"Due to the limited information currently available I am not able to provide any indicative costing for the security transportation operations."
25 Mr Lambie subsequently advised that before he would be able to quantify his costs of providing security to transport the document from Raby to Manly, remain with it and bring it back up to four times, he would first need to undertake a security assessment. The cost of such an assessment was said to be $1200.
26 Mr Hamod's affidavit is relatively long and difficult to summarise. It tells a remarkable and intriguing tale going back to June 1994 when Mr Hamod received the Certificate for security for costs and commissions said to have been earned by him for the supply of services for the sale of several other certificates held by PT Galaxy Trust Indonesia. Mr Hamod said that in June 1994 he conducted a due diligence on the Certificate with Pierre Grumbacher, the clearance officer of the second defendant through Alfima Trust and satisfied himself that the Certificate was authentic and valid and issued by the second defendant as a bearer certificate for a deposit of platinum.
27 However, in the following month, a group of business people from Italy headed by Antonio Enini (the Enini Group) kidnapped Mr Hamod and Michael O'Dowd, the representative of PT Galaxy Trust Indonesia, and escorted them to Italy where they were kept under tight security for a period of time and where they were subject to attempts to force them to negotiate the sale of the Certificate and other certificates to clients of the second defendant. In early August 1994 the Enini Group then escorted them to Zurich to negotiate the sale of the Certificate and other certificates to Manix Group Limited, a client of the second defendant. Mr Hamod said that while in Zurich, Mr George Kurian introduced Ms Mary Podge, a former secretary of the board of the second defendant, who inspected the original of the Certificate and confirmed that it was authentic and valid and issued by the second defendant.
28 In August 1994, while staying in a hotel in Zurich, Mr Hamod deliberately caused a public nuisance so that the Swiss police would arrest him and assist him and Mr O'Dowd to escape from the Enini Group. Between early August and 22 August 1994, the Swiss police kept Mr Hamod in custody with the original of a Certificate to investigate its authenticity and validity. About 22 August 1994 the Swiss police released Mr Hamod after they had confirmed that the certificate was authentic and valid "and issued by the Swiss authority" through the second defendant. Mr O'Dowd was found alive in Italy.
29 Mr Hamod said that as a result of his refusal to deposit the Certificate in the safekeeping account in a bank in Switzerland, he was asked to leave the country as the certificate was a bearer certificate and his life was in danger so long as he carried with him. Subsequently, an armed unit of the Switzerland Armed Forces escorted him through Zurich and the airport to the door of a waiting plane.
30 In late August 1994 Mr O'Dowd escaped from the Enini Group and resumed negotiations for the sale of other certificates to Metropolitan Life Assurance of America, a buyer that Mr Hamod had previously introduced. In September 1994 Mr O'Dowd, on behalf of PT Galaxy Trust, demanded that he return the Certificate before it would pay his costs and commissions from the sale of other bullion certificates. Mr Hamod said that when he refused to do so before payment of his costs and commissions, Mr O'Dowd and his associates threatened to kidnap Mr Hamod's daughter and rape her until such time as the certificate was returned.
31 Back in Australia by October 1994, Mr Hamod then attended the Nowra police station with the original Certificate and with documents associated with the sale of other bullion certificates. Mr Hamod said that he was also in possession of other documents giving him the lawful right to hold the Certificate until such time as he received payment of his costs and commissions. He lodged complaints about the threats from Mr O'Dowd and his associate Mr Clarke to kidnap his daughter and harm her. Mr Hamod said that Detective Superintendent Green inspected the Certificate and conducted a due diligence on its authenticity and validity and on associated documents. Detective Superintendent Green referred the matter to the Australian Federal Police.
32 That same month Senior Constable Dunlop of the AFP called Mr Hamod and arranged to interview him about the threats that had been made. Senior Constable Dunlop subsequently informed him that the AFP had received a complaint from Interpol about the alleged theft of the Certificate from the Indonesian authority. Apparently unknown to him at this time, officers of the first defendant and of the AFP installed listening devices on his phones and in his house. In the meantime, Mr John McMurtrie, the managing director of the second defendant, conveyed an invitation to him through Mr Nicholas Wall to deposit the original of the Certificate in a safekeeping account with the second defendant against which he could draw funds from time to time.
33 Mr Hamod then says that from 5 December 1994, in the face of his refusal to trade with the second defendant on the Certificate on the terms and conditions stipulated by Mr McMurtrie, including his execution of a guarantee document for payment of $600 million in commission to Mr Wall and others, Mr Philip Ludowici and others from the second defendant conspired with corrupt police officers to collect the original of the Certificate, fabricate evidence to injure him, and damage his reputation and his business.
34 On 5 December 1994, 2 January 1995 and 20 January 1995 Mr Hamod supplied the second defendant with a full copy of the Certificate and asked it to conduct due diligence and confirm its authenticity and validity. According to Mr Hamod, Mr Ludowici and Mr Philip Muhlbauer, both executive officers of the second defendant, forged one page of a certificate and made written statements to the police alleging that the forged page was a copy of the Certificate in his possession. On 20 January 1995, Mr Hamod was arrested. On the same day the New South Wales police raided his house and his office. His documentary and electronic records associated with the Certificate were seized and detained together other business and personal records.
35 In February 1996, the Certificate was collected by police officers from the exhibits safe and taken without Mr Hamod's knowledge or consent to Switzerland where it was handed over to "third parties" without a court order or other authority to do so. Police officers ultimately returned the Certificate to the safe.
36 On 3 April 1998, after the dismissal of charges against him at committal, police officers refused to release the Certificate to Mr Hamod. Magistrate Horler ordered it to be returned to him forthwith.
37 Mr Hamod says that between 1994 and 2007 a number of business consultants and financial institutions have conducted due diligence enquiries on a copy of the certificate and "confirmed" that the Certificate is authentic and valid. In late March 2000, HSBC supplied a copy of the Certificate to Pierre Grumbacher, the second defendant's clearance officer, who confirmed the authenticity and validity of the Certificate from the copy of the original.
38 Mr Hamod has sworn a statement dated 26 July 2007 for use in the principal proceedings. It was not read before me but I am aware that it is extremely voluminous. Mr Hamod sought to refer to some 28 exhibits to that statement. Some of these are contained in a volume of material described as a "bundle of documents from which an inference may be drawn that [the second defendant] acknowledged the validity of the platinum certificate or alternatively positively asserted its invalidity". Of these, only exhibits AH18, AH20, AH41, AH103, AH166, AH178, AH200, AH203, AH 205, AH208, and AH219 are included in the volume. This material will presumably be relied upon in support of the proposition that the second defendant has approached the validity of the Certificate in an inconsistent and opportunistic way so that the force of an indignant assertion that it should be entitled to examine it forensically is correspondingly reduced.
39 It is important immediately to observe that almost none of the documents contained in the bundle lend support to this argument. For example, AH174 is a document that has been executed by Mr Hamod. It appears neither to have been issued nor adopted by the second defendant. Similarly, AH178 is a letter from Saade Makhlouf to Mr Hamod and contains nothing that would appear to bind the second defendant to a particular view about the authenticity of the Certificate. Unfortunately, almost all of the other documents in the bundle fall into this category.
40 One document that does not is a letter from Allens Arthur Robinson dated 4 April 2005 to Krohn Rechtsanwälte. Paragraph 4 of that letter is in the following terms: -
"You correctly note that no agreement has been reached between UBS and your client concerning the realisation of the Certificate. This is because the Certificate is not valid. We are instructed that it is a forgery and was not issued by UBS. Indeed, we are instructed that UBS does not - and never has - issued bearer certificates for platinum bullion or any precious metals. UBS has consistently denied the validity of the Certificate. Mr Hamod has been told this many times. It has also been made clear to all of the various legal representatives that Mr Hamod has used during the course of the Australian legal proceedings."
41 Part of paragraph 8 of the same letter, to similar effect, is in the following terms: -
"As the Certificate is not valid and was not issued by UBS: