Goode v Bechtel [1904] HCA 27

High Court of Australia|1904-07-01

'the knowledge of the applicant. The objection in such cases is, H. C. or A. that the applicant comes too late ; not, as here, that he comes too as soon; and the cases cited at the bar as to applications after Zimperr,

sentence are therefore inapplicable." That is the rule that applies 4)". np, to taking objection to jurisdiction by way of prohibition. Appli- cations to this Court for special leave to appeal are not granted as of course. We think that the analogy of the rule just stated may very well be applied when special leave is asked for the purpose of raising an objection which would not have been allowed to be taken by way of prohibition, especially when the value of

the property involved is sosmall. For these reasons we think the

Solicitor, for appellant, #. Morley Alcock. Solicitor, for respondent, J. M. Speed.

H. E. M. (HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA.] GOODE . : z ; ; : 7 : . APPELLANT; PLAINTIFF, AND BECHTEL . ; : : . : : . RESPONDENT. DEFENDANT,

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA.

Arbitration - Jurisdiction of arbitrator - Setting aside award - Grounds for setting H. C. or A.

aside, ea. Asa general rule an arbitrator is a judge of law as well as of fact, and his Pa decision cannot be objected to on the ground that he misconceived the law, Oct ig8

' Judgment of the Full Court of Western Australia (6 W.A. L.R., 86) reversed, a meet and the award of the arbitrator restored. beh on

H.C. of A. Appean from a judgment of the Supreme Court of West

On 20th November, 1903, an agreement of reference y entered into between the appellant and the respondent whi¢ after reciting that the parties had been carrying on in partnershi together the business of saddlers and tanners at Perth and K goorlie under the style of R. Bechtel and Co., that an agreemer had been made for the dissolution of the partnership, and th divers questions, disputes, and differences had arisen and we

and matters in difference between the said parties in anyw relating to or concerning the said partnership or the affairs accounts thereof, or which might arise out of or in conneetio with the same, should be referred to the arbitration and deter mination of one W. E. Moxon.

On 6th January the arbitrator gave his award the ma\ eria part of which was as follows : -

"3. That as regards the alleged and unexplained deficieney o £2,974 13s. 4d. shown in the balance-sheet of the said partnershi affairs prepared by Messrs. Smith and Goyder, and produced t me on the said reference, the deficiency alleged shall be taken be the sum of £2,974 13s. 4d. and no more, and that there shall b allowed by way of deduction from such sum the following item viz. : -

Loss on Tannery " «. £1,338 18 5 D. and P, Discounts... He 143 8 Advertising Charges... Peis 148 8 8 Making a total of ... ... £1,496 10 9 Leaving a balance deficiency of £1478 2 7

= - < - -

Of which last-mentioned sum the said Robert Bechtel shall fort! with pay to the said Frederic Daniel Goode one half, nam the sum of £739 1s. 3d."

On application made on 13th April, 1904, to the Supre Court of Western Australia the award was ordered to be aside with costs on the ground that it appeared on its face #l the arbitrator had acted on a mistaken idea of the law as to responsibility of partners inter se for losses sustained by | partnership.

'i) Robinson (with him Russell), for the appellant. The award H. ©. or A.

annot be set aside unless it is bad on the face of it: Redman on alrbitration, 3rd ed., p. 261; Hodgkinson v. Fernie (1); Archer Owen (2); Lancaster v. Hemington (3). Here the respondent 'as the active partner, the appellant being merely a sleeping tner.

The Court has set aside an award on the ground of mistake on he part of the arbitrator : Ames v. Millward (4); but that was n the ground of inconsistency. [He also referred to Fuller v. Tenwick (5); Adams v. Great North of Scotland Railway Co. (6) ; Re London Dock Co. and Trustees of Shadwell (7)].

The Arbitration Act of Western Australia under which this ference was made (59 Vict. No. 13) enables the parties to state

4 case. _ [Grirrira C.J. - The proper course, where one party fears a "yrong decision, is to apply to revoke the reference to arbitration.]

Pilkington, for the respondent. A mistake of law appears m the face of the award, and therefore the award may be "shallenged. Hodgkinson v. Fernie (1) is not to the contrary.

[Grierrrn C.J. - Can you give a concrete instance of a mistake of law appearing on the face of the award ?]

In all cases where certain facts are admitted and the law is "wrongly applied, the mistake arises on the face of the award. "Kent County Council v. Elstob (8); Gaby v. Wilts and Berks _ Canal Co. (9); Fuller v. Fenwick (10).

_,, [Grireira C.J. - In Gaby's Case the defendants pleaded a

_ Statute by which certain actions were required to! be brought _-within six months. The award found that the acts sued for were ) prohibited by the Statute, and that the defendants were conse- ) quently not within the protection of the limitation. The Court thought that the protection extended to acts done under the "circumstances found by the arbitrator. In all the cases cited the award showed on its face that the arbitrator did not really intend

& (1) 30B.NS. (6) (1891), A.C., 31. (2) 9 Dow (7) 32 LJ., Q.B., 30. (3) 4A. and B., 345. (8) 3 Kast, 18.

H.C. oF A. to decide as he did in form, so that there was an inconsis

apparent on the face of the award.] Where the arbitrator says the loss is unexplained a respondent must bear it, he is wrong upon the face of the Partners are only liable for loss arising from personal negli Beven on Negligence, pp. 1455 and 1456; Thomas v. Ai The arbitrator has found what is inconsistent with pe negligence - he has found the loss is " unexplained." (Guirritu C.J. - Suppose the loss was unexplained, on was the onus of proof before the arbitrator? If on the x dent, the arbitrator thought he had failed to establish it. P facie, I should read the award as meaning that the loss was borne by the partners equally. O'Connor J. - What is meant by "unexplained ?" mean unexplained in the balance-sheet ; there it is put profit and loss ?] :

GrirritH C.J. This is an appeal from the Supreme Western Australia setting aside an award made by an arbit upon a submission to him of all matters in dispute bet persons who had previously carried on business in partne Perth and Kalgoorlie. By the reference all disputes, question matters in difference between the partners in anywise relati or concerning the partnership were referred to the arbitra Mr. Moxon, who made an award by which he directed things to be done by the parties. Amongst other things the# contains this paragraph : - " Paragraph 3. That as regard alleged and unexplained deficiency of £2,974 13s. 4d. shown balance-sheet of the said partnership affairs prepared by M Smith and Goyder, and produced to me on the said referene deficiency alleged shall be taken to be the sum of £2,974 and no more, and that there shall be allowed by way of from such sum the following items: Loss on tannery, £18: 5d; D. & P. Discounts, £14 3s. 8d. ; advertising charges, 8d; making a total allowance of £1,496 10s. 9d., and

sum the said Robert Bechtel shall forthwith pay to the said Frederic Daniel Goode one half namely, the sum of £739 1s. 3d." An application was made to the Supreme Court to set aside the award on the ground that the award, in paragraph 3, was bad in law on the face of it. I confess to having felt some difficulty in apprehending what the alleged mistake in law is. Reading that paragraph by itself, the first impression it would convey to my mind would be this: - On taking the accounts of the affairs of the partnership there was a deficiency in the assets as against the liabilities of £2,974 13s. 4d., the cause of which was said to be unexplained; but on inquiry I find that £1,496 10s. 9d. of this has been accounted for. Then an award follows that the parties should bear the remainder of the deficiency in equal propor- tions. To that there is on the face of it no objection. It is apparently a most reasonable order to make. But we are told that it is a mistake, and that the real meaning of it is that the respondent shall bear the whole of that loss. We are also told that the respondent was the active partner in the partnership, the appellant being merely a sleeping partner. These facts appear to have been treated by the Supreme Court as before them, and as it is on those facts only that the respondent makes out any sort of a case here, we will deal with them on the assumption that they are true. The error of law, suggested to be apparent on the face of the award, is that, when there is a partnership loss, it must be borne equally, and that no partner can be made responsible for the whole of any particular loss unless it is through his de- fault that it was occasioned. Grant that that is so. The next step which is necessary before you can find any mistake in law is, that it must appear that the arbitrator has required the respondent to bear the whole of this loss without its being proved that he was responsible for it. It was the arbitrator's province to ascertain whose fault it was. The fact that he describes it as an unexplained deficiency does not indicate that he failed to apply his mind to the question who should be held responsible for it; but supposing that it does, and that on the evidence before him it did not appear who was responsible, he may have come to this conclusion: - " Here is a deficiency. Neither partner offers any

explanation, and, in the absence of any explanation, I think it a reasonable thing for me to make the partners bear the lo equally, or, as is suggested, that the active partner should it all." I fail to see anything contrary to law in that. most that can be said or suggested is that the arbitrator, dealing with the matter, applied an erroneous rule as to the onu of proof. The law is clearly settled, as stated by Williams J in Hodgkinson v. Fernie (1), that when a cause or matters difference are referred to an arbitrator, whether a lawyer or layman, he is constituted the sole and final judge of all question both of law or of fact. During the argument we asked for illu trations, concrete instances, of cases of what was called an of law apparent on the face of an award ; but the insta referred to by Mr. Pilkington were cases in which it was that the arbitrator had not really himself decided the questio which was referred to him, but had answered the question } reference to what he supposed to be a rule of law, but was nm a rule of law. There may be other instances, but each cas must depend upon the nature of the submission, and the for of the award. We have only to deal with the award before u and, as I have said, the most that can be urged against it is the arbitrator took an erroneous view of the onus of proo Whether he did or did not is merely conjecture. It does m appear on the face of the award. The award on the face of is good, and ought to stand, and the appeal should be allowed

Appeal allowed with costs, including ¢b of proceedings in the Supreme Co

Solicitors for appellant, Haynes, Robinson & Cow. Solicitors for respondent, Stone & Burt. HEM

At a glance

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Decision date

Source

Judgment (36 paragraphs)

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