(1) Orders or Rulings
4 The significance of the debate on this topic is a little difficult to understand. The Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (the Rules) apply to the order for the separate trial of the issue of liability. There is no specific order under r 30.01, as it was supported by the parties. Following the trial of separate issues under r 30.01 of the Rules, there is authority to say that an appeal from a determination will lie by leave even if a formal order reflecting the determination has not been made: see Arrowcrest Group Pty Ltd v Gill (1993) 46 FCR 90 at 99 (per French J, with whom Jenkinson and Spender JJ agreed); Town v Australian Telecommunications Commission (1983) 47 ALR 137 (per Franki, McGregor and Sheppard JJ); compare Landsal Pty Ltd (in Liquidation) v REI Building Society (1993) 41 FCR 421 where the separate hearing was but a step in the decision-making process and did not finally dispose of the questions in the litigation, and no order under the then Order 29 of the Rules for the separate trial of issues, and no application for leave to appeal was made.
5 If there were any need to refine the effect of the judgment to an express determination, it is to be done by the Draft Order. It is clear enough from the Order made when the judgment was given, that it was intended that it was finally to resolve particular issues in the proceeding, even though other issues remain to be resolved.
6 In my view, the appropriate course is to prepare and have available a final Draft Order, recording the effect of the judgment in terms of an order which (if it becomes appropriate or necessary during the further conduct of the matter) can be made an order without further debate (the Draft Order). The terms of that order are in accordance with Annexure A to these reasons for ruling and are entitled "Draft Order".
7 The judgment decided, on the matter of liability, that the native title holders of the subject land are entitled to compensation for certain acts that impair or extinguish native title, and are not entitled to compensation in relation to certain other acts which were the subject of their claims. That followed extensive submissions in respect of a number of different pieces of land, but primarily on two issues.
8 The first is whether or not Crown to Crown grants, or particular use of the land, extinguished native title under s 23B(9C) and s 23C(1) of the NT Act (concerning claimed acts 4, 16, 18, 20, 22, 24, 26, 28 and 30). It was held by the judgment that Crown to Crown grants are not to be considered as exclusive possession acts. The consequence is that the native title holders are entitled to compensation under ss 17 and 20 of the NT Act for the impairment (but not the extinguishment) of their native title, and are entitled compensation under s 23J of the NT Act for any later extinguishing acts.
9 The second main issue concerned whether s 47B of the NT Act operated to apply the non-extinguishment principle to the creation of prior interests. That issue is relevant to claimed acts 34, 37, 38 and 39 occurring within what was defined as the Part A. No 1 area, where the Court had determined in the earlier native title proceedings that s 47B applies to that area. It was held that s 47B does not apply to an application for the determination of compensation, so that prior partial extinguishment by the grant of pastoral leases is not to be disregarded. At the time of the later claimed compensable acts, exclusive native title was not "revived" and the relevant native title interests were non-exclusive. Consequently, it was found that acts 37, 38 and 39 (grants of grazing licences) had no effect greater than the historic pastoral leases and are not compensable. The appropriate order, in those circumstances, is that the compensation application should be dismissed in relation to acts 37, 38 and 39.
10 I have dealt separately with act 34 in the next section of these reasons for ruling.
11 However, in my view, it is not desirable (despite the direction that there be a separate hearing on the question of liability to pay compensation) that final orders should now be made on the issues of liability. To do so might facilitate the further fragmentation of the hearing. The fact that I am leaving the orders as the Draft Orders reflects my view that it is preferable for all remaining issues in this proceeding to be resolved before any appeal. An appeal by leave made from the judgment, either by the applicant or by the respondent to the Full Court, and depending on the outcome of that appeal, to the High Court by leave would occupy further time and possibly further delay the hearing of the remaining issues. I think it is more satisfactory in the interests of justice for all issues now to be addressed, so that the judgment is a step along the way to final determination of the proceedings. Ultimately, the Draft Order (if final orders are to be made) will be complemented by the assessment of the appropriate compensation. Any appeal can then deal with all issues without the risk of there being two separate sequential appeal processes, and the delay in the quantification which might follow from the first sequential appeal process being undertaken. I accept, of course, as counsel said that it is not presently intended to appeal at this point from any orders reflecting the judgment. The comment was made in submissions that the applicant had no "present intention" to appeal, depending upon how the case progresses. The liberty to apply which I have given leaves the parties the opportunity to seek the making of orders in those terms, in the event that leave to appeal is sought, and it will accommodate, if appropriate circumstances arise, that circumstance.
12 I have not overlooked the suggestion which the parties have made that the final orders build in an undertaking on the part of the applicant and the respondent not to appeal pending the hearing and determination of the quantification of the compensation. In my view, that is somewhat of an artificial contrivance concealing rather than exposing the factors to which I have referred. More importantly, it would impose an obstacle to the exercise of the rights the parties have presently to seek leave to appeal. I do not think it is appropriate to do so.
13 Finally, I mention in this regard, that I understood from certain submissions that the parties intended to ask the Court to assess compensation for the acts which the judgment would otherwise indicate are not compensable, on the basis that it is desirable for all issues to be decided once and for all at first instance so that full appeal rights (if sought to be exercised) can be undertaken in relation to all issues.
14 The Draft Order, in its terms, is not itself the subject of dispute.