The reasoning process put forward to support that view includes the following:-
"31. For the following reasons, it is submitted that, in the events that have occurred, no "dispute" or "medical dispute" exists for the purposes of sections 26D of the CL Act and 321 of the WIMWC Act.
32. First, it is made clear in section 322 of WIMWC Act that assessment of the degree of permanent impairment is to be made in accordance with WorkCover Guidelines.
33. Secondly, in view of the provisions dealing with the inter-relationship between the CL Act and the WIMWC Act, the obligation imposed by section 322 applies equally to the assessment of the degree of permanent impairment of an offender for the purposes of the CL Act. That is so because the Minister has not yet exercised his discretion to issue specific guidelines for the purposes of applying the WIMWC Act to offenders and, in those circumstances the WorkCover Guidelines apply (see Clause 19 of Part 6 of Schedule 1 of the CL Act).
34. Thirdly, the obligation to assess the degree of permanent impairment in accordance with WorkCover Guidelines applies to assessments generally and also specifically to medical disputes which are referred to an approved medical specialist for assessment.
35. Fourthly, as the WorkCover Guidelines for the Assessment of Permanent Impairment make explicit, they are intended to be applied by medical practitioners. The scheme is not one which contemplates an individual person who is not a medical practitioner determining the degree of permanent impairment."
23 The parties were aware of only three authorities that were thought to be of possible assistance in dealing with the question in dispute. The plaintiff relied on Ferraro v WGE Pty Limited [2005] NSW WCC PD 98 (26 August 2005) (a decision of Acting Deputy President Deborah Moore) and Welsh v TNT Express [1993] NSWCC 15 (2 July 1993); (1993) 9 NSWCCR 345 (a decision of Geraghty J). The defendant relied on what was said in paragraphs 42 and 43 of the judgment in Thomson v WorkCover Authority of New South Wales [2004] NSWSC 282 (a decision of Bell J).
24 Section 319 (which appears in Part 7 of Chapter 7 of the Act) contains a definition of "medical dispute". The section contains the following:-
" 319 Definitions
In this Act:
medical dispute means a dispute between a claimant and the person on whom a claim is made about any of the following matters or a question about any of the following matters in connection with a claim:
….
(c) the degree of permanent impairment of the worker as a result of an injury"
The section also contains a definition of "Approved Medical Specialist".
25 Section 321 of the Act is as follows:-
" 321 Referral of medical dispute for assessment
(1) A medical dispute may be referred for assessment under this Part by a court, the Commission or the Registrar, either of their own motion or at the request of a party to the dispute. The Registrar is to give the parties notice of the referral.
(2) The parties to the dispute may agree on the approved medical specialist who is to assess the dispute but if the parties have not agreed within 7 days after the dispute is referred, the Registrar is to choose the approved medical specialist who is to assess the dispute."
Section 322(1) of the Act is as follows:-
" 322 Assessment of impairment
(1) The assessment of the degree of permanent impairment of an injured worker for the purposes of the Workers Compensation Acts is to be made in accordance with WorkCover Guidelines (as in force at the time the assessment is made) issued for that purpose."
26 In the determination of the narrow issue, I propose to first look at the question of whether or not there is a dispute.
27 The meaning to be attributed to "dispute" excited little argument. Whilst the first defendant submitted that there could be no "dispute", this contention was not the subject of elaboration. The dictionary meanings given to the word cover a wide range (including merely, absence of agreement and non-acceptance). The concept of inability to reach agreement seems to have been embraced by the first defendant in its submissions.
28 If regard be had to the relevant facts and circumstances of this case, I consider that the finding of fact that should be made is that there is a dispute between the plaintiff and the first defendant about the matter or a question about the matter of the degree of permanent impairment of the plaintiff as a result of his injury. What is being sought by him is an assessment as to whether or not the injury has resulted in a degree of permanent impairment that is at least 15% (which was described in the application as a "threshold dispute"). Presumably, what has been referred to as the "threshold dispute" falls within the category of being a question about any of the matters specified in (a)-(g) (in this case (c)). It seems to me that the said facts and circumstances reveal there is dispute both as to the "threshold dispute" and as to, inter alia, what is related thereto.