"[92] Liability under either limb of Barnes v Addy is a personal liability although proprietary remedies may be available. A party liable under the first limb, for having received and been chargeable with property transferred in breach of fiduciary duty with requisite knowledge of the breach, may be liable to pay compensation even if he or she no longer holds the property, just as an accessory liable under the second limb of Barnes v Addy
may be liable to pay compensation. A third party's personal liability under the first limb of Barnes v Addy should not depend upon the mechanism by which the property was transferred, but rather upon whether the third party received property that was trust property, or was transferred in breach of fiduciary duty, or was traceable to property so transferred, and, if so, whether the third party had the requisite knowledge (not merely constructive notice) of the breach of trust or breach of fiduciary duty so as to warrant the imposition of personal liability arising from the receipt.
[93] In El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings plc (1994) 2 All ER 685, Hoffman LJ said, in relation to the requirements of liability for knowing receipt, "for this purpose the plaintiff must show, first, a disposal of his assets in breach of fiduciary duty. Secondly, the beneficial receipt by the defendant of assets which are traceable as representing the assets of the plaintiff; and thirdly, knowledge on the part of the defendant that the assets he received are traceable to a breach of fiduciary duty" (at 700)."
- The reference to El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings Plc & Anor [1994] 2 All ER 685 in Turner, makes clear that the receipt must be "beneficial" rather than nominal. The defendants argue with some force that the only beneficial receipt of the travel products and services consumed by Mr Critchley's daughters was their receipt not his. This argument is persuasive. It is difficult to see how Mr Critchley or Ms Tarbuck received many of those services beneficially.
- Mr Maroya answers this argument by emphasising that the defendants have taken a wilfully narrow construction of the word "received" and that the defendants understood the tickets purchased by them could be used by third parties, being nominated family, and that is what they chose to do.
- A Goway counter argument also arises out of Court's findings in the narrative that on several occasions Mr Critchley dealt directly with Ms Comito on his daughters' behalf and paid Goway for aspects of his daughters' travel and was later reimbursed by them, for example with the platinum travel passes.
- But it is important not to import into the reasoning at this point the idea that Mr Critchley made a contract with Goway on behalf of his daughters to purchase platinum travel passes. As a result of the Court's conclusions about Ms Comito's ostensible authority, there was no contract ever made on or after November 2015 between Goway and Mr Critchley for the supply of platinum travel passes. There was only a payment by Mr Critchley to Goway and then Goway supplied travel products and services, without contract, directly to Ms Fryer and Ms Storey who consumed them. They were the sole recipients of those services directly from Goway.
- But there are several cases mainly prior to 15 March 2015 with respect to the discounted business class airfares, for example, where Mr Critchley acquired and paid for tickets in what the Court has found were binding contracts with Ms Comito. After making binding contracts to acquire the discounted tickets Mr Critchley requested the tickets (and accommodation where relevant) be gifted onto his daughters and issued in their names. In so doing he was nevertheless disposing of his beneficial interest in what he had acquired, by a method of his own choice - namely by gifting them to his daughters. It does not matter whether he was the ultimate consumer of them or not. In those circumstances he was still a recipient because he exercised the powers of a beneficial owner over them as his own property. But the problem for Goway's claim in this earlier period before 15 March 2015, is that although he may have received the tickets he did not receive them with the requisite knowledge, if they were issued before 15 March 2015.
- It would appear therefore that there is some room for a finding that the defendants have Barnes v Addy recipient liability for some of the Goway travel products and services consumed by Mr Critchley's daughters and their families. This would be for discounted business class airfares or like products that were acquired before 15 March 2015 but were only actually only issued, received, and disposed of by Mr Critchley to his daughters after that date.
- The parties will need to examine this area of the defendants' Barnes v Addy recipient liability for the cost of travel products and services consumed by Mr Critchley's daughters. This can be done whilst the parties are undertaking the necessary quantum calculations based upon the Court's findings. The parties may wish to agree upon a timetable for this and submit it to chambers.