Consideration
23 The appellant alleges that the primary judge erred in dismissing his application for the same reasons advanced before the Federal Circuit Court. The first respondent submits that the primary judge's decision was correct, and the appeal must fail.
24 The delegate's decision in the appellant's case was a Part 5-reviewable decision within the meaning of s 338(2) of the Act. As indicated already, by virtue of s 348 of the Act, the Tribunal was required to review the decision "if an application is properly made under section 347".
25 Section 347 of the Act relevantly provides as follows:
(1) An application for review of a Part 5-reviewable decision must:
(a) be given to the Tribunal within the prescribed period, being a period ending not later than:
(i) if the Part 5-reviewable decision is covered by subsection 338(2), (3), (3A), (4) or (7A) - 28 days after the notification of the decision.
26 As already noted, for the purposes of s 347 of the Act, the prescribed period is defined in reg 4.10 of the Regulations as starting when the applicant receives notice of the decision and ending at the end of 21 days after the day on which the notice is received.
27 When the Minister or his delegate refuses to grant a visa, he is required by s 66(1) of the Act to notify the applicant of the decision in the prescribed way. As noted above, reg 2.16(3) of the Regulations provides that, for the purposes of s 66(1) of the Act, the Minister must notify an applicant of a decision to refuse to grant a visa by one of the methods specified in s 494B of the Act. As noted above, s 494B(5) provides for transmission by email as a method by which a document may be given to a person.
28 The first respondent was entitled to rely on this method since the document notifying the delegate's decision was transmitted by email to the last email address provided to the first respondent by the appellant for the purposes of receiving documents in accordance with s 494B(5). By operation of s 494C(5) of the Act, the appellant's authorised representative and the appellant (see below) were taken to have received the emailed notification of the delegate's decision at the end of the day on which the document is transmitted. This was the end of 18 December 2015.
29 Section 494D(1) of the Act provides that if a person gives the first respondent written notice of the name and address of another person authorised by the first person to receive documents, the first respondent must give the authorised recipient the documents instead of the first person. The appellant gave the written notice referred to in s 494D(1) when he completed his Visa application form as described in [3] above. As will have been seen, s 494D(2) of the Act provides that if a document is given to the authorised recipient, it is taken to have been given to the first person.
30 By operation of ss 494B(5), 494C(5) and 494D(1) and (2) of the Act, the applicant was taken to have received the notification of the delegate's decision at the end of 18 December 2015, when it was emailed that day to the email address he had given in his Visa application form.
31 I reject the appellant's argument that the Tribunal should not have included public holidays when calculating time because the time limits in s 347(1)(b) of the Act and reg 4.10 of the Regulations are calculated in "days", not "working days". One may contrast these provisions with other provisions of the Act, which do indeed refer to working days: see, for example, ss 137K, 195, 332H, 352, 379A, 379C, 418, 441C, 473HB, 473HD, and 494B(4). None of these latter provisions were, however, applicable here.
32 Consistently with ss 36 and 37 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), "days" in the provisions relevant to the appellant's case means calendar days. Section 36 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) makes particular provision for the case where a thing must by another Act be done on a Saturday, a Sunday or a holiday, but this would not have assisted the appellant. He was obliged to have filed his application for review in the Tribunal by 8 January 2016. This was a Friday and not a public holiday: see s 36(3). In any event, assuming the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) was applicable, the effect of s 36 would only be to allow him to file the application the next day that was not a Saturday, a Sunday or a public holiday: see s 36(2) and (3).
33 In the present circumstances, the appellant has not shown that there was any error in the judgment of the primary judge, who held that, as the application for review to the Tribunal was made out of time, the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction. Neither the Tribunal nor the Federal Circuit Court were able to extend time.
34 I would add, lest it be thought it had been overlooked, that the reference in the Tribunal's reasons to reg 2.55 of the Regulations (which was inapplicable here) was in error. For the reasons explained, however, the error could have made no possible difference, given that s 494C(5) (which was applicable) had the same effect as reg 2.55.
35 The legislative provisions applicable in the appellant's case were explained to him at the hearing. The appellant indicated that he understood their operation and he had hoped to obtain a student visa. The Court has no power, however, to grant or refuse a student visa. This power lies with the first respondent, subject to merits review by the Tribunal.
36 For the reasons stated, the appeal should be dismissed. The appellant should pay the first respondent's costs of the appeal.
I certify that the preceding thirty-six (36) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Kenny.