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[2012] VCAT 927
Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal
2012-07-03
Original judgment source is linked above.
Background: Installation and Use of EGMS at the Hoppers Club[1]
No permit is required to install and use a gaming machine in a restricted area if that area does not exceed 25 per cent of the gross floor area of the premises where liquor may be consumed.
The gross floor area where liquor may be consumed does not include bedrooms, external drinking and dining areas, service areas, kitchens, area behind bars, storage areas, administrative areas, lifts, stairs, ramps, escalators, corridors, hallways, lobbies, service ducts, plant rooms and toilets.
There was some discussion at the hearing as to whether the existing use rights could extend beyond the existing gaming room to the full extent of 25% of the floor area. The applicant did not however pursue an establishment of existing use rights to that extent, and it is also unnecessary to finally decide that issue. However, I observe that the restriction in the planning control operating prior to 18 October 2006 was in relation to a 'restricted area' not greater than 25% of the floor area. The emphasis appears to be on the restricted area (i.e. here, the existing gaming room), and the applicant had never prior to 18 October 2006 pursued any notional planning scheme entitlement (insofar as it may have then existed) to extend its restricted area whilst that opportunity existed within the scheme. I therefore doubt that existing use rights would extend further than that contended for by the applicant in this case - i.e. within the existing gaming room.
Any condition or restriction to which the use was subject continues to be met. This includes any implied restriction on the extent of the land subject to the existing use right or the extent of activities within the use.
In my view no implied restriction on the extent of existing use rights can be derived from a meticulous cataloguing of the extent of particular activities as at the relevant date of commencement of the planning scheme:
(a) Such a process would not be to characterise the use by reference to its real and substantial purpose "according to ordinary terminology". This is the process envisaged by s6(3)(b) of the Act, by clause 63.02 and by authority;
(b) Such a process would give to the words "implied restriction" a meaning contrary to their ordinary meaning. It would attribute to circumstances of the degree of extension the notion of "restriction". "Restriction" ordinarily implies an external cause or source. No such cause or source has been identified in the present case. I should add that I incline strongly to the view that such restriction must be founded in a planning control, but it is unnecessary to so decide in the present case.
(c) Such a process would give to the words "implied restriction" a meaning unnecessary for their operation and one which did not give effect to the "construction principle" which I have stated above, requiring them to be interpreted in favour of the holder of existing use rights.
[1] See the Witness Statements of Mr Eggleton, Mr Bate and Mr Mitchell
Hoppers Crossing Club Ltd
Wyndham CC [2012] VCAT 927
(1975) 132 CLR 83
(1973) 129 CLR 138