Supreme Court of WA|2008-08-13|Before: Blaxell J

GYPSY JOKERS MOTORCYCLE CLUB INC -v- COMMISSIONER OF POLICE [No 2] [2008] WASC 166 (13 August 2008)

JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

CITATION : GYPSY JOKERS MOTORCYCLE CLUB INC -v- COMMISSIONER OF POLICE [No 2] [2008] WASC 166

HEARD : 5 DECEMBER 2005, 1 MAY 2006, 2 & 23 JULY 2008

Administrative law - Judicial review - Organised crime - Fortification removal notice - Compulsory removal of fortifications - Review of notice - Whether or not Commissioner of Police could have reasonably believed facts necessary for issue of notice

Decision that Commissioner of Police could have reasonably had the belief required by s 72(2) when issuing fortification removal notice

1 BLAXELL J: This is a review of a fortification removal notice issued by the Commissioner of Police pursuant to s 72 of the Corruption and Crime Commission Act 2003 (WA) (the Act). The notice issued on 5 May 2004 and was addressed to the plaintiff association which, at all material times, had conducted its affairs from premises at 10 Lower Park Road, Maddington. The premises comprised a clubhouse within a walled compound, which were 'fortified' within the meaning of the Act.

2 The power to issue the fortification removal notice was dependent upon the Commissioner having a reasonable belief as to two facts, namely:

(2) That the premises were habitually used as a place of resort by members of a class of people, a significant number of whom may reasonably be suspected to be involved in 'organised crime', (as defined in the Act).

3 The review requires me to decide whether or not the Commissioner of Police could reasonably have believed the above facts at the time of issuing the notice. If I decide that the Commissioner could not have reasonably had that belief, then the notice will cease to have effect.

4 The review first came on for hearing on 5 December 2005, but was adjourned as a result of a constitutional issue being raised by the plaintiff. Consequently, two questions were referred to the Court of Appeal pursuant to s 43 of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA). Those questions were duly answered by the Court of Appeal in its decision in Gypsy Jokes Motorcycle Club Inc v Commissioner of Police [2007] WASCA 49. There was then an appeal to the High Court, which upheld the majority decision of the Court of Appeal (Gypsy Jokers Motorcycle Club Inc v Commissioner of Police [2008] HCA 4; (2008) 82 ALJR 454). The hearing of the review then resumed, and, upon its completion on 23 July 2008, I reserved my decision.

The statutory scheme for removal of fortifications

5 One of the main purposes of the Act, as stated in s 7A, is 'to combat and reduce the incidence of organised crime'. 'Organised crime' is defined in s 3 as:

[A]ctivities of 2 or more persons associated together solely for purposes in the pursuit of which 2 or more Schedule 1 offences are committed, the commission of each of which involves substantial planning and organisation;

6 Division 6 of pt 4 of the Act provides for the removal of fortifications from premises which are reasonably believed to be associated with organised crime. The general underlying purpose of these provisions was summarised in the following remarks by Premier Gallop, during the Second Reading Speech in respect of the Bill:

Members may be aware that premises owned or used by criminal gangs are often heavily fortified. The effect of this fortification is to prevent the police from obtaining access to these premises. The result is that investigations are hindered because searches cannot be conducted or cannot be conducted in a timely manner. These heavily fortified premises become a safe haven for organised criminals and their activities. In order to carry out successful investigations and obtain evidence, the police must be able to obtain entry to these premises. The Government recognises that occasionally this will require demolition of existing fortifications. The Bill sets out the process and circumstances in which these fortifications can be removed. (Hansard 6 November 2001, 5041)

7 Section 67 of the Act defines 'fortification' as meaning:

[A]ny structure or device that, whether alone or as part of a system, is designed to prevent or impede, or to provide any other form of countermeasure against, uninvited entry to premises;

8 'Heavily fortified' has the meaning given by s 67(2), namely:

(2) Premises are heavily fortified if there are, at the premises, fortifications to an extent or of a nature that it would be reasonable to regard as excessive for premises of that kind.

9 The process for removal of fortifications is commenced by an application to the Corruption and Crime Commission. Section 68 provides that the Commissioner of Police may, without giving notice to any other person, apply to the Commission for the issue of a fortification warning notice. The Corruption and Crime Commission then has power to issue a fortification warning notice if it is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that:

[T]here are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the premises to which it relates are -

(a) heavily fortified; and

(b) habitually used as a place of resort by members of a class of people a significant number of whom may reasonably be suspected to be involved in organised crime.

10 Section 69 stipulates certain formalities in respect of the contents of a fortification warning notice, and s 70 provides for service of the notice on the owner or occupant of the premises. One of the requirements of a notice is that the owner or occupant be informed of a 'submission period' of 14 days. Once the submission period has elapsed, the Commissioner of Police has power to issue a fortification removal notice. However, s 72(2) provides that:

(2) The Commissioner of Police cannot issue the fortification removal notice unless, after considering each submission, if any, made before the submission period elapsed, the Commissioner of Police reasonably believes that the premises are -

(a) heavily fortified; and

(b) habitually used as a place of resort by members of a class of people a significant number of whom may reasonably be suspected to be involved in organised crime.

11 Section 73 requires that a fortification removal notice include the following:

(a) a statement to the effect that, within 7 days (or such further time as allowed by the Commissioner of Police), the fortifications at the premises must be removed or modified to the extent necessary to satisfy the Commissioner of Police that the premises are no longer heavily fortified;

(b) a warning to the effect that if the fortifications are not so removed or modified, the Commissioner of Police may remove or modify the fortifications to the extent required by the notice; and

12 Section 75 allows the Commissioner of Police to remove or modify fortifications when a fortification removal notice is not complied with. Section 78 further provides that:

(1) The powers given by this Division may be exercised without regard to whether any statutory or other approval had been given for the fortifications.

(2) No statutory or other approval is required for the removal or modification of fortifications in accordance with a fortification removal notice.

13 Section 76 provides for a limited review of a fortification removal notice by the Supreme Court. When an application for review is made, the period within which fortifications can be removed or modified in accordance with the notice is extended to the seventh day after the final disposition of the review.

14 The decision of the Supreme Court on an application for review is final, and s 83 provides that the consent of the Parliamentary Inspector is required for any proceedings for a prerogative writ, or for any injunction or declaratory judgment in respect of the performance of a function for the purposes of pt 4 of the Act. Section 79 also bars any claim for compensation in respect of removal of fortifications.

15 The Commissioner of Police cannot issue a fortification removal notice unless he 'reasonably believes' the two facts specified in s 72(2). Furthermore, in respect of one of those facts, there is a requirement that certain persons 'may reasonably be suspected' to be involved in organised crime.

16 In George v Rocket [1990] HCA 26; (1990) 170 CLR 104, the High Court considered legislation which allowed a justice to issue a search warrant when there were 'reasonable grounds for suspecting' certain things, as well as 'reasonable grounds for believing' others. The court noted (at 115) that suspicion and belief are different states of mind, and went on to state:

Suspicion, as Lord Devlin said in Hussien v Chong Fook Kam [[1970] AC 942, 948] 'in its ordinary meaning is a state of conjecture or surmise where proof is lacking: "I suspect but I cannot prove."' The facts which can reasonably ground a suspicion may be quite insufficient reasonably to ground a belief, yet some factual basis for the suspicion must be shown.

17 The court also approved the dictum of Kitto J in Queensland Bacon Pty Ltd v Rees [1966] HCA 21; (1966) 115 CLR 266 (at 303) that:

A suspicion that something exists is more than a mere idle wondering whether it exists or not; it is a positive feeling of actual apprehension or mistrust, amounting to 'a slight opinion, but without sufficient evidence', as Chambers's Dictionary expresses it. Consequently, a reason to suspect that a fact exists is more than a reason to consider or look into the possibility of its existence.

18 As to the state of mind that is necessary for a 'reasonable belief', the court held (at 116):

The objective circumstances sufficient to show a reason to believe something need to point more clearly to the subject matter of the belief, but that is not to say that the objective circumstances must establish on the balance of probabilities that the subject matter in fact occurred or exists: the assent of belief is given on more slender evidence than proof. Belief is an inclination of the mind towards assenting to, rather than rejecting, a proposition and the grounds which can reasonably induce that inclination of the mind may, depending on the circumstances, leave something to surmise or conjecture.

19 The first fact that the Commissioner is required to reasonably believe is that the premises to which the fortification removal notice relates are 'heavily fortified'. 'Fortification' is defined very widely in s 68 to include any structure or device which prevents or impedes uninvited entry. Hence, a device as simple as an ordinary front door lock constitutes 'fortifications' within the meaning of the Act.

20 Section 68(2) provides that premises are 'heavily fortified' if there are fortifications to an extent or of a nature as 'would be reasonable to regard as excessive for premises of that kind'. Yet again, this requires the application of an objective test of what a reasonable person would regard as excessive, and the issue of excessiveness is to be determined by reference to 'premises of that kind'. These are very wide words which, in my view, require a comparison with other premises which have similar characteristics in respect of such matters as the nature of building improvements, the general location in which they are situated, and the type of use to which they are put.

21 The second fact which the Commissioner of Police must reasonably believe under s 72(2), is a rolled-up combination of all of the matters specified in par (b) and in the definition of 'organised crime' in s 3. Accordingly, a reasonable belief is required of the following composite facts:

(1) that the premises are 'habitually used as a place of resort';

(4) may reasonably be suspected to be involved in activities of two or more persons;

(5) who are associated together solely or partly for purposes;

(6) in the pursuit of which two or more Schedule 1 offences 'are' committed; and

(7) the commission of each of which offences involves substantial planning and organisation.

22 When the provision is broken down in this way, it can be seen that it consists of simple words in common use, the natural and ordinary meaning of which can be readily understood. For example, the words in (1) and (2) above should be understood to mean that the members of the class of people in question frequently attend the premises in large numbers. Similarly, a 'significant' number is obviously more than a small number of those persons. 'Substantial' planning and organisation means a considerable or notably large amount of planning and organisation.

23 With regard to the words in (6) above, it is important to note that the Commissioner's belief must relate to present and past, but not future, Schedule 1 offences. It should also be noted that the offences listed in the schedule are mostly (but not entirely) of a very serious nature. They include homicides (other than manslaughter), attempted murder, making or possessing explosives under suspicious circumstances, property laundering, and serious drug offences. Nevertheless, it is a somewhat eclectic list as is shown by the inclusion of the offence of assault with intent to rob, but not the more serious robbery offences.

24 Although there is no real difficulty in interpreting the provisions of s 72(2), the submissions from the parties have raised particular issues of construction which need to be addressed. Firstly, senior counsel for the defendant has contended (in oral, but not written, submissions) that the meaning of 'excessive' in par (a) should be construed in conjunction with the reasonable belief under par (b) that the premises are associated with organised crime. In this regard, it is submitted that 'there is a nexus, constant nexus, between the fortifications and the character of the activity there' (ts 44 and 50).

25 I must confess to some difficulty in understanding this submission, which does not appear to be based on any suggestion that the plain meaning of 'excessive' should be modified in favour of some other construction consistent with the overall statutory scheme. Nevertheless, the particular provision is to be considered within the statutory context as a whole, and in light of the mischief that Parliament intended to cure. (CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 384, 408; Project Blue Sky v Australia Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28; (1998) 194 CLR 355, 381.) Accordingly, the question whether the Commissioner could have reasonably believed that the fortifications were 'excessive' (in the sense of being more than is necessary, normal, or desirable) for premises of that kind, is to be considered within the context of the police allegedly requiring access to the premises for the purpose of combating organised crime.

26 A further issue of construction arises from the submission of senior counsel for the plaintiff that the Commissioner could not hold a reasonable suspicion that a person was involved in a particular Schedule 1 offence if that person had been acquitted of the charge of that offence. I understand this submission to be to the effect that the presumption of innocence which follows an acquittal would make any such suspicion unreasonable.

27 Although the presumption of innocence is a hallowed principle of the criminal law, there are many instances where it has been overridden by statute, and the most obvious example is the Bail Act 1982 (WA). In my opinion, the acquittal of a person on a charge of a Schedule 1 offence does not preclude the Commissioner of Police from coming to the conclusion pursuant to s 72(2) that that person may reasonably be suspected of involvement in that offence. If the presumption of innocence was to prevent the Commissioner from holding such a suspicion, then the same situation would have applied prior to acquittal (which would be inconsistent with the express provisions of the Act). The only significance of an acquittal for the purposes of s 72(2) is that the prosecution could not prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, the fact of the acquittal is one of the matters which should be put into the balance when determining whether the Commissioner could have reasonably had the belief required by s 72(2) at the time of issuing the notice.

28 Section 76(1) enables an owner, or other interested person, affected by a fortification removal notice to apply to the Supreme Court for a review. The review is restricted to the limited question whether:

[H]aving regard to the submissions, if any, made before the submission period elapsed and any other information that the Commissioner of Police took into consideration, the Commissioner of Police could have reasonably had the belief required by section 72(2) when issuing the notice.

29 As can be seen, s 76 does not allow a broad-ranging inquiry into whether there were reasonable grounds for the issue of the fortification removal notice, and Parliament has limited the scope of the review to the question whether the Commissioner 'could' have reasonably had the required belief. Furthermore, the materials to be taken into account in determining that question are not all of those that are available at the time of the review, but only the submissions and other information that the Commissioner took into consideration at the time of issuing the notice. In this regard, the majority of High Court in their decision in the present matter held that:

The determination, in an action for judicial review, of whether a statutory or other office holder could reasonably have had a belief of a particular description is readily recognised as the performance of a judicial function. Upon that review the Supreme Court is to be satisfied that facts exist which are sufficient to have induced that belief in a reasonable person. With respect to s 76(1) of the Act, the belief in issue is that of the Commissioner of Police stipulated by s 72(2), and its reasonableness is to be determined by the Supreme Court upon regard of any submissions and any other 'information' which the Commissioner of Police took into consideration. It is that material which provides the record upon which this particular species of judicial review is determined by the Supreme Court. [(2008) ALJR 454 [28]]

30 An unusual and difficult feature of the review process under s 76 is that the applicant is not necessarily informed of all of the information that the Commissioner took into account. This is because of s 76(2) which provides that:

(2) The Commissioner of Police may identify any information provided to the court for the purposes of the review as confidential if its disclosure might prejudice the operations of the Commissioner of Police, and information so identified is for the court's use only and is not to be disclosed to any other person, whether or not a party to the proceedings, or publicly disclosed in any way.

31 The operation of this provision will usually prevent an applicant from testing or contradicting some of the more vital information taken into consideration by the Commissioner, and from making any meaningful submissions in respect of the same. The provision also prevents the court from giving full reasons for its decision (to the extent that that decision turns upon the confidential information). Notwithstanding the 'incontrovertible unfairness' to an applicant in these circumstances, Steytler P in the Court of Appeal (with whom Martin CJ agreed) held that:

The fact that the Supreme Court's ability to conduct an effective review is limited by the Commissioner's right to claim confidentiality, and hence to limit the extent to which the information relied upon by him should be disclosed, is a troubling feature of the legislation. However, that feature must be looked at in the light of the very limited function given to the court by s 76. Its function is not that of deciding whether or not, at the time of the review, there are reasonable grounds for the formation of the belief referred to by s 72(2). Rather, its task is only that of determining whether, having regard to the submissions made by the applicant and to whatever information was taken into account by the Commissioner in forming his belief, the Commissioner could have reasonably had the required belief when issuing the notice: s 76(1). It is implicit within s 76 that the Commissioner is required to place before the court all of the information that he took into consideration. Consequently, the court is still able to exercise some form of genuine evaluative or adjudicative review ... initiated by the owner of the premises or by an interested person, even if it is one that is likely to be hampered by the inability of an applicant, to whom no, or limited, disclosure is made, to make any useful submissions, for example with respect to other matters that must also have been known by the Commissioner at the time at which he formed the required belief. [[2007] WASCA 49 [110]]

32 On the appeal to the High Court, the majority held that it is for this court to determine the validity of any claim to confidentiality under s 76(2):

It will be apparent that the text of the subsection falls into two parts, the second commencing with the words 'and information'. The first part of the subsection identifies the circumstances in which the information in question may be identified as confidential; the second part is controlled by the first and deals with the consequences of that identification for the conduct of the review by the Supreme Court.

Any exercise by the Commissioner of Police of the power conferred by s 76(2) is conditioned upon the requirement introduced by the phrase 'if its disclosure might prejudice the operations of the Commissioner of Police'. The power is not conditioned upon the existence of the opinion of the commissioner to that effect. Rather, the condition operates in circumstances where information is provided by the commissioner to the Supreme Court and it is for the Supreme Court to determine upon evidence provided to it whether the disclosure of the information might have the prejudicial effect spoken of in the subsection. [[2008] HCA 4 [32] - [33]]

33 Accordingly, I have received evidence from the Commissioner of Police in support of his claims to confidentiality of some of the information that was taken into consideration at the time of issue of the fortification removal notice. I have also made determinations as to the extent to which any disclosure of that information might prejudice the Commissioner's operations (and the reasons for those determinations appear below).

The materials that are relevant to the review

34 At all materials times, the Commissioner of Police delegated his powers and duties under the Act to the then Assistant Commissioner of Police, Melvyn Hay. The validity of that delegation is not challenged by the plaintiff

35 In an affidavit sworn on 5 November 2004, Assistant Commissioner Hay has outlined the history of events giving rise to the fortification removal notice that issued on 5 May 2004. In that regard, he made an application to the Corruption and Crime Commission on 12 February 2004 for a fortification warning notice, which application was supported by a very lengthy affidavit. The Commission heard the application on 31 March 2004, and a transcript was prepared of all of the evidence and submissions.

36 On 31 March 2004, the Corruption and Crime Commission issued a fortification warning notice, and that notice was served on the plaintiff on the following day. On 14 April 2004, the plaintiff's solicitors delivered written submissions to Assistant Commissioner Hay, together with a videotape of the subject premises, and of other neighbouring premises.

37 Subsequent discussions between the parties resulted in an inspection of the premises, on 22 April 2004, by Superintendent James Migro and Acting Detective Senior Sergeant Fyneman. Acting Detective Senior Sergeant Fyneman then provided Assistant Commissioner Hay with a report of that inspection, as well as photographs of the premises which had been taken by him at that time.

38 On 5 May 2004, Assistant Commissioner Hay decided to issue the fortification removal notice, and, on the same day, he sent a letter to the plaintiff's solicitors responding to their submissions. The materials that Assistant Commissioner Hay took into consideration when deciding to issue the fortification removal notice comprised the following:

(a) copy of his affidavit sworn on 12 February 2004 in support of the application to the Corruption and Crime Commission for a fortification warning notice;

(b) copy of the outline of submissions filed with the Corruption and Crime Commission on behalf of the Commissioner of Police;

(d) copy of the fortification warning notice dated 31 March 2004;

(e) the plaintiff's solicitors' submissions to Assistant Commissioner Hay, together with the videotape which accompanied those submissions;

(f) copies of digital photographs of the fortifications at the premises, as taken by Acting Detective Senior Sergeant Fyneman on 22 April 2004; and

(g) copy of report dated 22 April 2004 compiled by Acting Detective Senior Sergeant Fyneman.

39 By an originating summons filed on 12 May 2004, the plaintiff applied for a review of Assistant Commissioner Hay's decision to issue the fortification removal notice. On 25 October 2004, the court gave directions for the filing and serving of affidavits by the parties, and, as a result, I have before me the following materials which have been received without objection:

(a) affidavit of Assistant Commissioner Hay sworn 5 November 2004;

(b) affidavit of Karl Joseph O'Callaghan sworn 15 November 2004;

(c) affidavit of Dean Adams (the treasurer of the plaintiff association) sworn 20 December 2004. This affidavit takes issue with many of the assertions in Assistant Commissioner Hay's affidavit and in Acting Detective Senior Sergeant Fyneman's report. It provides detailed information on the fortifications at the premises and also exhibits crimes statistics for Maddington and other suburbs; and

(d) affidavit of Commissioner O'Callaghan sworn 20 January 2005 in response to Dean Adams' affidavit. In this affidavit, the Commissioner comments on the crime statistics, provides measurements of the front gate of the premises, and annexes further photographs of the premises, as well as certain by-laws of the City of Gosnells.

40 Subsequently, a series of further affidavits were filed which were objected to by the defendant and received by me provisionally. To the extent that these affidavits contain additional information not taken into account by Assistant Commissioner Hay on 5 May 2004, they are clearly irrelevant. The parties, nevertheless, agreed that I should receive the affidavits provisionally and rule on the defendant's objections at the end of the hearing. Accordingly, and in respect of each of those further affidavits, I now rule as follows:

(1) Affidavit of William John Clements sworn 5 October 2005:

This affidavit verifies the source of the crime statistics exhibited in Dean Adams' affidavit of 20 December 2004. As that other affidavit was received without objection, I rule that Mr Clements' affidavit is also admissible.

(2) Affidavit of Patricia Joan Gosfield sworn 5 October 2005:

Ms Gosfield is a professional photographer who took the photographs that are exhibit 'DA2' to Dean Adams' affidavit of 14 September 2005. Those photographs were of premises in various suburbs which had walls similar to that of the plaintiff's clubhouse. Mr Adams' affidavit described each of those premises in very general terms, whereas Ms Gosfield has deposed as to their precise location. As there was no objection to this material being tendered with Mr Adams' affidavit, I rule that Ms Gosfield's affidavit is also admissible. Nevertheless, in light of the very limited nature of the review, it is clear that the photographs of these other premises are only relevant to the extent that they indicate matters that it would be reasonable to assume were within Assistant Commissioner Hay's general knowledge.

(3) Affidavit of Shaun Phillip Matthews sworn 29 November 2005:

This affidavit provides very detailed measurements and specifications of the alleged fortifications at the plaintiff's clubhouse, as well as the reasons why the same were installed. The affidavit also exhibits two compact discs of digital photographs of the subject premises, and of 54 other premises in the Maddington area. Quite obviously, most of this information was not before Assistant Commissioner Hay at the time that he issued the fortification removal notice, and is therefore irrelevant except to the extent that it clarifies the state of the plaintiff's clubhouse when inspected on behalf of the defendant on 22 April 2004. The affidavit is also admissible to show the general nature of fortifications at other premises in the Maddington area. (A matter which it is reasonable to assume was within Assistant Commissioner Hay's contemplation at the material time.)

(4) Affidavit of Dean Adams sworn 1 September 2005:

This affidavit outlines the manner in which Mr Adams determined that certain neighbouring premises in the Maddington area had electric fencing (as deposed to in par 18 of his affidavit of 20 December 2004). As par 18 of his first affidavit was received without objection, I rule that his second affidavit is also admissible.

(5) Affidavits of Dean Adams sworn 16 February 2006, and of Gavin Wayne Kerber sworn 20 April 2006:

These affidavits concern the circumstances surrounding the execution of a police search warrant at the subject premises on 17 January 2006, and focus respectively on the ease or difficulty with which officers were able to gain entry I rule that the affidavits are only admissible to the extent that they reveal features of the fortifications which were present at the date of issue of the fortifications removal notice.

(6) Affidavit of Acting Detective Senior Sergeant Fyneman sworn 20 April 2006:

This affidavit responds to that of Shaun Phillip Matthews sworn 29 November 2005, and is admissible to the same limited extent as that other affidavit.

The determination of the Commissioner's claims to confidentiality

41 Pursuant to s 76(2), Assistant Commissioner Hay's affidavit of 5 November 2004 identified much of the information provided to the court as being confidential because its disclosure might prejudice the operations of the Commissioner of Police. For this reason, redacted copies of that affidavit and of other materials were served on the plaintiff.

42 Following the resolution of the appeal proceedings in the High Court, the Commissioner provided evidence in support of the claims to confidentiality so that the court could determine whether or not disclosure would have the relevant prejudicial effect. That evidence was in the form of an affidavit sworn by Superintendent James Migro on 17 June 2008, which affidavit was itself the subject of further claims to confidentiality.

43 All of the issues concerning the Commissioner's claims to confidentiality came on for hearing before me on 2 July 2008. At that hearing, the plaintiff contended that s 76(2) did not apply to the separate claims to confidentiality in respect of Superintendent Migro's affidavit, and that those claims should be determined in accordance with the ordinary principles that govern claims of public interest immunity. This submission was based on the proposition that s 76(2) should be limited in scope to the primary claims to confidentiality and should not extend to the evidence provided in support of those claims..

44 Accordingly, I was asked to carry out a 'balancing exercise' and to weigh the public interest in maintaining the confidentiality of the material, against the public interest in ensuring that there was a fair hearing. If this submission is correct, then the consequence of a successful claim to public interest immunity is that the Commissioner would be precluded from relying on the material the subject of that claim.

45 However, it is my considered opinion that, on a proper construction of s 76(2), the information provided to the court 'for the purposes of the review' includes information provided for the purpose of determining the extent to which that subsection should take effect. Such a construction is necessary if the court is to be able to properly determine the Commissioner's claims under s 76(2), and then make use of all relevant materials including materials adjudged to be confidential.

46 In this regard, it can be expected that the evidence in support of a valid claim to confidentiality will be largely coextensive with the confidential material in itself. In these circumstances, the narrow construction of s 76(2) suggested by the plaintiff would lead to the absurdity that the Commissioner would be unable to prove that disclosure might prejudice his operations, notwithstanding that it would, in fact, have that effect. This would make the provision unworkable, and for this reason, I have decided that a wider construction is necessary if the court is to be able to properly determine the Commissioner's claims under s 76(2). I also consider that this wider construction is consistent with the literal meaning of the words 'for the purposes of review'.

47 The plaintiff further submits that my determination of the primary issues of confidentiality under s 76(2) should be the subject of a balancing exercise similar to that undertaken with claims of public interest immunity. I understand this submission to be based upon the proposition that the court should strive for a construction of s 76(2) consistent with long-established common law principles designed to achieve fairness.

48 However, the clear words of s 76(2) provide a single criterion for a valid claim to confidentiality; namely, that 'disclosure might prejudice the operations of the Commissioner of Police'. Furthermore, the High Court has held that the scheme of s 76 is to displace what otherwise might have been a claim to public interest immunity by the Commissioner of Police ([2008] HCA 4 [25] and [5]). As the subsection stipulates only a single test for a valid claim to confidentiality, there is no basis for that factor to be balanced against any other. Accordingly, if it is established that disclosure might cause the relevant prejudice, that is determinative of the issue of confidentiality.

49 Consistent with the overall scheme of the Act, s 76(2) sets a very low threshold for a valid claim to confidentiality. All that is necessary is that disclosure of the relevant information 'might' prejudice the operations of the Commissioner of Police. Hence, the Commissioner needs to show only a 'low level possibility' that prejudice will occur for s 76(2) to take effect: F v National Crime Authority (1998) 154 ALR 471, 481.

50 In my opinion, some useful guidance as to the proper operation of s 76(2) can be found in principles which have evolved in respect of claims for public interest immunity, the making of non-publication orders, and freedom of information legislation. In those other areas of the law, the courts have recognised that there are particular categories of information which are likely to prejudice police operations if they are publicly disclosed. These established categories of potentially prejudicial information include the following:

The detection of crime is frequently assisted by members of the public who volunteer information about the commission of offences. These informers may be persons involved on the fringe of illicit activities, co-offenders seeking favourable treatment, or simply public spirited citizens. It is obviously in the public interest that nothing should be done which might discourage such people from coming forward, and the disclosure of their identity is likely to have that effect. For the same reason, the disclosure of any information from which the identity of an informer could be deduced is likely to prejudice police operations.

(2) The identity of complainants and victims of crime:

The disclosure of the identity of, or information which might identify a complainant or victim of crime in circumstances where no charges have been laid, may well prejudice the operations of the Commissioner of Police. This is because of the risk that there will be reprisals or intimidation of the complainant or victim by the persons implicated in the alleged offences. Furthermore the disclosure of such identities may have an ongoing effect by deterring other victims and complainants from coming forward.

The courts frequently take steps to protect the identity of witnesses by making non-publication orders. This is often because the disclosure of the identity of, or information which might identify, a person who has witnessed a crime may lead to attempts to prevent the witness from giving evidence in a criminal prosecution. It may also lead to reprisals being taken against the witness. If witnesses to crimes became reluctant to come forward, this would obviously prejudice the operations of the Commissioner of Police.

It is a well established principle that the anonymity of undercover police operatives should be preserved in order to protect their safety and to allow them to continue their undercover work. Similarly, information as to the identity of, or information which might lead to the identification of, a police officer investigating organised crime should be protected from disclosure in order to safeguard that officer from the possibility of reprisal or intimidation. In this regard, the operations of the Commissioner of Police would be prejudiced if such officers became reluctant to investigate organised crime.

(5) Police methodology and procedures of investigation:

Many of the procedures customarily used by police when conducting investigations are long-established and well-known. However, the methodology of police investigations is constantly changing, and there would be obvious prejudice to the Commissioner's operations if criminals became aware of new or unique investigative techniques. It can also be expected that when updated on new procedures, criminals would alter their methods of operation in order to avoid detection. The disclosure of methods and procedures adopted by law enforcement agencies could also alert a criminal to the fact that he is under investigation.

(6) Protection of intelligence and information which discloses an investigation:

It is of the very nature of police investigations of organised crime that information as to the types of offences being committed and the identity of likely offenders is gathered from a wide variety of sources. These sources can include informers, victims, witnesses, other police officers, and other law enforcement agencies. Furthermore, there is very often a long lead time between the commencement of an investigation of particular organised criminals, and their eventual prosecution. Quite obviously, it would be very detrimental to the prospect of such prosecutions if any of the information gathered beforehand was to be publicly disclosed. This is because it would provide those who are the subject of the investigation (or who suspect they are the subject of investigation) the opportunity to take steps to avoid prosecution.

51 Apart from the above categories of information, I consider that there is one further category of confidential information which necessarily arises pursuant to the scheme under the Act. The first step in the process of seeking fortification removal is for the Commissioner to make an application to the Corruption and Crime Commission under s 68. That section contemplates the application being made ex parte, and in the present instance, it is clear from the transcript that the hearing proceeded on the basis that it was in camera. Accordingly, information of a confidential nature was freely divulged in the course of evidence and submissions, and in answer to specific questions from the Commission. Although the Act does not specifically provide that the transcript of a hearing under s 68 is to remain confidential, there are compelling reasons why in the public interest it should be so.

52 The same considerations apply to the transcript of the proceedings on 17 December 2003 before a special Commissioner under pt 6 of the Criminal Investigation (Exceptional Powers) and Fortification Removal Act 2002 (WA) (which Act was repealed by the present Act). Those proceedings were the hearing of an earlier application by the Commissioner of Police for the issue of a fortification warning notice.

53 Most of the content of the transcripts of proceedings before the Special Commissioner and before the Corruption and Crime Commission comprises confidential information falling into one or more of the above categories. However, in my view, the claims to confidentiality of the balance of the material are not determinable under s 76(2).

54 It follows that those issues as to this remaining material need to be determined by a balancing of the competing public interests for and against its disclosure. There is firstly the public interest that such material not be disclosed so that bodies such as the Corruption and Crime Commission can function as intended. There is secondly the public interest that the applicant should have access to the material to assist it in knowing what case it has to meet. These conflicting public interests cannot be reconciled, and after giving them careful consideration, I have come to the conclusion that the first public interest outweighs the other and that the residual material in question should not be disclosed.

55 On 4 July 2008, I provided the parties with a schedule of my determinations in respect of all items in the materials before me that were the subject of the Commissioner's claims to confidentiality. With the agreement of the parties, that schedule was provided in advance and on the basis that my reasons for decision would be given at the completion of the hearing.

56 A copy of the schedule is attached, and it will be noted that I have allowed many of the Commissioner's claims to confidentiality, but rejected others. In each instance where I allowed a claim (other than in respect of transcript s of proceedings), I was satisfied that disclosure of the particular item might prejudice the operations of the Commissioner because it fell into one or more of the categories of confidential information referred to above. Unfortunately, and by reason of the requirements of s 76(2), I am unable to provide any more detailed reasons for each of those determinations.

Facts disclosed by the materials taken into consideration by the Commissioner

57 The Gypsy Jokers Motorcycle Club (GJMC) originated in the United States of America, and was founded by a group which broke away from another motorcycle club in 1969. In Australia, chapters of the GJMC exist in Perth, Kalgoorlie, Adelaide, Sydney, McLean (NSW) and Wodonga (Victoria). Although international reciprocal visits sometimes occur, the Australian chapters of the GJMC operate independently of their USA counterparts.

58 The Western Australian chapter of the GJMC was formed during the 1970s, and became incorporated as the plaintiff association in 1969. According to the constitution of the plaintiff, the association was formed for the purpose of organising and promoting the enjoyment of motorcycling pursuits for the benefit of its members.

59 Law enforcement agencies throughout Australia have had longstanding concerns about particular motorcycle gangs, including the GJMC. These agencies have collaborated in compiling significant intelligence about the activities of the GJMC, and have good reasons to believe that members of the GJMC are regularly engage in particular areas of organised crime. The Western Australian Police also have more detailed intelligence concerning members of the plaintiff association which indicates that they regularly participate in these same activities.

60 Australian law enforcement agencies have also compiled significant intelligence with regard to the structure and underlying culture of outlaw motorcycle gangs, including the GJMC. The plaintiff appears to adhere to this structure which involves a strict hierarchical ranking system comprising:

(1) The state president, who is responsible for both chapters within the State. The state president oversees the overall functioning of the club and determines the punishment for members who have broken club rules. There is reason to believe that the state president is aware of all major club activities, whether legal or illegal.

(2) There is a president of each chapter within the State. The chapter president is responsible for the functioning and activities of his particular chapter, which requires him to have intimate knowledge of the activities of specific members under his control.

(3) The sergeant-at-arms is the member in charge of the organisation of road trips, and who enforces club rules.

(4) Club members, being males who have been initiated into the club as 'full patch' members. (Initiation may involve the commission of a violent crime.)

(5) 'Nominees', being males sponsored by full members as future members of the club.

(6) 'Associates', who do not become members of the club, but assist members and participate in some club activities.

61 In the course of investigating the GJMC and its members, several common characteristics have been noted by law enforcement agencies, including the Western Australian Police. These include:

(3) the practice of witness, prosecutor and law enforcement officer intimidation;

(4) a high degree of mobility between clubs and chapters;

(5) a requirement for membership to commit a crime;

(7) use of sophisticated electronic equipment, including telephone intercept devices, parabolic microphones and tracking devices;

(8) extensive security measures at clubhouses and residences; and

(9) the use of counter-surveillance/counter-intelligence measures against law enforcement agencies and members of the judiciary.

62 At the time of the issue of the fortification removal notice, there were 59 known 'patched' members of the plaintiff. All but one of these had records of previous offending, and some members had been convicted of Schedule 1 offences. (I am unable to determine the precise number of prior Schedule 1 offences, because the records do not include necessary particulars in respect of drug and explosive offences.) Some members also had records for serious crimes which were not Schedule 1 offences, such as aggravated armed robberies, aggravated sexual assaults, and deprivations of liberty.

63 A number of members were also charged with further offences as a result of a particular investigation known as 'Operation Zircon', which was instigated on 1 September 2001, following the death of Donald Leslie Hancock and Lawrence William Lewis (as a result of an explosive device being planted in their vehicle). That investigation resulted in two GJMC members being charged with the murders of Hancock and Lewis. Subsequently, Sidney John Reid was convicted of those offences following his pleas of guilty, but Graeme Slater was acquitted (on 27 October 2003) at trial.

64 Operation Zircon also resulted in a close associate of GJMC members, Gary Ernest White, being charged with and convicted of the wilful murder of Anthony David Tapley. White had shot Tapley in the chest and head at close range and then burnt and disposed of the body. There had previously been a dispute between the two men over drug payments relating to the GJMC.

65 Zircon investigations also resulted in four members of the plaintiff and another associate being charged with attempted criminal damage by fire as well as three counts of causing an explosion likely to do serious injury to property. These charges related to an explosion at the Ora Banda Inn on 13 October 2000, an explosion at the Ora Banda Battery on 12 November 2000, and the destruction of Hancock's Ora Banda house by fire during November 2002. At the date of issue of the fortification removal notice, those charges were still to be heard.

66 Altogether a total of 130 charges were laid against 27 members or associates of the plaintiff as a result of Operation Zircon. Assistant Commissioner Hay's affidavit claims that 17 of these charges were for Schedule 1 offences, but, from all of the materials that I have seen, this number would not appear to be accurate. Nevertheless, there were certainly some convictions, or charges pending, in respect of Schedule 1 offences at the date of issue of the notice, including offences involving possession of substantial quantities of illicit drugs.

67 The consequent seizure of assets and cash from senior GJMC members resulted in a number of direct threats being made against police officers, including threats to kill. Furthermore, during the search of a vehicle owned by an associate of the plaintiff, the police located video footage which showed that police premises, police vehicles and police officers at the rear of Curtin House had been the subject of video surveillance by the GJMC.

68 The plaintiff became the registered proprietor of the premises at 10 Lower Park Road, Maddington, in 1996. The land is 2086 m2 in size and is situated in an industrial area in the City of Gosnells. The building on the premises was classified by the City of Gosnells for use as an assembly building (viz, for the gathering of people), and as a carpark for the purposes of the Building Code of Australia 1996.

69 When the plaintiff first acquired the premises, they were typical of the area in that they comprised a building with an office at the front and warehouse at the rear, surrounded by a carpark and open area. Subsequently, members of the plaintiff carried out substantial improvements, including the conversion of the building into a clubhouse and the erection of perimeter walls.

70 When carrying out these improvements, the plaintiff complied with all Local Authority and Government by-laws and regulations. Some of these regulations required the improvements to be constructed in a particular way. For example, the external doors to the bar and entertainment area were required to open outwards in case of fire.

71 As at the date of the issue of the fortification removal notice, the fortifications at the premises comprised the following:

Apart from the front gates, there is a perimeter wall completely surrounding the property. The wall is made of precast concrete panels, 100 mm thick, supported by steel columns, and is 2 m high at the front rising to 2.8 m high at the rear. Except where industrial items are stacked along the boundary in a neighbouring property, it would be necessary for the police to use ladders to gain access over the wall.

The front vehicle access gate consists of a steel frame covered with normal sheeting which is 2.1 m high and 4.3 m long. The gate runs on a track to slide open and is operated by an electric motor. The gate can be operated by means of an external keypad mounted on the adjacent wall, by a permanently fixed remote control in the bar area of the building, or by a number of portable remote controls. There is also an intercom system installed so that anyone arriving at the gate is able to speak to the person operating the remote control inside the building.

A front pedestrian gate is immediately adjacent to the vehicle access gate, is of the same height, and of the same construction. It is 1.2 m wide (which is sufficient to accommodate a motorcycle) and swings open and shut. The pedestrian gate is operated by the same external keypad, by a fixed remote control inside the building, or by a key.

Physically it is possible to gain access into the premises over the top of the vehicle access gate by climbing from the bonnet of a police vehicle parked hard up against it (as was shown during the execution of a search warrant after the issue of the fortification removal notice). Once inside, there are manual release buttons which can open both gates.

There are two external surveillance cameras mounted on the building on the premises. Both cameras are connected to monitors in the bar area and one camera has an additional monitor in a front bedroom in the building. Neither camera has a zooming or panning function, but provides fixed views. One camera provides an elevated view of the front gates, and the other views the length of the driveway running down the south side of the building.

Some of the windows of the premises have steel security grilles inside which are visible from the outside of the building. Other windows have steel mesh grilles attached externally.

There are two floodlights and two spotlights illuminating exterior areas of the premises. One floodlight mounted on the roof illuminates the front carpark area and front gates. Another floodlight at the rear overlooks an external entertainment area. Twin spotlights illuminate doorways at the side of the building.

At the rear of the premises, there are two large timber doors to the internal entertainment area which swing outwards. These doors are constructed of frames approximately 10 cm thick, clad with wooden planks approximately 35 mm thick. These double doors are secured by a latch with draw bolts inside the building. Each door is 1.5 m wide and 2.4 m high.

There are five other doors into the premises, two of which lead to a motorcycle storage area external to the main building. Four doors are made of steel, and the two of these which provide access into the main building both swing outwards and are secured on the inside with a key lock or a draw bolt.

The front door into the building has an aluminium frame with glass panes in the top and bottom. It has a standard door lock.

At the time that the premises were acquired by the plaintiff in 1996, there was an internal passageway leading to the original toilet. When the premises were changed into a clubhouse this passageway was bricked up at each end and provided with access through a low-level trapdoor hidden behind some shelving in the office area. During the execution of a search warrant on 4 September 2001, police used a brick saw to gain access into this 'hidden room'. They found some ammunition in the room, as well as evidence that it had been recently used for storage of other items.

The plaintiff's solicitors' submissions to Assistant Commissioner Hay dated 14 April 2004 did not comment on the hidden room. However, the affidavit of Dean Adams sworn 20 December 2004 deposes that the passageway was bricked up in the course of improvements because it was too narrow for required wheelchair access to the toilets.

72 When Assistant Commissioner Hay issued the fortification removal notice, he also took into consideration the previous difficulties that police had encountered in gaining access to the premises. Most of the information which is relevant in this regard has been validly identified as being confidential (under s 76(2)), and therefore cannot be referred to in these reasons for decision. All that can be said is that, as a result of particular intelligence, as well as a formal risk assessment, Assistant Commissioner Hay was concerned about the safety of police officers making a forced entry into the premises.

73 Assistant Commissioner Hay also had information that, on particular occasions, the fortifications had prevented investigating officers from gaining timely access to the premises, thus providing members of the plaintiff with the opportunity of destroying evidence.

74 On other occasions, motorcyclists being pursued by police were able to avoid apprehension by riding through the gate of the premises and using a remote control to close it behind them. In each instance, negotiations would eventually result in a junior member or nominee member being presented to the police at the front gate as the rider of the motorcycle. However, on each occasion the police doubted that this was the person they had observed on the motorcycle.

75 After the plaintiff was served with the fortification warning notice dated 31 March 2004, it provided Assistant Commissioner Hay with a key to the front pedestrian gate of the premises. In the plaintiff's solicitors' submissions dated 14 April 2004, it was stated that the key would allow police officers entry to the premises when entitled to do so by law. However, the provision of the key was made conditional upon Dean Adams being telephoned (on a particular mobile telephone number) 30 minutes prior to entry, so that arrangements could be made for a representative of the plaintiff to be present. In this regard, the submissions specifically stated that the provision of the key was not to be construed as a licence to enter upon the premises at will.

76 At the time of issuing the fortification removal notice, Assistant Commissioner Hay also had information as to the nature of fortifications at other premises in the Maddington area. This information came from a video and still photographs taken by police officers, as well as from the video which accompanied the plaintiff's solicitors' submissions.

77 In general terms, these materials showed that the other premises mostly had cyclone mesh perimeter fencing topped by two or three strands of barbed wire. Some premises also had electric fencing, and a few also had surveillance cameras. A variety of types of gates were used in these other premises, and some had steel reinforced doors into the main building. Many of the windows to these buildings had steel mesh or grilles similar to that used at the plaintiff's premises. None of the other premises depicted in these materials had solid front walls.

Whether the Commissioner could have reasonably had the belief required by s 72(2)

78 As previously noted, the Act set a very low threshold for the state of mind that was required of the Commissioner at the time of issuing the fortification removal notice. On the present review, the Commissioner need only establish that he 'could have' reasonably believed the facts stipulated by s 72(2).

79 Accordingly, there need not be proof that the Commissioner's belief was in fact correct. All that is necessary is that a reasonable person, cognisant of the information that the Commissioner in fact considered, could have had 'an inclination of the mind towards assenting to, rather than rejecting', the relevant facts. Depending on the circumstances, the grounds which can reasonably induce that inclination of the mind may leave something to surmise or conjecture (as per George v Rocket ibid).

80 As to the question whether Assistant Commissioner Hay could have reasonably believed that the plaintiff's premises were 'heavily fortified', it is relevant to have regard to the particular nature of those premises and the use to which they were put. The premises are a clubhouse for an incorporated association which was formed for the purpose of organising and promoting the enjoyment of motorcycling pursuits by its members. It is consistent with this object that, like any other club, the clubhouse will often be frequented by members for the purposes of meetings and social activities. Similarly, like any other club, there will be times when members and/or staff are not present, and it is necessary to secure the premises against unwanted intrusions by burglars and thieves. This is particularly so whenever any valuable motorcycles are being stored there.

81 It is also relevant to look at the particular security measures and fortifications used at similar premises in the nearby Maddington area. It is reasonable to assume that these other premises face the same level of risk of burglaries, theft, and property damage. It follows that the measures generally adopted at these other premises would provide some guidance in determining whether the particular fortifications at the subject premises could be reasonably regarded as 'excessive'.

82 It is relevant in this respect that the information taken into consideration by Assistant Commissioner Hay showed that the perimeter fortifications at these other premises were almost entirely cyclone mesh fences, topped with barbed wire. At some premises, electric fencing was substituted for strands of barbed wire. Most premises also had open mesh gates of a similar construction to the fencing. There were a few premises with surveillance cameras, but (from my perusal of the relevant materials) none had a system of keypad or remote control entry through the main access gate similar to that at the plaintiff's clubhouse.

83 It was quite obvious that many of the other premises had window grilles or steel mesh screens similar to those at the subject premises. There were a few examples of steel reinforced doors into buildings, and numerous instances of external floodlighting.

84 It follows that the only significant physical differences between the fortifications at the plaintiff's clubhouse and the fortifications at other premises of that kind were the solid walls and gates, and the system for monitoring and controlling entry. Another significant difference was that the plaintiff's system of controlled entry remained in place at all times, whereas other premises that were being used for the conduct of businesses necessarily had their front gates open during normal business hours. There was also at least one other clubhouse in the near vicinity, and it would have been reasonable to assume that there was unrestricted physical access into those premises during the particular times it was used by members.

85 From the point of view of a burglar or thief, the solid concrete wall around the plaintiff's premises was probably a lesser barrier to entry than cyclone mesh, topped by barbed wire and/or electric fencing. However, from the point of view of police officers making an uninvited but lawful entry, the solid wall and gates were a significant barrier. This was because of the reasonable concerns as to the safety of police officers making a forced entry into the plaintiff's premises without knowing what might be encountered on the other side (as established by the confidential information taken into consideration by Assistant Commissioner Hay). Furthermore, police officers were not in a position to make an uninvited but lawful entry into the plaintiff's premises by simply walking through the front gate during certain hours, as could be done at any other business premises or clubhouse. It was no answer to this difficulty in gaining access that Assistant Commissioner Hay had been provided with a key to the front pedestrian gate for use subject to 30 minutes' notice of entry. The very nature of police investigations involving the execution of search warrants, requires that there be an element of surprise in order to maximise the prospects of obtaining evidence.

86 It follows, in my view, that Assistant Commissioner Hay could have reasonably believed that the premises were heavily fortified. The fortifications, and, in particular, the front concrete wall, the solid entry gates and the controlled entry system could reasonably be regarded as 'excessive' in the sense that they were unnecessary from the point of view of deterring uninvited entry by burglars and thieves, but were a significant impediment to uninvited entry by police officers.

87 The fortification removal notice which issued on 5 May 2004 required removal of fortifications in addition to the front concrete wall, gates, and controlled entry system; and it is my view that not all of these could be reasonably regarded as 'excessive'. However, it is not my function on this review to order the deletion of particular items from the notice, and I am limited to determining whether the Commissioner could reasonably have had the general belief that the premises were heavily fortified.

88 With regard to the second limb of s 72(2), the confidential police intelligence taken into consideration by Assistant Commissioner Hay was more than mere idle wondering, and indicated that members of the plaintiff were regularly involved in particular areas of 'organised crime' (as defined by the Act) unrelated to the murders of Donald Leslie Hancock and Lawrence William Lewis. While that intelligence did not indicate the precise numbers of the plaintiff's members involved in such activities, those numbers were (by necessary inference) significant.

89 There was also other confidential police intelligence in the nature of direct evidence that particular named members of the plaintiff had committed in combination particular Schedule 1 offences involving substantial planning and organisation. Furthermore, there was additional confidential information which, in my view, supported a reasonable suspicion that members of the plaintiff who could not be identified were involved in particular offences which constituted yet another area of 'organised crime'. That intelligence also supported a reasonable belief that a significant number of those members were so involved.

90 I have already expressed the view that, as a matter of law, the acquittal of an accused on a charge of a Schedule 1 offence, would not preclude the Commissioner from continuing to have a reasonable suspicion that that person had, in fact, committed that offence. However, in light of the above observations and findings, it is unnecessary for me to cause further damage to the presumption of innocence by elaborating on this view.

91 The constitution of the plaintiff association required that its members attend weekly meetings of the club. The premises at 10 Lower Park Road, Maddington, were the designated clubhouse of the plaintiff, and police surveillance confirmed that its members regularly gathered there. Accordingly there were reasonable grounds for Assistant Commissioner Hay to believe that the premises were habitually used as a place of resort by the class of people in question.

92 In the end, I am satisfied that the information before Assistant Commissioner Hay provided reasonable grounds for a belief in terms of the second limb of s 72(2).

93 For all of the reasons outlined above, I have come to the conclusion that the Commissioner of Police could have reasonably had the belief required by s 72(2) when issuing the fortification removal notice in respect of the plaintiff's premises.

GYPSY JOKERS MOTORCYCLE CLUB INC v COMMISSIONER OF POLICE: CIV 1636/2004

DETERMINATIONS AS TO CLAIMS TO CONFIDENTIALITY BY COMMISSIONER OF POLICE:

WHERE INFORMATION IS IDENTIFIED AS CONFIDENTIAL

EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF CLAIM TO CONFIDENTIALITY

RELEVANT PARAGRAPHS OF DETECTIVE SUPERINTENDENT MIGRO'S AFFIDAVIT WHICH ARE SUBJECT TO A CLAIM FOR CONFIDENTIALITY

RELEVANT PARAGRAPHS OF RESPONDENT'S OUTLINE OF SUBMISSIONS WHERE ABLE TO BE DISCLOSED

DETERMINATION IN RESPECT OF CLAIM TO CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION

DETERMINATION IN RESPECT TO CLAIM TO CONFIDENTIALITY OF PARAGRAPHS OF DETECTIVE SUPERINTENDENT MIGRO'S AFFIDAVIT

Paragraph 18(1) of Mr Hay's Affidavit; paragraph 3 of Commissioner's Affidavit.

Paragraphs 9-16 of Detective Superintendent Migro's Affidavit.

Paragraphs 11, 12, 13 and 15 of Detective Superintendent Migro's Affidavit.

Item 2 Index and par 6 are not confidential and are to be disclosed.

Paragraphs 11, 12, 13 and 15 are not confidential and are to be disclosed.

GYPSY JOKERS MOTORCYCLE CLUB INC -v- COMMISSIONER OF POLICE [No 2] [2008] WASC 166 (13 August 2008)

At a glance

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Before

Catchwords

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Judgment (288 paragraphs)

GYPSY JOKERS MOTORCYCLE CLUB INC -v- COMMISSIONER OF POLICE [No 2] [2008] WASC 166 (13 August 2008)

Legislation Cited (2)

Cases Cited (6)