I come now to another question of much more importance - whether such an action as this can be brought at all in the Supreme Court. In the very earliest of these Acts provision has been made for preventing unnecessary legal expense in connection with conveyancing and litigation. The earlier Acts provided generally that all disputes between members of the society and the trustees or the governing body should be referred either to arbitration or to justices. I need not trace the series of decisions extending over a period of years, but they continued, I think, up to 1878, when the case of Mulkern v. Lord [1] was decided. It has been decided in a series of cases that this provision for the case of a dispute arising between the members of a society and the governing body did not apply to a controversy between a mortgagor and a mortgagee. That was the recognized construction up to 1878 in England, and in New South Wales up to 1873, when the Act was passed which is now contained in the Act of 1902. That Act contained a series of provisions taken from the Act 18 & 19 Vict. c. 63, which was passed at a time when it was understood that provisions of this sort in reference to Friendly Societies did not apply to, and that the provisions in the Acts originally relating to Friendly Societies and incorporated in the Building Societies Act , did not include disputes between mortgagor and mortgagee. That was the language used in the Statutes, and the state of the law as declared by the Courts up to 1855. I think that, as the legislature of New South Wales adopted the law of England in 1855 in identical language, it is fair to infer that the words were intended to be construed in New South Wales in the same sense as they had been in England. It is a common practice in British dependencies to adopt Imperial laws in the same language, one of the reasons being that they will thus have the benefit of the views of English Courts on the construction of the language used. I will refer now to the express provision under which this question arises. Sec. 58, sub-sec. (1) provides that disputes between an officer or member, or person claiming through a member of a society and the society or trustees, treasurer or committee of management shall be decided in the manner prescribed by the rules, and the decision so made shall be binding and conclusive on all parties without appeal. The controversies referred to are disputes between individuals and the society collectively. Then there is a provision as to what is to happen if the disputes are referred to justices, but limiting the powers of justices to all such powers as may be exercised by justices in summary proceedings. Then comes sec. 59 (sec. 15 of the Act of 1873) which provides: "In all societies established under this Act all applications - (b) for the settlement of disputes that may arise or may have arisen in any society, the rules of which do not prescribe any other mode of settling such disputes; or (c) for any other relief, order, or direction, ... shall be made to the District Court of the district within which the usual or principal place of business of the society is situate. (2) Such Court shall, upon the application of any person interested in the matter, entertain such application and give such relief and make such orders and directions in relation to the matter of such application as hereinafter mentioned, or as might before the commencement of the Friendly Societies Act of 1873 be given or made by the Supreme Court or any other Court, and the decision of such District Court upon and in relation to such application as aforesaid shall not be subject to any appeal." It is conceded that this action, being an action of ejectment, only falls within the jurisdiction of the District Court if it comes within this section, for otherwise the action will not lie in that Court. The Supreme Court has decided in this very case that that section does not apply to an action of ejectment by a mortgagee. Perhaps their decision went rather further than necessary. The words "make such orders and directions ... as hereinafter mentioned," may relate to the succeeding section - orders that the Supreme Court would not have made in its ordinary jurisdiction. But the question is whether the action of ejectment by a mortgagee against a mortgagor falls within that section. So far as the provision as to disputes is invoked, I am of opinion that the section has no application. For in this case there is no dispute. The main facts were never really disputed. There is some dispute as to how much is actually due, but, in my opinion, a dispute, in order to be relevant for this purpose, must be a dispute relevant to the existence of the right to the relief claimed by the plaintiff. In this case there is no dispute as to any fact affecting the plaintiffs' right to recover. The only question in the action is whether they are entitled to recover possession of the land. If any part of sec. 59 can be invoked, it is that referring to applications "for any other relief, order, or direction." The provision was originally in these words, sec. 15 of the 37 Vict. No. 4: - "In all societies established under this Act or any of the said repealed Acts all applications for the removal of trustees or for any other relief order or direction or for the settlement of disputes ... shall be made to the District Court of the district within which the usual or principal place of business of the society shall be situate," and then come the same words as in sub-sec. (2) of sec. 59 of the Act of 1902. In what sense would these words have been construed in England when they were passed? Were they words likely to have been used by the legislature or any lawyer to describe an action of ejectment in 1855? It is quite clear that they would not. Relief is a term used in equity, but I do not know that any instance can be found of a person in possession asking for relief from an action of ejectment being spoken of as seeking relief. At any rate some sensible meaning must be given to the words. I confess that I felt a difficulty for some time on the point, but after further consideration I think there are many kinds of relief which might be granted by the District Court under that provision. For instance, suppose the question were raised whether the funds of the society were properly invested, or the trustees were about to invest them in a way that was thought to be improper, the District Court would, I think, have power to entertain a suit to compel proper investment. That is only one instance. Considering that these societies are in many respects analogous to joint stock companies, and putting aside disputes amongst individual members, I think that this construction gives ample meaning to the words without straining them to give them a sense which I am sure they could not have borne when introduced in 1855. The practice of New South Wales in respect of actions of ejectment was exactly the same as it had been in England.