necessary, and no more than is necessary, to maintain professional discipline and high standards of conduct" (per Cosgrove J in Dickens v The Law Society, 421981 at 16), before the imposition of any order of a disciplinary nature (and one depriving him altogether of his right to practise), a practitioner should be given the opportunity to be heard, not only in respect of the findings open to the Court, but also in mitigation of any penalty to which a practitioner's conduct as found might expose him. In this respect, I agree with my brother Wright J, whose reasons likewise I have had the advantage of reading. Where I respectfully differ from him is in his conclusion that once the findings had been announced, the appellant should have been afforded the opportunity to make submissions as to the appropriate order and to urge that one short of striking off would meet the justice of the case. I differ only because I am satisfied from a perusal of the transcript that the appellant was given ample opportunity to make submissions counter to those of counsel for the respondent Society who had strongly submitted that findings of the kind in fact made by his Honour should be made and who had sought the order of striking off as the appropriate one should the trial judge make those findings.