THE DESIGNATION ISSUE
23 Before his Honour it was submitted that the Windella Ramsar site had not been designated in accordance with Article 2 of the Ramsar Convention because no precise description had been given of the boundaries of it nor was it delimited on a map. It followed that the site was not a 'declared Ramsar Wetland' as defined in s 17(1) of the EPBC Act.
24 His Honour proceeded to construe the EPBC Act against the background of the Ramsar Convention. Pursuant to it, each Contracting Party has an obligation to designate at least one wetland and the right to add others to the List or, in special circumstances, delete them. A Contracting Party has obligations to promote the conservation of wetlands in its territory. His Honour observed that the limited role of the Bureau, to maintain the List and be informed of changes, is consistent with each Contracting Party's right under Article 2(5) to add or remove wetlands from the List.
25 His Honour held that a designation by the Commonwealth for the purposes of s 17(1) of the EPBC Act requires the Commonwealth to provide material which indicates or specifies the subject site. The expression itself does not require the giving of precise geographical coordinates or the provision of a map in the nature of a survey. It is sufficient to designate a site by providing information to enable its approximate boundaries to be determined. Sufficient information was provided in the RIS and in maps with it. The site was, in his Honour's view, designated within the meaning of the section.
26 His Honour rejected the submission that to be designated under Article 2(1) required strict compliance with the Article. In his Honour's view, s 17(1) of the EPBC Act was not intended to incorporate any particular requirement derived from Article 2 as a pre-condition for the valid designation of a wetland for inclusion in the List. Given the obligation on the part of the Commonwealth to designate at least one wetland, and the limited function of the Bureau in maintaining the List, his Honour reasoned that the expression in s 17(1) 'under Article 2 of the Ramsar Convention for inclusion in the List' was intended only to identify the source of the Commonwealth's obligation or right to designate a wetland of international significance.
27 His Honour considered that there was an underlying, but incorrect, assumption in the appellants' argument about the requirements of Article 2(1) in any event. Whilst a Contracting Party is obliged to provide the information specified, that does not mean that a failure to do so meant that the rights and duties flowing from the inclusion in the List were not to be obtained. The Convention does not give expression to this. To give it this effect would cut across its object and purposes. This view of the Convention was supported by the practice of the Contracting Parties. Whilst repeatedly urging parties to complete maps and description of wetlands, there had been no suggestion that a failure to do so means that a wetland was not to remain listed.
28 In conclusion his Honour added that, had it been necessary to determine whether there was in fact a precise description of the Windella Ramsar site, he would have been prepared to so find. In his Honour's view the information supplied by the Minister was sufficient for an interested person to ascertain, albeit with the application of some skill, the coordinates for each of the four corners of the site.
29 Neither s 17(1) nor the EPBC Act imports the Ramsar Convention into domestic law. Nevertheless regard may be had to the terms of a Convention where there is ambiguity in the domestic legislation: Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292at 305-6; Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273at 315; on the footing that, prima facie, Parliament should be taken as intending to legislate in conformity with international law: Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade v Magno (1992) 37 FCR 298at 304. Section 15AB(2)(d) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth)also permits reference to a treaty to assist in the ascertainment of the meaning of a statutory provision.
30 The appellants made reference at various points in their submissions to the need for conformity between Article 2 of the Ramsar Convention and s 17(2) of the EPBC Act, referring to cases such as Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1at 123-131; 232 and Koowarta v Bjelke Petersen (1982) 153 CLR 168at 260-261. I understood these references to be in aid of a general submission concerning the construction of conventions and domestic statutes and not to suggest some disconformity which might spell invalidity of the section. No such issue had been raised in the proceedings.
31 It does not seem to me that there is any uncertainty attending the meaning of that part of s 17(1):
'… designated by the Commonwealth under Article 2 of the Ramsar Convention for inclusion in the List of Wetlands of International Importance kept under that Article … .'
In particular the ordinary meaning of the word 'designated' is plain. It means to nominate, specify, indicate, describe or identify. Of itself it does not have a meaning which requires precision in description. Nothing in the section or the EPBC Act suggests that it needs to be read as if it required precise boundary identification or mapping.
32 The appellants submitted that it was likely that more was required by the act of designation, and in particular mapping which might follow a survey and show the boundaries of the wetlands. This was because the EPBC Act intersects with a number of State regulations where this precise identification is required. The purpose of these various regulations was not however gone into. It is not obvious why their requirements are relevant to an interpretation of s 17(1). In any event the point, not raised before his Honour, is met by the evidence that, with the application of some skill, the boundaries of the sites can be ascertained.
33 It was further submitted that the requirement of public notice suggests that the public be informed of what land is involved, particularly since pecuniary penalties may be imposed for contravention and those whose property interests may be affected have a right to know. In the ordinary course the property owner affected would have been party to the negotiations which s 326(1) of the EPBC Act requires towards an agreement about the future of the wetlands. That occurred in the present case regarding the Windella Ramsar site and maps produced. In the case of successive landowners, they would be able to access or have someone skilled access the database as mentioned above.
34 The EPBC Act does provide a mechanism for notifying the public about wetlands. It does not however require that the areas be notified prior to or even at the time of designation. Section 327(2) envisages that the notice specifying an area of land that has been included in the List be given after the event of designation occurs. It cannot be read as a requirement of designation. It may be, to take up the appellants' point, that these notices require a specification sufficient for an understanding of what areas are involved. It is not necessary to decide that point, save to observe that s 327(3) confirms that a failure to comply with the section does not affect the status of an area as a declared Ramsar wetland.
35 Section 17(1) of the EPBC Act, as the appellants rightly conceded, does not expressly import that part of Article 2 which contains the requirements of a precise description of a site's boundaries and mapping. There appears to be no basis for their implication. The word 'under' [Article 2] does not, in the context of s 17(1), mean 'in accordance with the requirements of the Article'. I respectfully agree with Sackville J that the expression is intended only to identify the source of the Commonwealth's obligation or right to designate wetlands.
36 Section 17(1) does however borrow from the Convention the words 'designated … for inclusion in the List of Wetlands of International Importance' and refers to the List kept under that Article. The meaning of the word 'designate' in Article 2 then assumes some importance. Where a provision of a treaty is transposed, the legislature discloses a prima facie intention that they have the same meaning: Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 CLR 225at 230-1; 240 ('Applicant A'). The question which then arises is whether that word derives a different meaning in the context of Article 2 and the treaty; and in particular whether it incorporates the requirements of the second sentence of the Article into its meaning.
37 Treaties are interpreted in Australia in accordance with the requirements of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Article 31 (the Vienna Convention): Applicant A at 251-252 and the cases there cited. Article 31 of that Convention provides the leading general rule to interpretation. It requires:
'1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.'
38 Article 31(3)(b) provides that there shall be taken into account, together with the context, any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation.
39 McHugh J in Applicant A explained the approach to be taken in applying Article 31. His Honour's approach has been described as 'holistic but ordered' (per Brennan CJ at 231). It is necessary, his Honour held, that interpretation be according to the ordinary meaning of the treaty's terms and the context, object and purpose of the treaty (at 256). Both McHugh J and Gummow J would give primacy to the ordinary meaning (at 254 and 277). I have referred to the ordinary meaning of the term to 'designate'. It does not have the meaning for which the appellants would contend.
40 The appellants sought to derive the requirements of a precise description of boundaries and of mapping from the purposes of the Ramsar Convention. They submitted that if the carrying out of the purpose of the Convention requires the protection of wetlands of international importance, the proper identification of those wetlands must be seen as part of that purpose. The case relied on for that proposition, Richardson v Forestry Commission (1988) 164 CLR 261at 290 ('Richardson'), is not however a case in point. Not only did the relevant Convention (Convention for the Protection of World Cultural and Natural Heritage) oblige each State Party to 'identify and delineate' properties having the requisite values (see at 263), the legislation in question reiterated that obligation as part of the Act's purposes. The purpose of protection of wetlands nominated by a Contracting Party to the Ramsar Convention cannot be said to require precise description as a precondition to listing. To do so would mean protection was not available because of a shortfall in information.
41 The functions of the Bureau set up under the Ramsar Convention do not suggest that the information required by Article 2 is necessary for its purposes in connexion with Listing. The Bureau does not have to determine whether wetlands should be included. It maintains the List and ensures it is kept up to date. The operation of the Convention may be contrasted, as Sackville J pointed out, with the function of the World Heritage Committee under the Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, referred to in cases such as Queensland v Commonwealth (1989) 167 CLR 232and Richardson above. Under that arrangement, a state party not only had an obligation to identify and delineate properties, it was also a matter for the Committee to determine whether the property had the necessary values to warrant listing. It may be seen that precise and detailed description of land, water and other features may be necessary for such a purpose.
42 There is no doubt that Article 2 seeks to create an obligation on the part of Contracting States to provide a precise description of boundaries and a map of the wetlands. It is in that sense a requirement of the Article, but that does not mean it is a requirement of designation or a precondition to listing. Designation has a different meaning and is an act of a Contracting Party separate from the provision of information. Put another way, there is no suggestion in the Convention that a failure to provide the information required by Article 2 would result in a site not being listed or being removed from the List. Reference to the many considerations of the Contracting Parties at their meetings over the years confirms such an interpretation.
43 Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention regards subsequent practices and agreements of Contracting Parties which reflect upon the interpretation of a treaty as part of its context. This approach is of particular importance in this case. The history of the meetings of the Contracting Parties discloses a concern to have the information required by Article 2(1), and more, provided. At no point however has it ever been suggested that if it were not done at the time of designation, that designation is taken not to have occurred or that a listing would be regarded as invalid. The requirement is seen as something which should be attended to as soon as possible.
44 It follows in my view that s 17(1) of the EPBC Act does not require a precise description of the boundaries of a wetland nor its mapping for there to be a designation. In my respectful view, his Honour was plainly correct in so determining.