Development potential - subdivision
60I am not satisfied that the market at the acquisition date would have regarded the land as having any significant subdivision potential.
61Although DCP provisions are not mandatory, they must form the focus, or focal point, of the consent authority's deliberations: Zhang v Canterbury City Council [2001] NSWCA 167, 51 NSWLR 589 at [75]. In the present case the DCP controls and other matters referred to below raise formidable hurdles to the asserted subdivision potential of the parent land, and are also relevant when otherwise considering its development potential.
62First, the minimum lot width control is 16 metres (cl B2.2). The subject land has a frontage of only 12.305 metres and an average width of only 12.2 metres.
63Secondly, the minimum building area control is 175 square metres (cl B2.2). According to the applicant's proposed plan of subdivision, ultimately attached to the town planners' joint report, the building area on the acquired land is only 142 square metres.
64Thirdly, the driveway width control is that: "Where a right-of-carriageway to another lot is provided over a lot, the width of that right-of-carriageway shall not be more than 20% of the required minimum width of the lot over which it is located": cl C4.7. There is a dispute as to the interpretation of this control. The respondent submits that in order for the control to make sense, the right-of-carriageway must not be more than 20 per cent of the width of the proposed lot; the average width of the proposed lot is only 12.2 metres; the driveway is 3 metres; and therefore the 20 per cent control is not complied with. The applicant's competing construction is that this ignores the reference to the "required" minimum width, which is 16 metres, and as the driveway is 3 metres the control is satisfied. It is unnecessary to resolve this issue. It is sufficient to say that the availability of these competing constructions would have represented a risk in the perception of the market.
65Fourthly, the parent land did not have the minimum lot areas required by the DCP. By title its area was less than 1,400 square metres. However, by survey, which I have earlier accepted, its area was just over 1,400 square metres. Given that it is common for a survey to be attached to a contract for sale, I consider that the hypothetical purchaser at the acquisition date would have been aware of the survey area. The LEP cl 11(2) requires that each allotment created by a subdivision must have a minimum lot area of 700 square metres. Although this would not have been satisfied by the title area, it was satisfied by the survey area. However, the DCP cl B2.2 requires a minimum lot size of 1,200 square metres, far in excess of what was achievable under a subdivision of the subject land.
66The applicant submits, however, that this provision of the DCP has no effect under s 74C(5)(b) of the EPA Act which provides:
74C Preparation of development control plans
...
(5) A provision of a development control plan (whenever made) has no effect to the extent that:
(a) it is the same or substantially the same as the provision of an environmental planning instrument applying to the same land, or
(b) it is inconsistent with a provision of any such instrument or its application prevents compliance with a provision of any such instrument.
67The LEP is an "environmental planning instrument" but the DCP is not: s 4. In my opinion, "inconsistent" here is to be given its ordinary and natural meaning. A provision of a DCP will be inconsistent with a provision of an LEP if there is want of consistency or congruity, lack of accordance or harmony or incompatibility, contrariety, or opposition with it: Coffs Harbour Environment Centre Inc v Minister for Planning (1994) 84 LGERA 324 (CA) at 331 per Kirby P. This was approved in Castle Constructions Pty Ltd v North Sydney Council [2007] NSWCA 164, 155 LGERA 52 at [41] - [42] and [55] where Tobias JA (Bell J agreeing) held that the natural meaning of inconsistency included where a paramount provision of an environmental planning instrument was intended to be an exclusive code or exhaustive statement. This was followed by me in Castle Constructions Pty Ltd v North Sydney Council [2007] NSWLEC 459 at [94] - [96].
68The respondent submits that the DCP provision merely provides for finer detail and therefore conforms with the LEP.
69Section 74C(1)(a) of the EPA Act empowers a relevant planning authority to prepare a DCP if it considers it necessary or desirable to make more detailed provision with respect to development to achieve the purpose of an environmental planning instrument applying to the land concerned. In North Sydney Council v Ligon 302 Pty Ltd [No 2] (1996) 93 LGERA 23 at 30 Cole JA (Meagher JA and Abadee AJA agreeing) held:
...Generally the development control plan must conform to the North Sydney Local Environmental Plan (s 72(3)). However that does not mean that where a use is permissible with consent under a North Sydney Local Environmental Plan , "more detailed provisions" regarded as desirable or necessary and specified in a development control plan may not regulate the circumstances in which a use is permissible with consent. There is no reason in principle why those "provisions" would not have the character either of a "prohibition" unless certain criteria are satisfied, or of a "development standard", which permits a development only on satisfaction of certain criteria.
70In 7-Eleven Stores Pty Ltd v City of Sydney Council [2004] NSWLEC 154, 138 LGERA 125 at [25] Lloyd J held that that was the relevant test.
71The respondent submits, and I accept, that it is unnecessary to decide the inconsistency point because non-compliance with the DCP's 1,200 square metre minimum is a risk that in any event must be taken into consideration in the ultimate valuation exercise.
72Fifthly, the position of the notional foreshore building line, which I have decided earlier, inhibits the location of a dwelling on the acquired land.
73Sixthly, given the difficult circumstances of the potential subdivision, a prudent purchaser would probably speak to the council. There is evidence that Mr Matthew Edmonds, Principal Officer - Development for Pittwater Council, is of the opinion that it would be difficult to anticipate that any consent authority acting reasonably would consent to the hypothetical residential subdivision. Mr Player's opinion was that a subdivision application would likely be refused by the council and the Court on an appeal. Mr Sander's opinion, at least, is that he did not believe the likelihood of securing a development consent to be "as remote as is suggested" by Mr Player. However, he accepted that the probability was low, and the risk of not getting subdivision approval was high. According to Mr Wood, that would lead to a profit and risk of 40 per cent on a hypothetical subdivision assessment, at which level one might as well "give the game away, it's not worthwhile". None of the experts considered that the highest and best use of the land was for subdivision.
74Having regard to the above matters, in my opinion the market at the acquisition date would have considered that a subdivision application would most likely be refused by the council, and the Court on an appeal. In my opinion, the market would not have attached any premium for the prospect of obtaining subdivision development consent.