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[1905] HCA 43
High Court of Australia
1905-07-01
O'Connor J, O'Connor JJ
Original judgment source is linked above.
H.C. or A. before us all the facts which can be proved. If the case
Natrona veasonably find a verdict for the plaintiff; and to send the cs
Morvat Lire down for another trial would be only a useless expenditure, ASSOCIATION
or AvsrraL- appears to me, therefore, that this Court will properly exercise eae powers by entering the verdict for the defendant.
Kray. O'Connor J. Appeal allowed, judgment set uside, judgment entered for the defendant. Solicitors, for appellant, Stone & Burt. Solicitor, for respondent, Jenkins. HEM.q (HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA.] : THE GREAT FINGALL ONE one APPELLA! LIMITED. ; 4 é ae DEFENDANTS, AND , SHEEHAN . '3 0 4 3 pi i . RESPONDE! PLAINTIFF, Re ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF am 3 WESTERN AUSTRALIA. 1905. ~~ - Appeal - Master and servant--Worker - Accident - Compensation - Liability PERTH, employer - Release - Accord and satisfaction - Contract - Consideration Canis, M7, Workers' Compensation Act (W.A.) 1902 (No. 5). Fy
An appeal lies to the Supreme Court of Western Australia from a Griffith C.J.,
Griith C.. of the Local Court in an action for compensation under the a O'Connor JJ. Compensation Act.
Respondent, while in the employ of appellants, received injuries for which he was entitled, during incapacity resulting therefrom, to compensation under the Workers' Compensation Act. The amount to which he was entitled at the end of the third week was £1 17s. 11d., on payment of which he gave appellants a receipt which was expressed to be in full satisfaction and liquidation of any claim he had or might have against them in respect of the accident. In an action to recover the balance of weekly payments to which, owing to a further continuance of his incapacity, he claimed to be entitled under the Act :
Held, that a release or an agreement to accept a lump sum in full satisfac- tion of all claims is not prohibited by the Act; but that the receipt in question did not amount to a release, but was merely evidence of an agree. ment by way of accord and satisfaction, and, in the absence of consideration, was not a bar to respondent's claim.
Decision of the Supreme Court affirmed, but on different grounds.
APPEAL from a decision of the Supreme Court of Western Aus- tralia.
The following statement of facts is taken from the judgment of Grigith C.J.
The respondent was a workman in the employment of the appellants, and during the course of his work he sustained an injury for which he was entitled to compensation under the Workers' Compensation Act. He took proceedings in the Local Court in the prescribed form, and amongst the defences set up by the appellants was that he had received a sum of £1 17s. 11d. from them "in full satisfaction and liquidation of any claim" he had or might have had against them in respect of the injury. The Local Court at Cue were of opinion that that defence was proved, and that it was a good defence, and they therefore dismissed the claim. The Supreme Court of Western Australia on appeal held that the receipt was not a valid release and discharge to the defendants, and remitted the matter to the Local Court at Cue for the assessment of compensation.
Pilkington (with him Stawell), for the appellants. No appeal lies to the Full Court from the decision of the Local Court on a claim under the Workers' Compensation Act. It was con- tended that an appeal lay to the Supreme Court under sec. 8 of the Workers' Compensation Act and sec. 8 of the Small
Debts Ordinance 1863, Amendment Act 1894. The Englis unlike the local Act which is founded upon it, provides expre for appeals. The appeal given by sec. 8 of the Small D Amendment Act 1894 does not apply to proceedings under Workers' Compensation Act. The tribunal established by latter Act is entirely distinct from that established under t Small Debts Ordinance 1863. The Workers' Compensation A created entirely new rights and liabilities, and the machinery also new.
The appeal provided for by sec. 8 of the Small Debts Amen ment Act 1894 is an appeal from a " judgment " ; but the tribun established by the Workers' Compensation Act has power onl make an "award." In addition, the right of appeal under of Small Debts Amendment Act 1894, from a tribunal consi of magistrates, cannot apply to a case decided by two asse under the Workers' Compensation Act.
In Carr vy. Stringer (1), it was held that no appeal lay sec. 14 of 13 & 14 Vict. c. 61, from the decision of a Co Court ; and that section is very similar to sec. 8 of the Small Dé Amendment Act 1894. The regulations under the Workers' Ooi pensation Act, dealing with the procedure of the Court, speak the result of the proceedings as an " award," and not asa jud; [He cited Workers' Compensation Act, Regulations 16, 17, 18, 32,34]. These regulations have the force of law, and form a to the interpretation of the Statute: Hardcastle on Stat (3rd ed.), at p. 164; Ex parte Weir (2); Interpretation Act 18 (W.A.), 62 Viet. No. 30, see. 11; Institute of Patent Agents Lockwood (3). The whole proceedings are therefore in the of an arbitration, and there can be no appeal from the awal given: Mountain v. Parr (4). 7
The company's liability and the amount and duration of payments were settled by agreement under sec. 8 of the before proceedings were taken; and the payment of £1 17s. 1 was a compromise of the claim, and was so found by the The agreement was not that the Act should not apply, merely that respondent should abandon the benefits secured
() E.B. & B., 123. (3) (1894) A.C., 347, (2) LR, 6 Ch, 875. (4) 1 W.C.C., 110.
by the Act. Such an agreement is binding on the parties, unless H. C. or A. expressly prohibited by the Act itself, compare Employers' - 1%
Liability Act (W.A.), 58 Vict. No. 3, sec. 14. There are no words aca
in the Act strong enough to take away the right of a workman eee tocompromise his claim. Sec. 8 assumes the right to compromise ; © Lamp.
or at least it does not exclude such right. Even though the Suneaie:
agreement for compromise were made before respondent was fully aware of the nature of his injuries, it is still binding: Rideal v. Great Western Railway Co. (1).
Villenewve-Smith, (with him Phillips,) for the respondent. An appeal lies to the Supreme Court from decisions of the Local Court in cases under the Workers' Compensation Act, just as in ordinary cases. Under the English Act (60 & 61 Vict. ¢. 37) proceedings in claims for compensation were purely arbitration proceedings. The local Act makes no provision whatever for arbitration pro- ceedings. The joint effect of sec. 16 of the Act, and Rule 41 thereunder is the same as sec. 5 of the English Act, under which an appeal lies to the King's Bench Division. An appeal also lies under sec. 120 of the English County Court Act, which is similar tosec. 8 of the local Small Debts Amendment Act 1894: Morris v. Northern Employers' Mutual Indemnity Co. Ltd. (2); Kniveton v. Northern Employers' Mutual Indemnity Co. (3). In Rules 31 and 34 the term "award" has no technical significance, being used merely for brevity. Rule 34 (2) further provides that the certificate may be filed in the Local Court and enforced as a final judgment of that Court. Sec. 9 of the Act also provides for the entering of judgment when an action is brought independently of the Act and compensation is assessed, as provided, according to the Act. In Mountain v. Parr (4), the judgment proceeded on the assumption that the County Court Judge sat as assessor and not as a Judge, and is therefore no authority for the contention of the appellants. The conferring of additional jurisdiction does not alter the Court on which it is conferred, eg., Navigation Act 1904 (W.A.), No. 59, sec. 20. A reference of disputes, similar to that provided for by the Workers' Compensation Act, was made to the County
(1) LF. & F., 706, (3) (1902) 1 K.B., 880. (2) (1902) 2 K.B., 165. (4) 1 W.C.C., 110.
H.C, oF A. 1905, eS 'THE GREAT FiGa Con- SOLIDATED Lrp. t SHEEHAN.
Court by the Friendly Societies Act 1875 (38 & 39 Viet. ¢, 6 sec. 22 (d), under which it was held that an application tot County Court must be taken to be an action and not a re to the Judge sitting as an arbitrator. Wilkinson vy. Jagger (1 Neptune Steam Navigation Co. v. Schlater, The Delano (2). Workers' Compensation Act confers a right of action on the w immediately an accident happens causing him injury (see. 6 a1 second Schedule.) Sec. 13 (1) was designed not only to meet co tracts made during service, but also after the accident had occun An agreement made between both parties before assessors for pi ment of a certain sum for compensation is a contracting out the Act, and cannot be enforced. The second Schedule (2), Con dition 8 provides that no agreement can be made for the paym: of a lump sum as compensation until after six months from th date of the first payment. The agreement referred to in see, 8 one which must be made in accordance with the Act. Ass the employer admits his liability, then a vested interest arises the worker. Any compromise to be operative must be it ance with the Act, which prohibits such compromise till a lapse of six months: Jones v. Great Central Railway Co.(' Even under the agreement £1 17s. 11d. was not to be the amount of compensation; but the respondent was in addition be given light work, When the light work ceased, the q arose as to the amount the respondent was entitled to. | object of the Act was to prevent the acceptance by the m of a lump sum as compensation before they knew the re: of their injuries: Minton-Senhouse " Accidents to Workmen, 2nd ed., pp. 128 and 206. Sec. 7 (2) enables the worker
claim compensation under or independently of the Act, pro vided that the employer is not to be liable to pay twice 0 The worker would be bound by his agreement to accept a cert: sum as compensation if he had taken proceedings indepent the Act; but once the Act has been appealed to, no such agre ment would have been binding: Chandler v. Smith & Son (} Appellants' contention really amounts to a plea of accord ané satisfaction, the onus of establishing which is on the compat
(1) 20 Q.B.D., 423, (3) 4 W.C.C., 23. (2) (1894) P., 40. (4) 1 W.C.C., 19.
There was no evidence of accord and satisfaction, nor of any con- H. ©. or A. sideration for the release by the respondent: Smith v. Baker & bey
Sons (1); Wohlgenvuthe v. Coste (2). Under any circumstances the 'tre Great £117s. 114. was already due to the respondent, and the payment of X¢a1t Cox- that amount cannot establish a plea of accord and satisfaction as DED, to all future payments. There was therefore no consideration SHEEMAN. for any agreement to forego those payments. It is admitted that there were other stipulations agreed upon besides those contained in the document, ¢.g., that respondent was to be given light work by the company. Even if the claim were compromised, the com- promise could not under any circumstances extend to future claims: Prosser v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Accident Insur- ance Co. (3); Rideal v. Great Western Railway Co. (4); Taylor
Pilkington in reply. The document containing a release of all claims is evidence of an agreement in the terms mentioned therein: Ellen v. Great Northern Railway Co. (6). Where agree- ment means mutual assent and not contract, no consideration is necessary. Where the payments end by mutual consent, the matter is at an end - the duration is deemed to be settled by agreement; and when the weekly payments are discontinued by agreement, there can be no further claim : Pomphrey v. Southwark Press (7).
Grirrirn C.J. This is an appeal from a decision of the Full +
Court of Western Australia, remitting to the Local Court at Cue, for reconsideration, a claim made under the Workers' Compensa- tion Act 1902. This Court gave special leave to appeal from the decision, upon the ground that two questions of law of general public importance were involved in the case: First, whether an appeal lies from the Local Court to the Supreme Court in a case of proceedings under the Workers' Compensation Act, and secondly, whether a claim by a workman under that Act can be released or settled by accord and satisfaction. We have had the advantage of very full and careful argument on both sides, and I
(3) 6 T.L.R., 285. (6) 17 T.L.R., 338, 453, (7) (1901) 1 K.B., 86.
think we are in a position to dispose of the matter withot serious doubt, although I confess my mind has fluctuated a deal during the argument. I will state briefly the facts o case. [The learned Judge then stated the facts as above proceeded :]
The first question for consideration is whether an ap from a Local Court to the Supreme Court in a case Workers' Compensation Act. The answer to that qu depends upon the construction of the Statutes. Section 6 of Workers' Compensation Act provides that if, in any emp within the Act, personal injury by accident arising out of a the course of the employment is caused to a worker, his empl shall, subject as thereinafter mentioned, be liable to pay pensation in accordance with the second Schedule to the Act, second Schedule is headed, "Scale and Conditions of Comp tion," and the second part of it, which applies to cases where worker is totally or partially incapacitated, declares that compensation shall be a weekly payment during the incap after the second week not exceeding 50 per cent. of his ave weekly earnings during the previous twelve months, if he been so long employed, but if not, then for any less per during which he has been in the employment of the employer; such weekly payments not to exceed £2, a the total liability of the employer shall not exceed £ Sec. 7 provides that nothing in the Act shall affect any liability of the employer independently of the Act where injury is caused by the negligence of the employer or of $0 person for whose act or default the employer is liable; and t the worker may claim compensation under the Act or same proceedings as are open to him independently of the A but the employer is not to be liable to pay compensatio dependently of and also under the Act. See. 8 provides thi any question arise as to liability to pay compensation under | Act, or as to the amount or duration of such compensation,' question, if not settled by agreement, shall, subject to the visions of the second Schedule, be heard and determined b , Local Court of the district within which the injury happene and that for all such purposes jurisdiction is conferred upon hi
"Court. Sub-section 2 of the same section provides that for the H- ©. oF A. "hearing and determination of any such question, "the Magistrate" sigs "shall sit with two assessors appointed in the manner to be pre- 'Te Great "seribed by regulation; and the decision of a majority of Buon ? "such three persons" shall be the decision of the Court. It = Et. "is necessary now to turn to the Acts of the legislature SneeHax, nder which the Local Courts are established. The principal Act g,ininos. is the Small Debts Ordinance of 1863, which provides, by sec. 2, hat it shall be lawful for the Governor to constitute Local Courts "for the recovery of smalldebtsanddemands . . . throughout "the Colony . . . and likewise by proclamation to alter the "time or place or manner of holding such Courts, which Courts are declared to be Courts of Record. So that the Ordinance begins by "establishing a new Court of Record. No doubt a Court in one "sense consists of the Judges of the Court, but in another sense it "is a separate entity, the functions of which are exercised by the "persons who, for the time being, are members of the Court. Sec. "3 provides that the Governor may from time to time nominate sand appoint such and so many justices of the peace as may be _ deemed fit and proper to exercise the powers conferred on them -by the Ordinance ; and the term "the Magistrate" wheresoever occurring in the Ordinance shall be understood to mean the Magistrate so appointed. Provision is then made for appoint-
H.C. or A. Compensation Act, although still called the Local Cou
substance a different Court, inasmuch as its constitution is tially different; and it is contended further that the proc under this Act are not in substance judicial proceedings, essentially in the nature of an arbitration. Under the E Workmen's Compensation Act, upon which the Act of this is mainly based, the proceedings are arbitration proceedi an appeal to the Court of Appeal. But under the Wi Australian Act jurisdiction is in terms conferred upon an exi Court by its own name, with special provisions to which I called attention. Our attention was called to the reg made under sec. 19, which provides that the Governor may m regulations for the purpose of prescribing the mode in claims and questions under this Act may be determined, and for any other purpose which he deems necessary in order to' full effect to the provisions and intention of the Act. Governor, under that power, has made regulations, in whit determination of the Court is throughout called an award, forms are given, all of which describe it as an award. It is tended that these regulations may be referred to for the puny of interpreting the Act. In my opinion they cannot. We } referred to a case in which it was said that in construing ambiguous section of the Bankrwptey Act 1869, the Rules m by the Lord Chancellor, which had the force of law, used as a guide as to which of the two or three possible con tions of the section was the correct one; but notwithstand that case I cannot assent to the argument that a regulation m by the Governor can be used for the purpose of consti Statute under which it is made. I come to the conclusion, | the language of the Act, that the legislature intended to co this jurisdiction upon the Local Court as a Court of Justice further reason for adopting that construction, if it is open the language of the Act is, I think, to be found in the cin stance that under the Small Debts Act 1894, an app from the Local Court to the Supreme Court upon any point or upon the admission or rejection of evidence. It is well cnt that under the English Workers' Compensation Act, extre difficult questions of law have arisen, upon which there have
«jivergent opinions expressed, and the opinion of the Court of
Appeal has often been dissented from by the House of Lords; and I think it is primd facie highly improbable that the legislature intended to leave the decision of important and difficult matters of law to a tribunal in which the majority of the Judges might be antrained laymen. In my judgment when the legislature con-
The other point of law of importance which induced this Court to give leave to appeal, was whether a claim under the Workers'
Compensation Act could be released or compromised. The "learned Judges in the Full Court were of opinion that it could mot. Sec. 13 deals with what is called "contracting out" of ithe Act. It provides that where the Registrar of Friendly Societies, after taking steps to ascertain the views of the employer and workers, certifies that any scheme of compensation, benefit, .-or insurance for the workers, whether or not such scheme includes other employers and their workers, is on the whole not less fayour- able to the general body of workers and their dependents than the provisions of the Act, the employer may, until the certificate is revoked, contract with any of those workers that the provisions of the scheme shall be substituted for the provisions of the Act, and that thereupon the employer shall, as respects the workers with whom he so contracts, be liable in accordance with the scheme in lieu of the Act; and adds: " But, save as aforesaid, this Act shall apply notwithstanding any contract to the contrary made _after the commencement of this Act." The effect of such a scheme would be that the provisions of secs. 6, 7, and 8, including the : reference to the Local Courts, would no longer be applicable ;
the question sascieseshall ..,. .. . be heard and determined by the Local Court of the district within which the injury happens; and for all such purposes jurisdiction is hereby conferred upon such Court. " 1f the section had stopped there no question could have been raised as to the right of appeal given by the Small Debts Act Amendment Act of 1894 applying to such cases. But it is said that the second sub-section of sec. 8 creates the difficulty, and that the Magistrate sitting with two assessors instead of alone, or with other justices constitutes a different Court from the ordinary Local Court. In my view whether assessors sit with the Magis- trate or other Magistrates sit with him, or he sits alone, the tribunal constituted in either of these three ways is the same - the Local Court. Under the Workers' Compensation Act juris- diction is given to the Local Court, and although for the purpose of hearing cases under the Act it is constituted in a special way, it is still the Local Court, and all the rights of appeal which are given from the decisions of the Local Court are, in my opinion, intended to be given from the Local Court when thus specially constituted under the Workers' Compensation Act. There is an English decision bearing upon the question which may be usefully referred to, Morris v. The Northern Employers Mutual Indemnity o. (1). The English County Courts have certain jurisdiction con- (1) (1902) 2 K.B., 165.
ferred upon them under the English Workmen's Compensatio 1897,and the question was raised whether the County Court sitti for the purpose of dealing with cases under that Act was in resp of appeals in the same position as the ordinary County Court, was contended ,that the right of appeal given from ordin; decisions of the County Court did not apply. With that question Collins, M.R., makes the following ol tions (1): - * We have here a decision given by a County Cou Judge in the exercise of his jurisdiction as such with regard what would certainly appear at first sight to be a ' matter' withi the meaning of sec. 120 of the Cownty Courts Act 1888. Prin facie the Divisional Court would seem to have jurisdiction und that section to entertain an appeal with regard to any matt with which a County Court Judge has dealt in the exercise o his jurisdiction, It seems to me, therefore, that such jurisdi must exist with regard to an order made by a County Court Judg under sec. 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act 1897, there is something in that Act to negative its existence. I do nol think that the appellant's counsel succeeded in pointing out any thing in the Workmen's Compensation Act 1897, which has that effect. The matters which arise under sec. 5 may be matters o considerable importance, and primd facie one would suppose thi the legislature intended that there should be an appeal from County Court in respect of them as in respect of other similar matters. For these reasons I think the Divisional Court had jurisdiction to entertain the appeal."
That principle of construction may well be applied in this When the Workers' Compensation Act was passed there was existence the Local Court with an appeal from all its decis on questions of law. To that Court the Workers' Compe Act handed over syauwio.. unless thers is something in
tion as paren in respect of the old. There 4 is certainly nothit in the Act itself which cuts down in regard to workers' com
exists in respect of Local Court decisions in other cases. (1) (1902) 2 K.B., 165, at p. 166.
these reasons I am of opinion that the decisions of the Local Court, under the Workers' Compensation Act, are subject to appeal on questions of law in the same way as other decisions of the Local Court are subject to appeal.
Another argument urged by Mr. Pilkington was this, that the determination of the Local Court sitting under the Workers' Compensation Act was not a judgment but an award, and therefore the right to appeal against judgments could not apply. There is one simple answer to that argument, namely, that the question whether the determination is appealable or not cannot be affected by the form of judgment or the procedure for attaining it authorized by the regulations. By sec. 19 the Governor is empowered to make regulations pre- scribing the mode in which claims and questions under this Act may be determined. It is true that the existing regulations have established a procedure which calls the determination of the Local Court an "award," but it is open to the Governor at any time to issue new regulations providing for an entirely different mode of initiating proceedings, beginning for instance by a plaint and resulting in a judgment. It cannot be that the existence of the right of appeal depends upon the form in which the deter- mination of the Local Court is to be given. There can be no doubt that the determination, whether in the form of an award or a judgment, is a judgment from which an appeal is given by the Small Debts Act 1894.
It was next contended that the jurisdiction of the Local Court was ousted because the matter had been settled by agreement under sec. 8 of the Workers' Compensation Act. In the first place it is clear that the Local Court did not apply their minds to the consideration of the question whether there had been any agreement for settlement which ousted the jurisdiction of the Court under that section. They dealt with the question of settlement of the claim by agreement it is true, but they dealt with it as an answer to the claim by way of release or accord and satisfaction. That dis- tinction, however, is not of much moment, because if it had appeared upon the face of the proceedings that there had been a legal settlement of the claim by agreement before the matter
B. C. or A. 1905. <7 Tue Great Frycaut Con- SOLIDATED Lrv.
= 'Tue Great Frxcatt Cox- SOLIDATED Lrp. v. SHEEHAN.
came into Court, and the Local Court had found that ag proved, this Court as a Court of Appeal would have been bo to give effect to the objection that the jurisdiction of the Court was ousted. The jurisdiction of the Court, however, « be ousted only by a valid agreement, and Mr. Villenewve-Sm i has contended that this is not a valid agreement, because he s the Act does not permit the parties to settle claims under { Act in that way. The learned Judges in the Court below ha upheld that contention, being of opinion that such an ag is contrary to sec. 13. I cannot take the same view. agreement does not come within the prohibition of sec. 13. forbids agreements that the Act shall not apply at all to dl contract of employment. Its object was to prevent workine from contracting themselves out of the benefits of the Act - t is to say, contracting themselves out of the Act in the sense they should acquire no rights under the Act. It is anothe question altogether when the parties come to an agreement a a right to compensation which has accrued under the Act. my opinion there is nothing to interfere with the liberty of wo men or employers to compromise that right in any way # think fit. I entirely assent to the general observations of m learned brother the Chief Justice that the ordinary right of m to manage their own affairs cannot be taken away except |
Statute. I donot think the Act has either expressly or impli placed any restriction upon the making of such an agreemm and if in other respects the agreement were valid, there nothing to prevent the plaintiff from agreeing to receive a cert sum of money or some other consideration or benefit in accord an satisfaction of his claim. But when one looks at the a itself it is clear that it is invalid on another ground. One of first principles of the law of contract is that every contract mu be supported by a valid consideration. On the face of the conti a consideration is stated, precise and definite. It is the payme £117s, 11d. by the defendant company to the plaintiff, For th payment the plaintiff purports to give upand relinquish all clai of any kind against the defendant company in respect of the a dent. But that £1 17s. 11d. was money, which, in the sense I sh
explain, belonged to the plaintiff already. He was entitled to it H.C. or a. under sub-sec. 2 of the conditions annexed to the Act. He had 18%.
suffered serious injury by the accident, sufficient time had elapsed to 'Tue Great entitle him to payment of some amount, the maximum being £1 17s. PN¢4ULCos-
'5 SOLIDATED 11d. It only remained to fix the exact amount. There is clear - Lt.
evidence that the exact amount had been fixed by the company's Suxenax. representative, and assented to by the plaintiff before the signing of the alleged agreement of compromise. So that, before the alleged agreement of compromise was made, the plaintiff had become entitled to be paid that £1 17s. 11d. as compensation under the Act. The Local Court specially find that the plaintiff was entitled to payment of this amount in respect of weekly payments under the Statute. The evidence upon which they came to that conclusion is worth stating. The plaintiff himself first gave evidence on the point. Tom Brown, the defendant's metallurgist, was his immediate superior, and there is abundant evidence that he had authority to fix the amount of weekly payments. He had authority to employ the plaintiff and he fixed his weekly wages. Speaking of Brown the plaintiff says: "Brown told me to see a doctor and get a certificate. After seeing the doctor I went back to the mine and gave the certificate to Tom Brown. Tom Brown read the certificate and told me to take it to the office and get my first week's pay which was due to me for getting hurt." Coming to the evidence of Brown himself we find he says: "I told him to see a doctor and get a certificate, to put it in the office and he could get half pay for being off. After fourteen days after accident the rules provide he can get half pay. He started as watchman then, and on the 2nd of June, or between that time and the 2nd of June the applicant was entitled to one half week's pay." Lynch, the accountant, who made out the receipt or alleged agreement of release, but who apparently had no instructions to draw out the document in the form in which it was drawn out, said, "I explained to Sheehan that he was going back to work and was to get no more on account of the accident. I knew he was entitled to £1 17s. 11d." Following all that evidence the Local Court found specially . . . that the plaintiff received from the company's accountant the sum of £1 17s. 11d., in pay- ment of half earnings, admittedly due to him as accident pay
H.C. or A. under the Workers' Compensation Act. To my mind it 1905. feetly clear that he was entitled to that £1 17s. 11d.
Tue Grear Alleged agreement of compromise was made, and therefore it ¢ Fincat.Cox- : . hare 2 ees
een, not form a consideration for any new promise ; that being so
Lro. £1 17s. 11d. was not a consideration at all. There was th Suernay. no consideration to support the agreement, and it has th
validity either as an agreement ousting the jurisdiction of
O'Connor J. Court, or as a compromise or accord and satisfaction of the tiff's claim. The only way of doing justice is to send tl back to the Local Court. I therefore agree with the con of the Supreme Court, although for different reasons from th on which their conclusion was based, that the matter mu remitted to the Local Court for decision. . Appeal dismissed with costs, Solicitors, for appellants, Stawell & Cowle. Solicitors, for respondents, Martin & Phillips. HE. (HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA.) THE YORKSHIRE FIRE AND LIFE) ApPE INSURANCE COMPANY Ile PLAINTIFF, AND THE BRITISH AND FOREIGN MARINE) REsro! INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. the H.C. oF A. DEFENDANT, hess ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA. -
creyeenend Fire Brigades Act 1890 (No. 1200) (Vict.), secs. 2, 42, 45, 46 - Contr fen 20, expenses of Fire Brigades Bourd - * Insurance Company," meaning of- Insurance Company insuring against fire on land - Fire insurance it
Grimth c.J., marine insurance - Premium covering both insurances - Ascertainment Of 1
Barton and . ony, O'Connor JJ. portion of contribution.