Was there a continuance of the use as a shop notwithstanding the gap in physical use?
47 Mr Wilson further submits that the evidence indicates an intention on the part of Mr Land to lease the premises as a shop, or alternatively, not to abandon the use as a shop. If the Court so finds, Mr Wilson submits that this intention is sufficient for there to be a continuance of use, notwithstanding a finding that there was a cessation in the physical use of the premises. This submission requires an examination of the relevant authorities.
48 In Daniel v Manly Municipal Council (1975) 34 LGRA 14, the use of a building for silk-screen printing ceased in December 1974. On 16 April 1976, the Council refused a development application dated 11 February 1975. The applicants were the new tenants. It was submitted by the Council that, upon the departure of the previous tenant, the existing use (which included silk-screen painting) was abandoned because the only intention of the owner was to have a tenant. Rath J considered that there was no evidence of an intention to abandon existing use rights, and noted that the plaintiffs, with the consent of the owner, had made an application on the assumption that the existing use rights continued. Rath J said that an existing use right does not necessarily come to an end because a tenant vacates a premises. Rath J rejected the argument of the Council, and held that the existing use right had not been abandoned.
49 Woollahra Municipal Council v Banool Developments Pty Ltd (1973) 129 CLR 138 involved a property which had been used as a motor garage and for related purposes from 1943 to March 1969. Banool Developments, who had purchased the land in 1968, submitted a development application in April 1969 for replacement of the building on the premises. The proposed use of the new building was different to the existing use, being for a service station and for parking. The development application was refused, and litigation ensued for a number of years. The issue before the Court was whether the existing use had been abandoned. Mason J (the other members of the High Court concurring) held that the making of the development application and associated litigation did not in those circumstances indicate an intention to abandon the existing use. His Honour said that the development application merely indicated the use which Banool Developments proposed to put the land if the application was approved. His Honour held that the existing use had not been abandoned, noting that the primary judge, Hope J, had found that the subjective intention of Banool Developments was to continue the existing use should the development application be refused.
50 Hudak v Waverley Municipal Council (1989) 18 NSWLR 709 involved a two-storey building which was lawfully occupied by tenants in separate flats between 1976 and 1980. After 1980, the building continued to exist but deteriorated to the extent that it was incapable of being used for any purpose. In 1985, a series of litigation in relation to the building commenced between Waverley Council and Mr Hudak. The issue before the Court of Appeal was whether Mr Hudak had abandoned the existing use as a multi-occupancy building. It was accepted that Mr Hudak had always intended to put the building into a habitable condition and to have it occupied by tenants after matrimonial problems with his wife had been resolved and after litigation with Waverley Council had ended. It was also accepted that Mr Hudak had deliberately allowed the building to become derelict, with the objective of making the land less attractive to his wife prior to a property settlement. Hope AJA considered whether a subjective intention on its own was enough to continue an existing use and said (at 716):
" As it seems to me, it is necessary to have regard to the whole of the circumstances, including the subjective intention of the relevant person, and to determine whether in light of all those matters the cessation of actual use proved by the facts is outweighed by an asserted subjective intention to continue the use ."
51 Hope AJA held that the cessation of actual use was not outweighed by Mr Hudak's subjective intention to continue the use. That is, the intention not to use the premises as a residential flat building during an indefinite period, allowing the building so to deteriorate in condition so as to become dangerous and uninhabitable, meant that there was an intention to abandon.
52 In Kogarah Municipal Council v Johnstone (1979) 41 LGRA 366, the defendants owned two parcels of land, and at the rear of one of the properties lay two tennis courts which, up until some time before May 1973, had been used commercially for day and night tennis. In May 1973, the then owners of the subject premises granted options to purchase the properties to a company, which was interested in redevelopment and had no interest in using either of the properties for the commercial hire of tennis courts. The options were exercised in November 1973. Between late 1973 and June 1975 procedures were in train to alter the proposed zoning of the land. In June 1975 the land was advertised for sale and the defendants entered a contract to purchase the land on 1 June 1976. The contract was completed on 1 October 1976. The defendants had purchased the land with the intention of letting the tennis courts for hire and setting up a tennis coaching school. The tennis courts had become substantially neglected. However, from time to time the defendants would use one of the courts for social tennis. The issue was whether there was a continuation of the existing use of the commercial hire of tennis courts. Powell J held that the existing use had been abandoned, taking into account the failure to use the tennis courts for some three and a half years, the original owners having no further interest in their use after granting the option, and the developers having no interest in using the tennis courts after exercising the option.
53 In the present case, in the absence of evidence from Mr Land himself, Mr Wilson submits that the Court should infer the asserted intention from the physical uses established by the facts. That is, the lease to Roger Mackenzie for approximately 12 months until 1971, and the later lease to Mr Wells, who initially used the land for the manufacture of rocking horses and later, upon Mr Land's suggestion, used the land for the sale of rocking horses and toys. From these facts, Mr Wilson submits that Mr Land's intention when he leased the premises from 1978 to Mr Wells was not to break the law, and to lease it for the lawful purpose of manufacturing and selling goods by retail. As noted in par [6] above, subject to the existing use exception, a "shop" was prohibited at all relevant times.
54 Mr Wilson further submits that the relevant intention in question is one of abandonment rather than continuance; a concept that requires an overt thought process rather than a lackadaisical approach, and that no such intention could be inferred from Mr Land's actions. Mr Wilson relies on the judgment in Woollahra Municipal Council v Banool Developments Pty Ltd, and the way in which s 107(3) of the Act was framed:
" Without limiting the generality of subsection 2(e), a use is to be presumed, unless the contrary is established, if it ceases to be so used for a continuous period of 12 months ."
55 I note also on this point the comments of Mahoney JA in Hudak v Waverley Municipal Council (at 713):
" The proof, at a later date, of what was the intention of the owner when, in fact, the use for that purpose ceased is, as experience has shown, often difficult. It is, I think, to the solution of difficulties of this kind that s 107(3) is primarily directed ."
56 In my view, the distinction between an intention to "continue a use" and an intention "not to abandon a use", if any, is a fine one. The same applies to the corollary, the distinction between an intention to "abandon a use" and an intention "not to continue a use". Whichever approach is adopted, the onus does not fall on the Council to establish that there was abandonment by way of an overt thought process. The onus remains on the Agostinos to establish that there was a continuance of use, or alternatively, that there was no abandonment of use.
57 In my view, the Agostinos have not discharged the onus of proving on the balance of probabilities that Mr Land's subjective intention was to continue the use of the premises as a shop. I am also of the view the Agostinos have not discharged the onus of proving that on the balance of probabilities, Mr Land's subjective intention was not to abandon the use as a shop.
58 I accept that it was Mr Land who suggested to Mr Wells that he should display a rocking horse out the front of the premises. I also accept that Mr Wells eventually used the premises as a shop, and that this was likely to have occurred whilst he was Mr Land's tenant. However, in my view, these facts are insufficient to discharge the onus, especially when it is considered that (i) Mr Land used the premises between 1971 and 1978 for farm storage purposes only; (ii) there is no evidence to suggest that Mr Land was actively seeking tenants or wanted to use the premises as a shop between 1971 and 1978; (iii) when Mr Wells occupied the premises in 1978, it was used only for the manufacture of rocking horses and it is not clear when he began selling; and (iv) the intention of Mr Wells when he occupied the premises in 1978 was to use the shed only for the manufacture of rocking horses.
59 The sum of these factors indicates to me that the contrary was the case. That is, Mr Land did not intend to use the premises as a shop and abandoned that use. The fact that Mr Land adopted a lackadaisical approach, and that some time later, Mr Wells decided to sell goods by retail is not sufficient on its own to establish on the balance of probabilities that Mr Land had intended for the premises to operate as a shop after 1971. I note Mr Wilson's submission that the Court should infer that the use was not abandoned because Mr Wells and Mr Land would have wanted to use the land for a lawful purpose when Mr Wells began selling, but, again, I do not think that this is sufficient to discharge the onus.