And see the instructive exposition by Brereton J in Waterman v Gerling Australia Insurance Co Pty Ltd (2005) 194 FLR 419 at [91].
44 To illustrate the degree of clarity and lack of ambiguity required of the representation, some Judges have spoken in terms of a representation amounting to an invitation to rely on it: see Streatfield v Winchcombe Carson Trustee Co (Canberra) Ltd [1981] 1 NSWLR 519 per Wootten J at 522 and the decision of Bryson J in Dainford Ltd v Repon Pty Ltd NSWSC 1 February 1988 unreported.
Conclusions
45 My conclusion is that neither the first representation, the second representation nor the third representation as alleged in the statement of claim is established as having been made.
46 I am not prepared to find that Mr Richards made the statement at the January 2006 annual general meeting which Mr Howe deposed was made by Mr Richards. As can be seen from [16] to [18] and [20] to [26] above, the evidence concerning this simple fact, short in compass as it is, is wide ranging, diverse and conflicting. I do not doubt that there was some discussion at that annual general meeting concerning the potential conflict between the 2006 World Championship and the 2007 Australian Championship. I say "potential", because the place and dates of the 2007 Australian Championship were not then fixed. Mr Richards does not concede that he made the statement he is alleged to have made. Mr Howe's own evidence as to the occasion on which the statement was made was conflicting. Witnesses at least as reliable as Mr Howe denied that Mr Richards made the statement on the occasion on which he is alleged to have made it. I decline to find that Mr Richards made the statement as alleged by Mr Howe.
47 Even if the statement were made in that form, it would not amount to a representation as alleged in paragraph 4 of the statement of claim, namely, a representation that there would be a sail off between the top 5 placed junior sailors from the 2007 Australian Championship and the Australian junior sailors who competed in the 2006 World Championship to determine the top placed 5 sailors who would be eligible for selection in the Australian team.
48 The lack of certainty in the terms of the statement as deposed to by Mr Howe; the fact that it was not then certain that the clash would occur at all; and the fact that all involved well knew that the ultimate discretion in making the selection was vested in the executive committee (to which the management of the affairs of the defendant was committed by the RA in the same way as it is generally committed to the board of directors of a company), means that the statement should not be interpreted as a firm representation as to the way in which the defendant would act, so that it would be unconscionable if the defendant acted otherwise: see State of New South Wales v R T & Y E Falls Investments Pty Ltd supra at [17].
49 So far as the second representation is concerned, again the terms of the 2 November 2006 letter which are relied on do not rise to the representation as alleged in the statement of claim. In paragraph 5 of the statement of claim, the representation was alleged to be that the five top placed sailors in the AOST would be selected in the team to compete at the 2007 World Championship. The words of the letter are the equivocal words "and a team of 5 sailors may then compete at the Optimist World Championship in Sardinia, Italy July 07." I find that the representation as alleged was not made. Again, even if it were, bearing in mind that the letter dealt with the agreement with Yachting Australia to form the AOST, which had purposes other than the selection of the international team, and the knowledge of the complete discretion in the matter of the executive committee of the defendant, the representation should not be taken as one that could be relied on as founding an estoppel.
50 I have already observed that, in any event, the plaintiff could not be entitled to relief upon the establishment of the second representation alone, unless the third representation were also established. In relation to this, Mr Howe asserts the statement made to him by Mr Bennett and Mr Bennett denies it. Upon this direct conflict between Mr Howe and Mr Bennett, I prefer the evidence of Mr Bennett. I have already recorded my respective views upon their credit. Furthermore, in my view the inherent probabilities favour the evidence of Mr Bennett. He was at the time President of the NSW affiliated association, but in relation to the defendant he was, at most, one non office holding member of its executive committee. He says that it was his belief that he was not a member of the executive committee until 11 January 2007. Whether he was an executive committee member in late 2006 or not, it seems to me unlikely that he would have taken it on himself to make a statement purporting to bind the defendant. The submission that membership of the executive committee would have conferred on him power to bind the defendant I reject. I find that the third representation was not made.
51 The result of the findings in [46], [49] and [50] alone is that the plaintiff's claim cannot succeed.
52 It is not necessary for me to deal with the issues of reliance or detriment or discretionary considerations. I say only that the plaintiff's claim faces considerable difficulties in those areas as well.
53 There is an interesting and unresolved area of law that would become material if the plaintiff's claim were otherwise established. This is the question of whether an estoppel by representation can found a cause of action based upon the representation alone, rather than being relied on to assist the establishment of a cause of action arising from other circumstances. Thus, in Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387, the plaintiffs succeeded upon a cause of action based upon a contract which had in fact not been entered into, but the existence of which the defendant was precluded by the estoppel from denying. In Handley, Estoppel by Conduct and Election (2006), the learned author seems inclined to the view that the representation alone cannot be the source of legal obligation: see [1-010]. Reliance is placed on what was said by Brandon LJ in Amalgamated Investment & Property Co Ltd (In Liquidation) v Texas Commerce International Bank Ltd [1982] QB 84 at 131 - 132. It would seem that this view continues to be the accepted view in England: see Baird Textiles Holdings Ltd v Marks & Spencer plc [2002] 1 All ER (Comm) 737 per Mance LJ at [87] - [91]. The learned authors of Meagher, Gummow and Lehane, Equity: Doctrines and Remedies (4th ed, 2002) at [17-065] appear to endorse the opposite view, namely that in appropriate circumstances the representation itself can be enforced, although with some reservation. This interesting and important question does not arise in this case.
54 The result is that the plaintiff's claim must be dismissed.