The Relevant Legal Principles
46 At pars 18 to 29 of its Opening Outline of Submissions, Glaxo summarised the relevant legal principles governing the issues calling for determination in the present case. It did so by reference to the judgment of Wigney J in Australian Olympic Committee Inc v Telstra Corp Ltd [2016] FCA 857 at [132]. An appeal from his Honour's judgment was dismissed. In the course of their Reasons for Judgment (Australian Olympic Committee, Inc v Telstra Corporation Limited [2017] FCAFC 165 at [73]), the Full Court noted that neither party submitted on appeal that his Honour's summary of the relevant principles was defective in some way. The Full Court was content to proceed upon the basis that his Honour's summary was correct.
47 Paragraphs 18 to 29 of Glaxo's Opening Outline of Submissions were in the following terms:
18. Section 18 of the ACL is not limited to misleading and deceptive representations; cf s 29(1). The question is whether the respondent's conduct, which may include acts, omissions, statements or silence, is misleading or likely to mislead or deceive: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v TPG Internet Pty Ltd (2013) 250 CLR 640 at 655 [49] (per French CJ, Crennan, Bell and Keane JJ).
19. Conduct is misleading or deceptive if it has a tendency to lead a person into error, or to believe what is in fact false. Conduct is likely to mislead or deceive if there is a real or not remote chance or possibility that it will have that effect: Global Sportsman Pty Ltd v Mirror Newspapers Pty Ltd (1984) 2 FCR 82 at 87-88. It is insufficient for the impugned conduct to only cause confusion or wonderment: Campomar Sociedad Limitada v Nike International Ltd (2000) 202 CLR 45 at 87 [106] citing the judgment of a majority of the Full Court in Taco Company of Australia Inc v Taco Bell Pty Ltd [1982] FCA 170; (1982) 42 ALR 177 at 201 (per Deane and Fitzgerald JJ).
20. The question whether conduct is misleading or deceptive is an objective question of fact that is to be determined on the basis of the conduct of the respondent as a whole viewed in the context of all relevant surrounding facts and circumstances. Viewing isolated parts of the conduct of a party "invites error": Butcher v Lachlan Elder Realty (2004) 218 CLR 592 at 625 [109] (per McHugh J); Campbell v Backoffice Investments Pty Ltd (2009) 238 CLR 304 at 341-342 [102] (per Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Kiefel JJ).
21. The question involves the characterisation of the relevant conduct. Evidence that persons have in fact been misled or deceived by the conduct is not an essential element, however, it can in some cases be relevant and material: Parkdale Custom Built Furniture v Puxu Pty Ltd (1982) 149 CLR 191 at 198 (per Gibbs CJ).
22. The tendency of the conduct or representation to mislead or deceive is to be considered or tested against the ordinary or reasonable members of the class to whom the representation was made or the conduct directed. The question is whether a substantial, or at least a reasonably significant, number of that class is likely to be misled or deceived: see Optical 88 Ltd v Optical 88 Pty Ltd (No 2) [2010] FCA 1380 at [336]-[342]. The focus on ordinary or reasonable members of the relevant class of consumers means, in effect, that possible extreme, unreasonable or illogical reactions can be put to one side.
23. It is not necessary to prove that the respondent intended to mislead or deceive, however evidence of such an intention may constitute evidence that the conduct was likely to succeed in misleading or deceiving, and may make a finding of contravention more likely: Yorke v Lucas (1985) 158 CLR 661 at 666 (per Mason ACJ, Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ).
24. Where the conduct or representation is in the form of an advertisement, the "dominant message" or "general thrust" of the advertisement is important. It is nevertheless important to have regard to the whole advertisement because context is or may be important. It may also be relevant to have regard to the external context in which a consumer is likely to view an advertisement: TPG Internet at 653-655 [45]-[49] (per French CJ, Crennan, Bell and Keane JJ).
25. Where the conduct or representation is in the form of words, it would be wrong to fix on some words and ignore others which may provide relevant context and give meaning to the impugned words. It is necessary to have regard to the whole document: Butcher at 638-639 [152] (per McHugh J).
26. While there are no special principles that apply to comparative advertising, factual assertions made by an advertiser must be true and accurate: Gillette Australia Pty Ltd v Energizer Australia Pty Ltd (2002) 193 ALR 629 at 633 [20] per Heerey J, at 640 [43] per Lindgren J and at 654 [91]-[93] per Merkel J.
27. A comparative, as distinct from a unilateral, promotion of a product necessarily indicates that the advertisement is not mere advertising puff, but involves representations of fact which are either true or false: Gillette (at 641 [44] per Lindgren J, referring to the authorities cited at 640 [43]). An advertiser can lawfully compare a particular aspect of its product favourably with the same aspect of a competitor's product provided the factual assertions are not untrue or misleading half-truths: Gillette (at 634 [22] per Heerey J). See also Stuart Alexander & Co (Interstate) Pty Ltd v Blenders Pty Ltd (1981) 53 FLR 307 at 310 per Lockhart J and Duracell Aust Pty Ltd v Union Carbide Aust Ltd (1988) ATPR ¶40-918 at 49,861 per Burchett J.
28. In assessing the impact of television commercials, the observations of Merkel J in Telstra Corporation Ltd v Optus Communications Ltd (1996) 36 IPR 515 are particularly apposite. Of the advertisements before him in that case, his Honour said:
"They will be seen by the casual but not overly attentive viewer viewing a free-to-air program with only a marginal interest in the advertisements shown between the segments of the program. In that context it will be the first impressions conveyed to that viewer, rather than an analysis of the cleverly crafted constituent parts of the commercial, which will be determinative."
Telstra (1996) 36 IPR 515 at 523-524; as applied in the context of corrective advertising in Medical Benefits Fund of Australia v Cassidy (2003) 135 FCR 1 at 23 [60] per Stone J (with whom, Moore J and Mansfield J relevantly agreed).
29. It is misleading conduct to make comparative efficiency claims that imply they were made on a scientific basis when, in fact, there is no proper scientific basis for making those claims: see Colgate Palmolive Pty Ltd v Rexona Pty Ltd (1981) 58 FLR 391; 37 ALR 391 per Lockhart J. Further, it can be misleading to make a statement which implies that there is an adequate scientific foundation in scientific knowledge to justify it [when] taken in its context the scientific statement quoted does not provide a proper foundation: Sterling Winthrop Pty Ltd v Boots Co (Aust) Pty Ltd (1995) 32 IPR 361 at 365 per Tamberlin J.
48 In its Opening Outline, Reckitt accepted much of what had been submitted on behalf of Glaxo in its Opening Outline. Reckitt submitted (correctly) that, when the Court comes to assess advertising of the kind under consideration in the present case, it is the dominant message which will be of crucial importance (Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd (2014) 317 ALR 73 at 81 [41]).
49 Reckitt also submitted (correctly) that, where claims are made of a scientific nature, proof that there is no scientific foundation or no adequate scientific foundation for those claims may be sufficient to establish that the claims are misleading.
50 In Janssen Pharmaceutica Pty Ltd v Pfizer Pty Ltd (1985) 6 IPR 227, Burchett J said at 234:
It was submitted by counsel for the respondent that the applicant had failed to prove positively that Vermox would not ever produce a migratory reaction in worms, and that a statement could not be said to be false or misleading within s 52 without such proof, there being no onus on the respondent to prove the truth of the statement. Of course it is correct that the onus is on the applicant, but it seems to me that proof that there is no scientific foundation for a statement in the realm of a science may be sufficient proof that the statement is misleading.
This will be so where in its context the statement must be, or is likely to be, taken as implying that there is an adequate foundation in scientific knowledge to enable it to be made; cf Colgate Palmolive Pty Ltd v Rexona Pty Ltd (1981) 37 ALR 391. I think the present is such a case. It is not without significance that the statement is made in a video distributed through pharmacies by a pharmaceutical company professing expertise in the area. The video represents its information as available to one who does research in appropriate libraries, and professes to be "presented as a service to the community by Pfizer" (these words are on the cover of the video, which also contains the sub-title "Worms - Knowledge and Treatment").
51 In Sterling Winthrop Pty Ltd v Boots Co (Australia) Pty Ltd (1995) 32 IPR 361 at 365, Tamberlin J said:
It can be misleading for a corporation which disseminates information not to put forward sufficient information to avoid the possibility that the recipient may be misled; cf Fraser v NRMA Holdings Ltd (1994) 124 ALR 548; ATPR 41-346 at 42,529-30. It can also, in my view, be misleading to make a statement which implies that there is an adequate foundation in scientific knowledge to justify it when taken in its context the scientific statement quoted does not provide a proper foundation; cf Colgate-Palmolive Pty Ltd v Rexona Pty Ltd (1981) 37 ALR 391; ATPR 40-242; 58 FLR 391; Duracell Australia Pty Ltd v Union Carbide Australia Ltd (1988) 14 ALR 293; ATPR 40-918; Janssen Pharmaceutical Pty Ltd v Pfizer Pty Ltd (1986) ATPR 40-654.
52 Justice Bennett expressed similar views in Johnson & Johnson Pacific Pty Ltd v Unilever Australia Ltd (No 2) (2006) 70 IPR 574 at 594 [105]:
Unilever has represented to the consumer that the preference exhibited by Holiday Skin users is supported by the "use test". The study was silent as to the preference of Holiday Skin users under the age of 25, who represented a substantial proportion of those users. The onus is on Johnson to establish that the representation was misleading and deceptive but, following Burchett J's observations in Janssen Pharmaceutical Pty Ltd v Pfizer Pty Ltd (1985) 6 IPR 227 at 234, if Johnson establishes that there is no foundation in the study for a statement in the advertisements, that may be sufficient proof that the statement is misleading. As his Honour recognised, the question is whether the context in which the representation is made implies that adequate foundation exists for making it.
53 Glaxo claims that, in all of the advertising and promotional materials, Reckitt makes statements of present and past fact as well as statements which are with respect to future matters. Glaxo relies upon a line of authority exemplified by the reasoning of Goldberg J in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Purple Harmony Plates Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 1062 at [18] where his Honour said:
I am satisfied that the representations relied upon by the Commission have been made in the company's brochure and on the website. Almost all the representations were in terms which made them representations with respect to future matters. There were not merely representing matters of present or past fact; rather they were couched in terms that represented that the products presently possessed characteristics and benefits, the characteristics and benefits had been demonstrated to exist in the past and would be maintained and enjoyed in the future. Put shortly, the representations were saying that if a person was to buy the relevant product, it would display the relevant characteristic or produce the relevant benefit in the future after the purchase was made: see Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Giraffe World Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) (1999) 95 FCR 302 at 332.
54 Similar reasoning was applied by Lindgren J in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Giraffe World Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) (1999) 95 FCR 302 at 331-332 [123]-[126] and by Dowsett J in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Danoz Direct Pty Ltd (2003) 60 IPR 296 at 324 [126].
55 A representor who makes a representation with respect to a future matter which is challenged in Court must bring forward evidence that there were reasonable grounds for the making of that representation at the time that it was made if it wishes to avoid the presumptive consequences of engaging the operation of s 4 of the ACL. In the present case, Reckitt relies upon selected elements of the body of scientific knowledge current as at the time the relevant representations were made as constituting the necessary reasonable grounds. In effect, in the present case, the implied representation pleaded at par 15B of the AFTS captures the same idea or notion that underpins the legal requirement that there be reasonable grounds to support claims made with respect to future matters. The parties seem to accept in the present case that, once the Court has determined what representations were made by the impugned advertising and promotional materials, the question of whether or not those representations breached the ACL as alleged will be determined by the answer to a further question, namely, whether there was a current adequate foundation in scientific knowledge to support the claims being made. If there was such a foundation, Glaxo's case will fail. If there was not such a foundation, the conduct in question will be misleading or deceptive. Here, once there was some evidence tending to support a conclusion that such a foundation existed, the onus of proving that it did not support the claims made rests upon Glaxo.