The learned judge authorized the entry of judgment in accordance with the terms of settlement drawn up. Judgment has not in fact been signed or entered, so we were informed. Had judgment been signed it may be doubted whether it was open to the plaintiff to attack it by making an application to the Full Court in the action to set aside the judgment and compromise. No objection was made on this score. But the difficulty which confronts the plaintiff is that her counsel when he signed the terms of settlement acted in accordance with the authority which she gave in the manner described by Mr. Beard. If the question whether the compromise should be set aside was a matter depending upon the discretion of the court, the course of events which led her, after she left the judge's chambers, at length to give way and express a consent might be very material. But in the circumstances of this case it does not appear to us that the court possesses a discretion to set aside the compromise or to intercept the formal entry of judgment. It is not a case of misapprehension or mistake made by counsel in consenting to an order or settlement: cf. Hickman v. Berens [2] . It is not a case where the assistance of the court is sought or invoked to carry a compromise into effect which otherwise could not be enforced by the party relying upon it. In such a case the assistance may be refused on grounds not necessarily sufficient to invalidate a simple contract. It is not a case where a compromise has been agreed upon by counsel acting only in pursuance of his apparent or implied authority from his client but, owing to a mistake or misapprehension, in opposition to his client's instructions or in excess of some limitation that has been expressly placed on his authority. In such a case, at all events until the judgment or order embodying the compromise has been perfected, an authority exists in the court to refuse to give effect to or act upon the compromise and perhaps to set it aside: see Neale v. Gordon Lennox [1] ; Shepherd v. Robinson [2] ; Little v. Spreadbury [3] , per Bray J.; Hansen v. Marco Engineering Co. (Aust.) Pty. Ltd. [4] , per Fullagar J.; Schwarz v. Clements [5] . In the course of the judgment in the case of Sheonandan Prasad Singh v. Abdul Fateh Mohammad Reza [6] , already cited, Lord Atkin said that these cases qualified the implied authority of counsel to compromise an action. "In the first instance the authority is an actual authority implied from the employment as counsel. It may, however, be withdrawn or limited by the client; in such a case the actual authority is destroyed or restricted, and the other party if in ignorance of the limitation could only rely upon ostensible authority. In this particular class of contract, however, the possibility of successfully alleging ostensible authority has been much restricted by the authorities such as Neale v. Gordon Lennox [7] and Shepherd v. Robinson [2] , which make it plain that if in fact counsel has had his authority withdrawn or restricted the Courts will not feel bound to enforce a compromise made by him contrary to the restriction, even though the lack of actual authority is not known to the other party" [8] . It is said that this power of the courts is to be exercised as a matter of discretion when in the circumstances of the case to allow the compromise to stand would involve injustice in view of the restriction on counsel's authority. See Halsbury's Laws of England, vol. 3, 3rd ed., p. 51; 2nd ed., vol. 2, pp. 526, 527. But in the case of a compromise which is made within the actual as well as apparent authority of counsel a court does not appear to possess a discretion to rescind it or set it aside. The question whether the compromise is to be set aside depends upon the existence of a ground which would suffice to render a simple contract void or voidable or to entitle the party to equitable relief against it, grounds for example such as illegality, misrepresentation, non-disclosure of a material fact where disclosure is required, duress, mistake, undue influence, abuse of confidence or the like. The rule appears rather from positive statements of the grounds that suffice (cf. Halsbury's Laws of England, vol. 26, 2nd ed., pp. 84, 85); but there is a dictum of Lindley L.J. which is distinct enough: " nor have I the slightest doubt that a consent order can be impeached, not only on the ground of fraud but upon any grounds which invalidate the agreement it expresses in a more formal way than usual To my mind the only question is whether the agreement on which the consent order was based can be invalidated or not. Of course if that agreement cannot be invalidated the consent order is good": Huddersfield Banking Co. Ltd. v. Henry Lister & Son Ltd. [1] .