18 The evidence to which I have referred makes it clear that a number of the discretionary considerations to which I have referred fall in Mr Albarran's favour. I have already summarised some of those matters, and I shall not repeat what I have said. Thus, it seems, there was a proper basis by which the order made could be supported. However, this is not in any way some sort of appeal from the order made by the Registrar. It is a hearing de novo. It is thus for me to consider all the evidence afresh, and to exercise the discretion anew, not guided by any presumption in favour of the correctness of the order made by the Registrar. Indeed, it could not be otherwise in circumstances where that order was made (as the rules provide) without a hearing, and was not supported by a statement of reasons. In those circumstances, a basis for challenging the exercise of discretion (if, contrary to what I have said, that were what is required) would not be available.
19 There is one more factor to which regard must be paid. That was hinted at by Einstein J in Chint, when his Honour referred to the proposition that a successful party is entitled to the fruits of its success, and to enforce the court's orders. I accept that. Although his Honour framed the proposition in terms of "major commercial litigation" I do not think that the principle is so limited. There is a real public interest in enabling parties who have litigated their disputes to enforce the victory that they have achieved. That public interest arises, at least in part, because the system of adjudication through courts depends firstly on acceptance of the outcome (if necessary, after exhausting all available avenues of appeal) and, secondly, the ability to enforce the outcome. If the process of adjudication is to survive, so that people do not resort to self-help, the courts should be slow to interfere in the normal processes of enforcement.
20 Equally, however, there is a legitimate public interest in having trained people, who perform important work, remaining available to perform that work. It would be a loss to the community if Mr Albarran's services as an insolvency practitioner were not available to the community; particularly, although this is not a consideration of great significance, during what is often called the "global financial crisis".
21 Equally, there is a significant public interest in the proper support of dependants by those who are, in the old-fashioned and somewhat paternalistic phrase, the breadwinner. Mr Albarran's unchallenged evidence is that the child of his previous marriage, the children of his present partner, and the child that he has had with that present partner, as well as that present partner, are all dependent on him for support. If he is prevented from earning his living (and the proper inference from his evidence is that the making of a bankruptcy order would prevent him from earning his living) then all those people will suffer.
22 Finally, in this context, I note that the instalment order made would not mean that the judgment debt remained outstanding for an unconscionable length of time. As a judgment of the Court, it carries interest at the rate, presently, of 9% per annum. The evidence of Mr Vallance includes a table prepared by him showing how long it would take for the judgment debt to be repaid if the interest rate remained the same and if the payments were made on time. On the evidence of Mr Vallance, the judgment debt would be repaid by February 2013; a period of a little less than four years. In the circumstances of this case, having regard to the amount of the judgment debt, I do not regard that as a time period so long that, of itself, it speaks against the continuation of the instalment order. The repayments that Mr Albarran has proposed (and that the Registrar, by his order, has confirmed) make very substantial reductions in the principal amount of the debt: a little under $23,000 per month initially, and of course increasing thereafter. Although it would be desirable if the judgment debt could be paid more quickly, there is no basis on the evidence for thinking that this would be likely to happen if the instalment order were rescinded. On the contrary, if the instalment order is rescinded and Mr Albarran is made bankrupt, it is likely that the great bulk of the judgment debt will not be paid at all.
23 Accordingly, taking all those matters into account, I am of the view that the order sought, for the rescission of the instalment order made on 17 April 2009, should not be granted. That is because, re-exercising the discretion anew myself, as I am required to do, I am persuaded that the instalment order is in all the circumstances of this case appropriate.