17 The competing opinions in this regard come from Dr Walton and Dr Weissman. Dr Walton, who examined on behalf of Griffiths' solicitors but was called by the TAC, assessed overall impairment at 17 percent with 11 percent of this occurring as a direct response to the accident and 6 percent being secondary or as a consequence of the physical injuries. In this regard, he was apportioning the impairment as required by s.46B(1). In cross-examination, he conceded that, in one sense, there was no great difference between a collective impairment of 17 percent and one of 20 percent, being the assessment made by Dr Weissman.
18 Dr Weissman, examining on behalf the TAC, assessed collective impairment at 20 percent, a figure from which he did not move. He appears to have carried out a thorough mental examination, and provided a detailed report. In a supplementary report, he assessed collective psychiatric impairment of 20 percent from which he excluded 5 percent as being secondary impairment. Accordingly, his assessment of the psychiatric impairment to be considered was 15 percent, and this was spelt out by him. It is also quite clear that, when making this assessment, he had before him Dr Walton's report, and specifically stated that he assessed Griffiths as being more unwell than had Dr Walton.
19 What happened next could not be regarded as being particularly satisfactory. The solicitors for the TAC forwarded to Dr Weissman a letter containing some additional material, including a report from a psychologist, Mr Bruton, to whom Dr Russell referred Griffiths in August 2004. The letter on behalf of the TAC is quite a lengthy one, highlighting various aspects of the case and of histories given by Griffiths. At least three of the points raised at some length in the letter relate to Dr Weissman's apportionment of secondary and non-secondary consequences. At the conclusion of these points, issues are raised such as "Does this impact on your assessment of the non-secondary component?" This letter was faxed to Dr Weissman on 19th November 2004.
20 Dr Weissman then reported back to the TAC by letter dated 23rd November 2004 but faxed later. He referred to the letter of 19th November and various points raised in it. Without requesting or carrying out a further examination of Griffiths, he increased the amount of secondary psychiatric impairment from one quarter to one third This had the effect of reducing Griffiths' Whole Person Impairment for non-secondary psychiatric or psychological injury from 15 percent to 13 percent. It is to be remembered that, in opening the case, Ms Bourke, on behalf of Griffiths placed before the Tribunal the assessments upon which Griffiths relied. These included the assessment of Dr Weissman of 15 percent non-secondary psychiatric injury. It is also to be remembered that, on 18th November 2004, the day before the faxing of the letter to Dr Weissman, the TAC apparently made an open offer based upon Griffiths' level of impairment being 49 percent. The existence of this "with prejudice" offer was not revealed to the Tribunal until 30th November 2004. In a situation where every percentage point has the potential to be vital, the downward revision of Dr Weissman's assessment, which arrived during the running of the case and without his having reviewed Griffiths, is something which has the capacity to create a feeling of unease. This is particularly so when, for example, the relevant aspects of Dr Russell's referral of Griffiths to Mr Bruton were not put to Dr Russell although the TAC possessed this information and, at least potentially, were going to rely upon it. Dr Russell gave evidence on 24th November 2004. Dr Weissman's additional report was faxed on 28th November 2004, but was not tendered until 30th November 2004. Further, as I understand it, there was no request that Mr Bruton attend for cross-examination.
21 I did not find Dr Weissman's explanation of the alteration to his assessment to be persuasive. I found it unconvincing. Assessing injuries of this nature and making the appropriate apportionment is a difficult task. As recently as 17th November 2004, just one week before the commencement of the case, Dr Weissman had assessed non-secondary psychiatric injury at 15 percent. Despite material put to him in cross-examination concerning a panic disorder suffered by Griffiths and diagnosed by Dr Russell, Dr Weissman was not prepared to return to that figure of 15 percent. Overall I was not impressed by his evidence as to which matters he took into account and which he disregarded when it came to altering his assessment.
22 Dr Weissman made his original assessment after a consultation with Griffiths and after receiving Dr Walton's report. It is also apparent that, in addition, he had a large number of medical reports, records, and other documents available to him. His considered opinion was that Griffiths had a non-secondary psychiatric injury which assessed at 15 percent. In my opinion, he was correct in arriving at that figure. These assessments are very much a matter of impression. Dr Walton has conceded flexibility in his assessment, and in the manner of assessment. As stated, I accept Griffiths as a witness of truth. The assessment of her non-secondary psychiatric impairment as being 15 percent coincides with my own opinion.
23 In summary, I assess Griffiths' psychiatric impairment as being 15 percent.