But those principles are not in themselves directly applicable in
the Court of Criminal Appeal. They are applicable, not as indepen-
dent rules, but as related to the subject of miscarriage of justice.
They should not, particularly in the Court of Criminal Appeal, be
regarded as absolute or hard and fast rules. The relevant proposition
in that jurisdiction is that (in Victoria, though not in England) a
new trial may be granted if the court thinks "that on any ground
there was a miscarriage of justice " (Crimes Act 1928, sec. 594 (1) )
In considering whether there has been a miscarriage of justice the
court should consider all the circumstances of the case. If, for
example, there being no elements of fraud, mistake or surprise, an
accused person has, by himself or by his legal advisers, deliberately
decided to set up a particular defence, he cannot complain as of a
miscarriage of justice for the sole reason that, that defence having
failed, he comes to the conclusion, or a court comes to the conclusion,
that he might succeed if he set up another defence. Thus, if an
accused person deliberately chooses to abstain from calling evidence
which is available to him, it cannot be said that the course of justice
has miscarried for the sole reason that it cannot be asserted with
certainty that the result would have been the same if such evidence
had been given. There is no miscarriage in such acase. Thus the
tules as to the availability of alleged fresh evidence and the weight
of that evidence must enter into a consideration of the propriety of
granting a new trial ina criminal case. These rules, as stated in the
reasons for judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal in this case,