We have here to deal with a case in which the father, instead of taking back his child to his new household, as he had the opportunity of doing when she was a mere infant, and allowing the second wife to bring her up from infancy with the second family, has deliberately permitted her to grow up from infancy in her grandparents' household, to form ties of affection there, and to remain until she was old enough to feel the unhappiness of the jealousy and bitterness which her presence would cause in her stepmother's household. The present application is to interfere with the existing conditions which the father himself has deliberately created, and to interfere in a way which the appellants allege is contrary to the child's welfare. I have carefully considered all the cases which have been cited, and I do not think it possible to obtain from any of them a clearer statement of the principles by which the Court must be guided than is to be found in the judgment of Lord Esher M.R. in Gyngall's Case[9] and in Lord Justice James's judgment in In re Agar-Ellis[10], which was afterwards adopted by Lindley L.J. in In re Newton[11] as being a correct statement of the law. Lord Esher M.R. in Gyngall's Case, after referring to the enforcement of the parent's right to the custody of his children at common law by habeas corpus, and the exercise of that jurisdiction by Chancery Judges, says[12]: - "But this has nothing to do with the jurisdiction proper to the Court of Chancery, which is what we are dealing with now. How is that jurisdiction to be exercised? The Court is placed in a position by reason of the prerogative of the Crown to act as supreme parent of children, and must exercise that jurisdiction in the manner in which a wise, affectionate, and careful parent would act for the welfare of the child. The natural parent in the particular case may be affectionate, and may be intending to act for the child's good, but may be unwise, and may not do what a wise, affectionate, and careful parent would do. The Court may say in such a case that, although they can find no misconduct on the part of the parent, they will not permit that to be done with the child which a wise, affectionate, and careful parent would not do. The Court must, of course, be very cautious in regard to the circumstances under which they will interfere with the parental right. As Knight Bruce V.C. said in Re Fynn52 DeG. & S., 457. the Court must not act as if it were a private person acting with regard to his child. It must act judicially in the exercise of its power. That its jurisdiction to interfere with the parental right is not confined, as was argued, to cases where there has been misconduct on the part of the parent seems to me clear from many cases. In the case of In re Fynn52 DeG. & S., 457., Knight Bruce, V.C., said: - Before this jurisdiction can be called into action ...it (i.e., the Court) must be satisfied, not only that it has the means of acting safely and efficiently, but also that the father has so conducted himself, or has shown himself to be a person of such a description, or is placed in such a position, as to render it not merely better for the children, but essential to their safety or to their welfare, in some very serious and important respect, that his rights should be treated as lost, or suspended - should be superseded or interfered with. If the word essential is too strong an expression, it is not much too strong. That is a clear statement that the Court must exercise this jurisdiction with great care, and can only act when it is shown that either the conduct of the parent, or the description of the person he is, or the position in which he is placed, is such as to render it not merely better, but - I will not say essential, but - clearly right for the welfare of the child in some very serious and important respect that the parent's rights should be suspended or superseded; but that, where it is so shown, the Court will exercise its jurisdiction accordingly."