I. Non-applicant Group Members
2 The applicants, who are Charles Hodges and Mark Hodges as Trustees of the Charles Hodges Superannuation Fund, are representative parties under Pt IVA of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). The group members they represent are persons who, at various times, suffered the misfortune of investing in the MFS Premium Income Fund ('the Fund'), a failed property trust from Queensland. The point of the representative proceeding is to recover damages from the auditors of the Fund's compliance plan ('KPMG') and some of its officers. The allegations are detailed and, to an extent, complex.
3 The applicants do not include John Alexander Manton and Elia Mary Lynch as trustees for the Manlyn Superannuation Fund although there is no dispute that they are group members.
4 The difference between the Charles Hodge Superannuation Fund and the Manlyn Superannuation Fund is this: the former has at all times kept its unit holding in the Fund whereas the latter disposed of its in November 2008 after the Fund was listed on the Australian Stock Exchange on 16 October 2008.
5 Plainly the issues which arise as to the quantification of their respective losses are going to be different and there is, in my opinion, utility in having this aspect of the matter determined at the initial trial. Although in its oral submissions KPMG faintly suggested that this Court lacked power to order the determination of issues with respect to group members who were not named as applicants this submission was not pursued in its eventual written submissions. The real question is whether considerations of practicality require it. In principle, I accept that they do.
6 KPMG submitted nevertheless that five matters suggested that the claim of the Manlyn Superannuation Fund should not be determined at the initial trial until its trustees first became named applicants or unless they were granted leave to appear. These matters were:
(a) the need for them to indicate a willingness to be included in the proceedings. I do not consider this necessary. Inevitably, the trustees will need to provide evidence in the trial of the course of their ownership of their units.
(b) the need for them to be adequately represented at the trial. I do not consider there is any risk that they will not be.
(c) the need to protect KPMG against any costs risk. I do not consider that the Court would not have power to award costs against them in the event that their claim failed.
(d) the need for them to provide discovery. This is a real concern. Whilst I consider that I probably have the power to order discovery against them, even as non-party group members, I will condition the orders I will make on an undertaking by the trustees to consent to a discovery order.
(e) the need to permit KPMG to take advantage of procedural evidentiary rules such as the rule in Jones v Dunkel. Again, this is probably a unfounded concern, but I will condition the orders I will make on an undertaking by the trustees of the Manlyn Superannuation Fund that they will accept at trial that procedural rules of evidence apply to them as if they were parties.
7 Subject to those matters, I am content to proceed with the common issues being framed in a way which includes the position of the trustees of the Manlyn Superannuation Fund.