Note: If the amount remaining after step 4 is negative, the head company is taken to have made a capital gain equal to the amount: see CGT event L5.
25 Each of Steps 1-4 reaches down further to nominated provisions. At each of the Steps, after the words "which is about", there are expressions which, at least on their face, appear to be descriptions of the provisions referred to.
26 There are some difficulties in the way in which the table operates. Although this case is concerned with step 4 it is convenient, for reasons which will become apparent, to begin with step 1. That step expressly concerns itself with values that the leaving entity takes with it "when it ceases to be a subsidiary member". That time is defined in s 711-5(1) to be "the leaving time". The words "which is about" ordinarily suggest that what follows is a description of that which proceeds. It is necessary than to attend to the provision apparently described, s 711-25(1). It provides:
For the purposes of step 1 in the table in subsection 711-20(1), the step 1 amount is worked out by adding up the head company's terminating values of all the assets that the head company holds at the leaving time because the leaving entity is taken by subsection 701-1(1) (the single entity rule) to be a part of the head company.
(emphasis added)
27 "At the leaving time", however, the fact is that the single entity rule does not deem the entity to be part of the head company for at that moment the subsidiary is no longer a member of the group.
28 This internal inconsistency in s 711-25 occurs in a context in which the provision is described in step 1 of s 711-20 as gauging liabilities at the time the entity ceases to be a member (scil. the leaving time).
29 There thus arises a dilemma. If the words "at the leaving time" in s 711-25(1) are given their usual meaning the words which immediately follow "because the leaving entity is taken by subsection 701-1(1) (the Single entity rule) to be part of the head company" are incoherent. At the same time, however, the expression "at the leaving time" in s 711-25 will be consistent with the description of s 711-25 in step 1 of s 711-20 for, so viewed, it will be concerned with liabilities "when it ceases to be a subsidiary member".
30 On the other hand, if s 701-25(1) be rescued from incoherence by reading "at the leaving time" as meaning "just before the leaving time" this comes at the cost of rendering the description of s 711-25(1) in step 1 inaccurate for, so interpreted, it will not operate at "the leaving time". Further, there is little doubt that the words in step 1 "that the leaving entity takes with it" will be left with no operation.
31 The problem of reconciling apparently conflicting parts of the statute is well-worn territory. That process of reconciling such provisions will often require a court, as Lord Herschell explained in Institute of Patent Agents v Lockwood [1894] AC 347 at 360, "to determine which is the leading provision, and which must give way". The High Court applied that dictum in Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355 at 381-382 [70] and went on to say:
Only by determining the hierarchy of the provisions will it be possible in many cases to give each provision the meaning which best gives effect to its purpose and language while maintaining the unity of the statutory scheme.
32 It is necessary, therefore, to identify which of step 1 and s 711-25 prevails over the other. That endeavour is to be approached with a recognition that neither construction is free from inconsistency. For two reasons, we favour the conclusion that it is s 711-25 and its difficulties which should prevail over step 1 and its inconsistencies: first, the scheme of Division 711 is about, as we have already indicated, putting a value on the interests held by the head company in a subsidiary at deconsolidation. That is only a meaningful endeavour just before the leaving time. Secondly, the words in the table include "which is about" which are words of description and not of prescription.
33 That conclusion carries with it the consequence that "at the leaving time" in that section should be construed as meaning "just before the leaving time". No doubt this is a strange reading of the word "at" but it is made necessary by the internal inconsistency which unquestionably exists: Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1981) 147 CLR 297 at 305, 311 and 321.
34 Since s 711-25 is paramount over step 1 this means that the words "Step 1 which is about the terminating values of assets that the leaving entity takes with it when it ceases to be a subsidiary member" should be construed to mean "which is about the terminating values of assets of the leaving entity just before it ceases to be a subsidiary member".
35 Essentially the same analysis can, and should, be applied to Steps 2 and 3. It should be noted that the description of step 3 which appears in the column headed "purpose of the Step" exhibits the clear intention that the analysis occur just before the leaving time. A corollary of that conclusion is that references to "at the leaving time" in ss 711-35 and 711-40 (described by Steps 2 and 3) should also be read as meaning "just before the leaving time".
36 That approach also resolves a conundrum in s 711-5(3) which describes how the object of Division 711 is to be achieved in these terms:
This is achieved by recognising the head company's cost for those interests, just before the leaving time, as an amount equal to the cost of the leaving entity's assets at the leaving time reduced by the amount of its liabilities.
37 This provision appears to require analysis both "just before the leaving time" and "at the leaving time". The source of the conundrum lies in Part 3-90's approach of assessing membership interests just before the leaving time but assets of departing subsidiaries at the leaving time. That conundrum can be solved by reading the words "at the leaving time" as meaning "just before the leaving time".
38 We have dealt with Steps 1, 2 and 3 to show that their preferable construction involves analysis just before the leaving time. Debate in this case turns, however, on step 4. Step 4 refers to s 711-45 which is in these terms:
(1) For the purposes of step 4 in the table in subsection 711-20(1), the step 4 amount is worked out by adding up the amounts of each thing (an accounting liability) that, in accordance with accounting standards, or statements of accounting concepts made by the Australian Accounting Standards Board, is a liability of the leaving entity at the leaving time that can or must be identified in the entity's statement of financial position.
(emphasis added)
39 There is a significant difference between this provision and ss 711-25 (Step 1), 711-35 (Step 2) and 711-40 (Step 3). Whilst each of those provisions contains an internal inconsistency which requires "at the leaving time" to be read as "just before the leaving time" this is not so in the case of s 711-45. Viewed in isolation the words "at the leaving time" in that section are capable of being given their ordinary meaning. Be that as it may, it would be strange indeed if Steps 1, 2 and 3 of s 711-30 were to be assessed "just before the leaving time" but step 4 was to be assessed "at the leaving time". Such an approach would require different meanings to be given to "at the leaving time" in s 711-45 to that which we think that phrase bears in ss 711-25, 711-35 and 711-40. It would also be an approach inconsistent with the way we have suggested that s 711-5(3) is to be interpreted.
40 At least as a matter of initial impression, therefore, it would be preferable to read "at the leaving time" in s 711-45 as "just before the leaving time" and to read the words in step 4 as a reference to the liabilities of the leaving entity just before the leaving time.
41 The taxpayer makes two points against such an approach. First, it submits that it gives no weight to the words "that the leaving entity takes with it". The same expression is used in Steps 1 and 2. If, like the other steps, the proper relation between step 4 and its referred section is that the latter is paramount over the former then this argument does not succeed.
42 The taxpayer's second argument, however, directly challenges that analysis of the relationship between step 4 and s 711-45 It contends that it is step 4 which controls s 711-45 and not, as in the case of the other Steps, the other way around. This is said to be so because step 4 should be characterised as part of the taxing provisions and, in contradistinction, s 711-45 as a calculating or machinery provision.
43 The primacy of step 4 arises, so it is said, because of s 104-520. That section contained elsewhere in the Act in Part 3.1 which deals with general topics relating to capital gains and losses. It is in these terms:
(1) CGT event L5 happens if:
(a) an entity ceases to be a subsidiary member of a consolidated group or a MEC group; and
(b) in working out the group's allocable cost amount for the entity, the amount remaining after applying step 4 of the table in section 711-20 is negative.
(2) The time of the event is when the entity ceases to be a subsidiary member of the group.
(3) For the head company core purposes mentioned in subsection 701-1(2), the head company makes a capital gain equal to the amount remaining.
44 The taxpayer submits that this provision creates CGT Event L5 and that in the act of its creation makes step 4 a critical component in the definition of the taxing event. Viewed as a substantive part of the provision which directly imposes a tax there is no reason, therefore, to subordinate step 4 to s 711-45 which only tells one how to calculate a particular figure.
45 This argument should be rejected for four reasons. First, it posits a relationship between s 104-520 and Division 711 which sees the latter as giving effect to the former. That, however, is not a correct characterisation of the role of Division 711. As we have endeavoured to show Division 711's dominant purpose is for fixing the tax cost setting amount for membership interests held by a head company. The fixing of that tax cost is a function made necessary for the consolidation provisions to interact with the rest of the Act. That is why s 701-55 equates the tax cost setting amount to other concepts used in the Act such as acquisition costs (for depreciation purposes) and the cost base (for capital gains tax purposes). It is no coincidence that that section is contained in Division 701 which is both entitled, and concerned with, "Core rules". Further, in every case of deconsolidation the tax cost setting amount will need to be determined regardless of whether CGT Event L5 occurs.
46 It is true, of course, that step 4 is referred to in s 104-520. However, when the significance of the tax cost setting amount to the general scheme of the consolidation provisions is appreciated the notion that it is that section which governs the operation of Division 711 becomes less plausible (particularly in all those cases where CGT Event L5 does not occur).
47 Secondly, even if Division 711 were to be construed on the basis that s 104-520 gives primacy to step 4, no different result would obtain. Division 711 provides for the calculation of the tax cost setting amount in every case and contemplates, in step 4 of s 711-20, a particular scheme of calculation. All that s 104-520 does is to test what the outcome of that particular calculation is. Section 104-520 expressly contemplates the calculation in step 4 taking its ordinary course. We would not therefore read s 104-520 as impacting on the meaning or operation of step 4 of s 720-20(1). To the contrary, a more likely construction is that s 104-520 simply "picks up" the operation of s 711-20 as it finds it. That approach is buttressed by the observation that s 711-20(1) has a substantive (and we think predominant) independent purpose outside CGT Event L5 which is the process of setting the tax cost setting amount.
48 Thirdly, if the taxpayer's argument were accepted there would inevitably be greater problems of coherence. We have already explained why Steps 1, 2 and 3 (and their corresponding provisions in ss 711-45, 711-35 and 711-40) must be read as requiring an analysis just before the leaving time. If step 4 is to proceed on the basis that assessment is to occur at the leaving time, then the table in s 711-20 will operate eccentrically bringing assets (Step 1), deductions (Step 2) and intra-group loans (Step 3) to account just before the leaving time but all other liabilities (Step 4) at the leaving time. That problem of coherence could be avoided if Steps 1, 2 and 3 (and their corresponding sections) were read as requiring assessment at the leaving time. But that approach leads to insoluble incoherence in ss 711-25, 711-35 and 711-40 which we see no way of resolving. An easier path - more consistent with s 104-520's more attenuated role - is to read step 4 simply as part, like the other steps, of s 711-20 and to be interpreted in the light of the balance of Division 711.
49 Finally, the taxpayer's argument gives rise to some anomalies. Because the head company in many cases of deconsolidation will have transferred its membership interests in the subsidiary at the leaving time, fixing the time cost at that moment suffers from the defect of fixing the cost of an asset no longer owned by the head company. Allied to that difficulty is the logical incoherence of having the Act prescribe one cost at the leaving time (the tax cost setting amount) and the parties fixing another (namely, the consideration for the disposal). A much more plausible operation is one which sees the tax cost setting amount fixing the value of the membership interests while the Single entity rule is in play and permitting the real world to provide costing information thereafter. Those observations are reflected in the language of Division 711, both in ss 711-1 which makes plain that what is being valued is an interest "in the entity" and s 711-10 and s 711-15(1) which show that the enterprise undertaken by Division 711 is the assessment of the value of interest "held" by the old group.
50 For those reasons the taxpayer's objection to the construction we favour should not be accepted. It follows that the appeal should be dismissed with costs.
I certify that the preceding fifty (50) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justices Finn, Sundberg & Perram.