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[2015] FCA 443
Federal Court of Australia
2015-05-13
French J, Spender JJ, Sheppard JJ, Mansfield J
Original judgment source is linked above.
REASONS FOR RULING 1 The present claim is a claim for compensation under s 50(2) and s 61(1) of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) (NT Act). Judgment was given on 19 March 2014 on the issues of liability, reserving for further consideration issues as to the appropriate amount of compensation payable: Griffiths v Northern Territory [2014] FCA 256 (the judgment). 2 The parties subsequently made submissions on a series of issues: (1) whether final orders should be made reflecting the judgment on the issues of liability; (2) how to address the issue of liability in respect of "act 34", one of the extinguishing acts in respect of which compensation is claimed and which was not addressed in the judgment; (3) how to address the issue of liability in respect of "acts 50A-50C", which involve invalid future acts, and in respect of which by the judgment leave in principle was given to amend the application; and (4) procedural directions to progress the hearing of the compensation claim. 3 For the reasons which follow: (1) I do not presently propose to make "Final Orders" reflecting the judgment, but to record the conclusions I have reached in the terms of a Draft Order which will then, when appropriate, become the Orders of the Court in the light of the judgment; (2) the Draft Order will include a term encompassing "act 34"; it will also include the Table which has attached to it the correction to Item 10 agreed by the parties; (3) there will be leave to the applicant to amend the application, in the form proposed by the applicant; and (4) a date will be fixed for further directions in May 2015 anticipating that the process of discovery by the respondent will be completed, as foreshadowed, by 30 April 2015.
(1) Orders or Rulings 4 The significance of the debate on this topic is a little difficult to understand. The Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (the Rules) apply to the order for the separate trial of the issue of liability. There is no specific order under r 30.01, as it was supported by the parties. Following the trial of separate issues under r 30.01 of the Rules, there is authority to say that an appeal from a determination will lie by leave even if a formal order reflecting the determination has not been made: see Arrowcrest Group Pty Ltd v Gill (1993) 46 FCR 90 at 99 (per French J, with whom Jenkinson and Spender JJ agreed); Town v Australian Telecommunications Commission (1983) 47 ALR 137 (per Franki, McGregor and Sheppard JJ); compare Landsal Pty Ltd (in Liquidation) v REI Building Society (1993) 41 FCR 421 where the separate hearing was but a step in the decision-making process and did not finally dispose of the questions in the litigation, and no order under the then Order 29 of the Rules for the separate trial of issues, and no application for leave to appeal was made. 5 If there were any need to refine the effect of the judgment to an express determination, it is to be done by the Draft Order. It is clear enough from the Order made when the judgment was given, that it was intended that it was finally to resolve particular issues in the proceeding, even though other issues remain to be resolved. 6 In my view, the appropriate course is to prepare and have available a final Draft Order, recording the effect of the judgment in terms of an order which (if it becomes appropriate or necessary during the further conduct of the matter) can be made an order without further debate (the Draft Order). The terms of that order are in accordance with Annexure A to these reasons for ruling and are entitled "Draft Order". 7 The judgment decided, on the matter of liability, that the native title holders of the subject land are entitled to compensation for certain acts that impair or extinguish native title, and are not entitled to compensation in relation to certain other acts which were the subject of their claims. That followed extensive submissions in respect of a number of different pieces of land, but primarily on two issues. 8 The first is whether or not Crown to Crown grants, or particular use of the land, extinguished native title under s 23B(9C) and s 23C(1) of the NT Act (concerning claimed acts 4, 16, 18, 20, 22, 24, 26, 28 and 30). It was held by the judgment that Crown to Crown grants are not to be considered as exclusive possession acts. The consequence is that the native title holders are entitled to compensation under ss 17 and 20 of the NT Act for the impairment (but not the extinguishment) of their native title, and are entitled compensation under s 23J of the NT Act for any later extinguishing acts. 9 The second main issue concerned whether s 47B of the NT Act operated to apply the non-extinguishment principle to the creation of prior interests. That issue is relevant to claimed acts 34, 37, 38 and 39 occurring within what was defined as the Part A. No 1 area, where the Court had determined in the earlier native title proceedings that s 47B applies to that area. It was held that s 47B does not apply to an application for the determination of compensation, so that prior partial extinguishment by the grant of pastoral leases is not to be disregarded. At the time of the later claimed compensable acts, exclusive native title was not "revived" and the relevant native title interests were non-exclusive. Consequently, it was found that acts 37, 38 and 39 (grants of grazing licences) had no effect greater than the historic pastoral leases and are not compensable. The appropriate order, in those circumstances, is that the compensation application should be dismissed in relation to acts 37, 38 and 39. 10 I have dealt separately with act 34 in the next section of these reasons for ruling. 11 However, in my view, it is not desirable (despite the direction that there be a separate hearing on the question of liability to pay compensation) that final orders should now be made on the issues of liability. To do so might facilitate the further fragmentation of the hearing. The fact that I am leaving the orders as the Draft Orders reflects my view that it is preferable for all remaining issues in this proceeding to be resolved before any appeal. An appeal by leave made from the judgment, either by the applicant or by the respondent to the Full Court, and depending on the outcome of that appeal, to the High Court by leave would occupy further time and possibly further delay the hearing of the remaining issues. I think it is more satisfactory in the interests of justice for all issues now to be addressed, so that the judgment is a step along the way to final determination of the proceedings. Ultimately, the Draft Order (if final orders are to be made) will be complemented by the assessment of the appropriate compensation. Any appeal can then deal with all issues without the risk of there being two separate sequential appeal processes, and the delay in the quantification which might follow from the first sequential appeal process being undertaken. I accept, of course, as counsel said that it is not presently intended to appeal at this point from any orders reflecting the judgment. The comment was made in submissions that the applicant had no "present intention" to appeal, depending upon how the case progresses. The liberty to apply which I have given leaves the parties the opportunity to seek the making of orders in those terms, in the event that leave to appeal is sought, and it will accommodate, if appropriate circumstances arise, that circumstance. 12 I have not overlooked the suggestion which the parties have made that the final orders build in an undertaking on the part of the applicant and the respondent not to appeal pending the hearing and determination of the quantification of the compensation. In my view, that is somewhat of an artificial contrivance concealing rather than exposing the factors to which I have referred. More importantly, it would impose an obstacle to the exercise of the rights the parties have presently to seek leave to appeal. I do not think it is appropriate to do so. 13 Finally, I mention in this regard, that I understood from certain submissions that the parties intended to ask the Court to assess compensation for the acts which the judgment would otherwise indicate are not compensable, on the basis that it is desirable for all issues to be decided once and for all at first instance so that full appeal rights (if sought to be exercised) can be undertaken in relation to all issues. 14 The Draft Order, in its terms, is not itself the subject of dispute.
(2) Claimed act 34 15 It is accepted, following the judgment, that claimed act 34 (the grant of Crown Lease Term 624) is to be treated as extinguishing non-exclusive native title. That is contrary to the applicant's contention that the non-extinguishment principle applies to that act to suspend any native title subsisting at the time of the grant. It is common ground, therefore, that the disposition of the claim in respect of act 34 should be an order that the native title holders are entitled under s 23J of the NT Act to compensation for extinguishment of their native title by act 34.
(3) Claimed amendment in relation to acts 50A-50C 16 The judgment has indicated that leave to amend the compensation application is to be granted. In the absence of submissions as to there being any dispute about the appropriate orders which should follow, there will be orders giving leave to amend the application in the form proposed by the applicant. 17 I note that this claim as now amended involves an action in the nature of damages for trespass for grants made and actions taken by the respondent over Lots 82, 83 and 84 that are invalid to the extent that they affect native title by virtue of ss 24AA(2) and 24OA of the NT Act. As I indicated, I am satisfied that the Court has jurisdiction to entertain that claim: s 39B(1A)(c) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s 213(2) of the NT Act and see Edwards v Santos Ltd (2011) 242 CLR 421 at [41] and [45], and LNC Industries Ltd v BMW (Australia Ltd) (1983) 151 CLR 575 at 582-583.
(4) Procedural orders 18 The parties were largely agreed upon a timetable. 19 At the time of the hearing to decide the appropriate orders, there was evidence provided by the respondent (the affidavit of Jennifer Laurence) that the extensive discovery required by the applicant from the respondent would take a considerable time to complete, and would not be completed until April 2015. I anticipate, therefore, that will shortly be completed, and that in the meantime discovery has been progressively given in waves. 20 It is now appropriate to accommodate any further pleadings issues, to give directions for the exchange of evidence, to address any other pre-trial processes, to address the most efficient way in which documentary material should be produced without unnecessary duplication, and to determine the location and time to be set aside for the hearing. There may be other interlocutory issues to address. It may be that a number of the steps foreshadowed by the parties have been progressed as they then anticipated. 21 The Draft Order, by reference to the Table with the judgment, means that I will amend Item 10 of the Table, as agreed, by omitting "CLT 674" and substituting "CLT 655". 22 Following this Ruling I will set a further directions hearing in May 2015, at a time to meet the convenience of the parties and counsel. The proposed procedural directions may also be able to be agreed. It may require some alteration from the timetable previously proposed. I certify that the preceding twenty-two (22) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Ruling herein of the Honourable Justice Mansfield.
Associate: Dated: 13 May 2015 ANNEXURE A No: NTD 18/2011
Federal Court of Australia District Registry: Northern Territory Division: General ALLAN GRIFFITHS AND LORRAINE JONES ON BEHALF OF THE NGALIWURRU AND NUNGALI PEOPLES Applicant NORTHERN TERRITORY OF AUSTRALIA Respondent ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA Intervenor DRAFT ORDER JUDGE: Justice Mansfield DATE OF ORDER: - WHERE MADE: -
Note: In this Draft Order: (1) "past act", "previous exclusive possession act" and "non-extinguishment principle" have the meaning given by the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) (the Act); (2) "exclusive native title", "non-exclusive native title" and "native title holders" have the meaning given by the Interim Statement of Agreed Facts dated 2 May 2012 at [2], [3] and [4]; (3) the numbered acts referred to in these orders are the subject of the compensation claims in the Applicant's Amended Particulars dated 17 October 2012; (4) the Applicant has withdrawn the claims for compensation made for acts 35, 42, 49A and 55. THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
Federal Court of Australia District Registry: Northern Territory Division: General ALLAN GRIFFITHS AND LORRAINE JONES ON BEHALF OF THE NGALIWURRU AND NUNGALI PEOPLES Applicant NORTHERN TERRITORY OF AUSTRALIA Respondent ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA Intervenor AMENDED COMPENSATION APPLICATION (amended pursuant to leave given on 13 May 2015) A. Details of the claim
Griffiths
Northern Territory of Australia
(1993) 46 FCR 90
(1983) 47 ALR 137
(1993) 41 FCR 421
(2011) 242 CLR 421
(1983) 151 CLR 575