Section 86G of the Act
14 Section 86G(1) of the Act confers a discretionary power on the Court to make a negative determination without holding a hearing when certain conditions are satisfied. The section provides as follows:
86G Unopposed applications
Federal Court may make order
(1) If, at any stage of a proceeding in relation to an application under section 61, but after the end of the period specified in the notice given under section 66:
(a) the application is unopposed; and
(b) the Federal Court is satisfied that an order in, or consistent with, the terms sought by the applicant is within the power of the Court;
the Court may, if it appears appropriate to do so, make such an order without holding a hearing or, if a hearing has started, without completing the hearing.
Note: If the application involves making a determination of native title, the Court's order would need to comply with section 94A (which deals with the requirements of native title determination orders).
15 A non-claimant application is "unopposed" for the purpose of s 86G(1) if the only party is the applicant or if each other party notifies the Court in writing that he or she does not oppose an order in, or consistent with, the terms sought by the applicant (s 86G(2)).
16 While a non-claimant application may be determined under s 86G of the Act, this does not alter the requirements of proof. As the Full Court outlined in Mace v Queensland (2019) 274 FCR 41; [2019] FCAFC 223 at [44], "The question for the Court remains the same whether the application is unopposed or contested: has the applicant discharged their burden of proof that no native title exists in the claim area?"
17 The standard of proof is the civil standard, on the balance of probabilities: Mace at [54]. Whether the burden of proof has been discharged should be decided on the circumstances of each case, and on the evidence adduced, without the need to rely on maxims or presumptions arising in a different adversarial context: Mace at [64].
18 In Wagonga Local Aboriginal Land Council v Attorney-General of New South Wales [2020] FCA 1113 (upheld on appeal), Jagot J helpfully summarised the propositions established in Mace regarding non-claimant applications: at [10]. Those principles relevantly include the following:
(a) The reason for a non-claimant application does not govern the Court's approach to the exercise of the power: Mace at [42].
(b) A non-claimant application does not involve any general inquiry into what native title rights and interests may have existed at the time of sovereignty or any general inquiry into how those rights may or may not have continued: Mace at [55].
(c) Relevant considerations will include the nature of the land and the tenure involved, the presence or absence of any present or previous native title claims and the nature and content of those claims, and any particular evidence adduced by the parties: Mace at [48].
(d) The Court mut act on evidence, direct or indirect, which can be weighed against the case brought by the non-claimant applicant: Mace at [52].
(e) The provisions of the Act are intended to facilitate all persons with a proper interest in an area of land taking step to ensure that their interest is taken into account when the Court is making a determination with respect to that land. However, it is not necessary to employ evidentiary or adversarial presumptions to the task which may have been developed by the common law in different contexts from native title determinations. A better approach is to focus on what the evidence before the Court does establish, whether for or against the determinations sought by the non-claimant application: Mace at [56].
(f) In a non-claimant application, account needs to be taken of the gravity of a negative determination and its permanency in terms of its effect on native title rights and interests which are otherwise sought to be protected by the Act: Mace at [66].
(g) No hard and fast rules can be laid down about what evidence might be required or what might suffice for a non-claimant applicant to meet the required standard of proof: Mace at [68]. Given what is at stake and the fact that any determination affects property rights as against the whole word no prescriptive approaches or glosses on the statute should be imposed. The Court has a wide discretion whether or not to make a negative determination and the potential combination of considerations which may arise in any particular application cannot be predicted or turned into any kind of checklist: Mace at [72].
(h) The Court's task is not to be more or less "stringent" depending on the kind of case before it but is to decide if the non-claimant applicant has discharged its burden of proof. In doing so, the subject-matter of the non-claimant application and the consequences of a negative determination inform the requisite level of persuasion for a negative determination: Mace at [82].
(i) The principal evidence likely to impede the grant of a negative determination is evidence of an assertion of native title in the land the subject of the non-claimant application, which is objectively arguable, not evidence of the potential for the assertion of native title. A representative body is best placed to assist Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples to provide such evidence. The quality of such evidence, rather than its extent, will be determinative: Mace at [97].
19 It is against that background that I turn to consider the facts in this case.