Gianna (Jenny) Angius v Estate of the late Laura Angius

Background

1. The background to the matter can be briefly stated. It appears to be that the deceased, who is, as adverted to above, the late mother of both Robert and Jenny, relevantly, left the bulk of her estate to her son Robert. I understand, although I have not been taken to the Will itself, that part of the assets of the estate (or perhaps of notional estate) were left to the children of Jenny (Gabrielle and Sean). Sean is a minor. Robert is apparently the trustee of a unit in which Sean has an interest. Gabrielle is an adult. It is asserted that the unit in Gabrielle's name is not a legacy, nor did it properly form part of the estate, reference being made to certain submissions made at the hearing before Robb J in this regard.
2. I am told, and it does not seem to be disputed, that there is and has been an ongoing family rift between Robert and his father, John; and that John and Jenny, in effect, sided against Laura and Robert.
3. By notice of motion filed on 17 February 2016 Robert sought to be joined as the second defendant to the proceedings under r 6.24 of the UCPR and the costs of that motion be costs in the cause. That application to be joined as a party was not subject to any conditions of the kind now proposed. The application, I am told, was heard by Hallen J and the application was dismissed by orders made on 15 June 2016. On that occasion his Honour ordered the applicant, Robert, to pay the costs of the first defendant, calculated on the indemnity basis, of the notice of motion (limited to one hour of court time and any time spent in preparation for the notice of motion); and ordered Robert to pay Jenny's costs of the notice of motion. I have not been taken to any reasons that may have been given orally by his Honour at that time.
4. In submissions filed in opposition to the present notice of motion by Jenny, it is said that there is no evidence to suggest that Robert has satisfied that costs order; nor, will I add, is there any evidence whatsoever however to suggest that Robert has not paid those costs (or at least I was not taken to any evidence in that regard).
5. Robert's fresh application for joinder, pursuant to the notice of motion filed 3 April 2018, came before Robb J in 2018. At the time there was also an application before Robb J for an interim distribution. His Honour, for the reasons published in Gianna (Jenny) Angius v Gordon Albert Salier [2018] NSWSC 995, declined at that time to make the orders for joinder of Robert.
6. Robb J noted (at [49]) that Hallen J had already rejected an application by Robert to be joined in the proceedings. His Honour there stated that: "[a]lthough I am unaware of the basis for his Honour's decision, I would hesitate to disturb his Honour's ruling without having positive grounds for doing so". His Honour then noted (from [50]ff) the submissions that had been put on that occasion.
7. His Honour said (at [52]) that it seemed to him that the real reason behind Robert's application was a desire to be heard personally and to be able to put his own case in defence of his entitlement to substantially all of the deceased's estate.
8. His Honour noted (at [54]-[58]: 54 …It has been my personal experience that the circumstance that most frequently undermines the efficient conduct of family provision applications is the introduction into the proceedings of evidence primarily relevant to extraneous emotional issues that seem to possess the protagonists, and these matters rarely have any, or any adequate, relevance to the true issues that should be the focus of the attention of the parties. 55. This problem can be exacerbated where the executor is not independent, but a primary beneficiary of the deceased's estate. The result is that, in practical terms, the Court can be deprived of the assistance of an independent executor or administrator in dealing with the application properly and efficiently. 56. In the present case, where it is plain that the level of antagonism between the protagonists is so high that they cannot act civilly towards each other, it would be counter-productive for an order to be made joining Robert as a defendant, even subject to the proposed restrictions, without the Court first having a very sound reason to do so. 57. I will not make the orders sought by Robert now, but I will not dismiss that aspect of his notice of motion. 58. I will give Robert leave to renew his application in the future, closer to the time when the proceedings are fixed for hearing. I will not prejudge the outcome of any such application, but I would suggest that it should be based on some objective ground that might satisfy the Court that Robert's joinder will add something positive to the conduct of the proceeding, in circumstances where the Court has a basis for understanding what Robert's involvement would entail, and possibly also some basis for the Court to be able to judge that Mr Salier had decided not to adopt some course suggested by Robert that it would be reasonable to allow Robert to pursue himself.
9. Robert now presses the same relief sought in the notice of motion filed 3 April 2018 (i.e. the relief that Robb J declined to give). Robert puts forward two submissions in this regard. Insofar as Robb J had suggested that any further application for joinder of Robert should be based on some objective ground that might satisfy the Court that Robert's joinder would add something positive to the conduct of the proceedings, Robert submits that this requirement (if it may be termed a requirement) is satisfied on two grounds.
10. The first ground relates to an allegation that Robert makes as to an alleged interest held by John Angius, Robert and Jenny's father, in Jenny's home. It is noted that since Robb J's judgment in 2018 there has been a four day hearing before Sackar J that was determined on 23 November 2018 when Sackar J published his reasons in Robert Angius v John Angius [2018] NSWSC 1772. In that matter, the dispute between the parties concerned whether two mortgages totalling $600,000 entered into between the parties were voidable as sham mortgages or, alternatively, voidable or unenforceable by reason of unconscionability or estoppel.
11. Sackar J, for the reasons set out in that judgment, concluded that the mortgages in question were clearly sham mortgages (see [190]) and that they were contrived to protect Robert, in Family Court proceedings or in any future relationship. His Honour also considered that the claim grounded in equitable estoppel succeeded (see his Honour's reasons from [196]-[198]). His Honour accordingly concluded that Robert's contentions succeeded. At the conclusion of his Honour's judgment, his Honour called for submissions on the appropriate relief to be granted, but it appears apparent that his Honour was there contemplating setting aside the mortgages.
12. In submissions, on the present occasion, in support of the application for Robert to be joined, it is said that, during the course of the hearing, before Justice Sackar there was affidavit evidence from John, as well as cross-examination of John, in which John accepted that he had placed a similar mortgage on Jenny's home to protect her against any possible claims from de facto partners and any other creditors. Reference is made to some of that evidence in Sackar J's judgment (at [154]), but I do not rely on any factual findings in his Honour's judgment as establishing any facts in issue in these proceedings (see s 91 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW)).
13. The submission made for Robert is that the administrator was not a party to those proceedings and does not have access to that evidence and cross-examination which it is said may be critical in defeating Jenny's claim.
14. Pausing here, it would appear that it has been Robert's forensic decision not to provide any such evidence or make available to the administrator any such evidence. I was taken to correspondence in which the administrator's solicitors had sought information from Robert in that regard. In particular, I refer to a letter dated 29 May 2019 from the administrator's solicitors, in which (in par 7) it is said: 7. If Robert Angius has evidence which is directly relevant to the Mortgage given to John Angius by Jenny Angius, then you should let us know as soon as possible. If there is such evidence it would need to be in the proper form and consent sought or an application made for relief to rely on it (given the proximity of the hearing).
15. I interpose to note that the reference to the proximity of the hearing is that this matter has been set down for hearing from 9 to 12 September this year.
16. I also note that Counsel appearing for Robert on the present application has made very clear that Robert does not and will not seek to adduce any further evidence in support in relation to the substantive issues in those proceedings.
17. The letter dated 29 May 2019 from the administrator's solicitors also included the following: 8. In respect of the disentitling or disqualifying conduct: a. The affidavit of Robert Angius affirmed on 27 August 2014 contains evidence that: i. At paragraphs 6 to 11, 20, 21, that Jenny Angius made a number of requests to the late Angius for financial support, and there were arguments between them about this. ii. At paragraphs 12 and 23, that Jenny Angius said to the late Laura Angius in 2011 "I am going to kill you. You are a fucking bitch". iii. At paragraph 13, that the relationship between Jenny Angius and the late Laura Angius deteriorated significantly after itiid-2D07. iv. At paragraph 18, that Jenny Angius became abusive to (he late Laura Angius both verbally and physically. v. At paragraph 25, that the Police were called on 25 December 2008, 4 May 2010, 10 September 2010, 16 September 2010 and 14 October 2010 and, at paragraph 28, on six further occasions in 2011. vi. At paragraph 26, that from 2007 onwards the late Laura Angius showed Robert Angius bruises and scratches on her arms and legs. vii. At paragraph 31, that from about 2010 onwards, the late Laura Angius had less contact with Jenny Angius. b. An affidavit of Jacqueline Varela sworn 1 December 2014 has been filed in relation to the same or similar issues. Reply affidavits were affirmed by Robert Angius and by Jacqueline Varela on 2 November 2016. c. The relevant conduct is the deterioration in the relationship between the late Laura Angius and Jenny Angius from 2007 onwards, and verbal and physical violence by Jenny Angius towards Laura Angius to 2010 and 2011. d. If the suggestion in your email is directed towards Jenny Angius' involvement either direct or in direct in the death of her mother, the late Mrs Angius, we do not consider there to be a sufficient basis to make such a serious allegation. e. The administrator's present view Is that the conduct alleged may be relevant to the amount of provision sought by the plaintiff but it may not be sufficient to eliminate her claim completely in view of the nature and value of the deceased's estate.
18. Emphasis was placed by Counsel appearing for Jenny on the present application on the fact that there has been no response to that letter.
19. Counsel appearing for Jenny also took me to a letter dated 16 July 2019 from Jenny's solicitors to the solicitors acting for Robert in which confirmation was sought that Robert had passed on the information and evidence referred to in an email letter dated 31 May 2019 to the estate and sought advice as to whether it was their "express position" (which I assume means the estate's position) that they do not propose to run those points at the hearing of the matter. Information was also sought as to whether it was the case that Robert would not revise his financial circumstances as a claimant on the estate if he were to incur costs as a party to the proceedings.
20. The response to that, rather unhelpfully, by email dated 17 July 2019, was to refer Jenny's solicitors to the affidavit sworn 16 July 2019 of Jose Perez; and, as to the issue about financial circumstances, to say that "[w]e do not understand your question, given the Orders sought in the Notice of Motion".
21. Robert's position, as set out in his Counsel's submissions, is that the mortgage over Jenny's home is a sham mortgage that will never be called upon by John; nor will John ever seek to exercise any rights in respect of the two-thirds share he currently holds in Jenny's home. It is noted that Jenny's application for provision is seeking, as per her affidavit of 3 April 2014, an order that would enable her to discharge the mortgage over her home to John and also sufficient funds to enable her to acquire her father's two-thirds interest in her home.
22. Robert's position is that Jenny is seeking a large sum of money from the estate so that she can "allegedly pay out John", in circumstances where Robert will seek to submit to the Court that John's alleged interests over Jenny's home, including the mortgage, are a protective mechanism in the event that Jenny has any future relationship claims against her.
23. It is noted that John's estate (which is said to be equal to the deceased's estate, if not larger, although I note that the administrator takes a different view as to the value of the estate to that put forward by Robert), is that John's estate will predominantly go to Jenny, given the long-standing animosity between John and Robert.
24. It is submitted for Robert that matters may arise during the course of the hearing that are not known to the administrator, including evidence given during a 2012 Coronial Inquest into Laura's death and other Supreme Court proceedings that did not involve the administrator, and that matters may also arise during the course of the hearing where further instructions may be needed from Robert or where Robert may seek to provide further instructions, and it is noted that the administrator would not be obliged to act on any instructions from Robert.
25. The second ground which is put forward in support of the renewed application, and which is said to have arisen since the judgment of Robb J "relates to Robert's very strongly held view that Jenny is not entitled to any provision whatsoever from their late mother's estate". I am told that Robert will seek to submit that Jenny's conduct towards her mother, both physical and verbal, was such that it fully disentitles or disqualifies Jenny from obtaining any order for provision from the estate, and that this is more so given that the deceased has already left two units to Jenny's two children. (I interpose here to note that Counsel for Jenny suggests that that was not pursuant to provisions of the Will, but I have not gone to the Will in the context of this application to determine that issue.)
26. The administrator's view is, as set out in the letter to which I have earlier referred, that the conduct alleged may be relevant to the amount of provision sought by the plaintiff, but it may not be sufficient to eliminate her claim completely in view of the nature and value of the deceased's estate.
27. Robert submits that he has first-hand knowledge of the nature and extent of Jenny's alleged conduct towards the deceased and that, while he has filed an affidavit in that regard, there may be concessions made by the administrator during the hearing to which does not agree. Robert submits he should be permitted to put his case forward as forcefully as possible. It is submitted that, "[i]f he loses, he can at least walk away knowing all his contentions and arguments were put before the Court and not seek to blame the Administrator and his Counsel for not pressing certain arguments". (If that last submission is a submission that this would bring an end to the litigious disputes between the family, can I simply say that the conduct and history of the proceedings to date would give me no confidence in that regard.)
28. It is submitted by Robert: that his joinder as a party would be unlikely significantly to increase the hearing time, if at all; that the proceedings, if successful, will affect his significant interest in the estate; and that there is little doubt that Jenny will seek an order that any claim awarded in her favour should be deducted from Robert's share in the estate and not from legacies received by her two children. It is submitted that that in turn may place in issue the legacy already gifted to Gabrielle and, again, that Robert might seek to put different submissions to those of the administrator on that point and should not be denied that opportunity.
29. It is submitted that Robert "seeks to maximize his prospects of minimizing and, indeed eliminating, the claim by the Plaintiff by putting forward fully and completely all arguments in his favour, unhampered by the Administrator's potential lack of knowledge of the family history and any desire to maintain more neutral position". It is further submitted that the administrator "understandably, is unlikely to defend the proceedings with the same rigger and enthusiasm which can only flow from the applicant's own self -interest [sic] in the Estate". (If that is a submission that suggests that the administrator would not properly proceed in the matter in a balanced and objective way, there can be no criticism made of the administrator in that regard.)
30. In resisting the application, Jenny, in essence, asserts that this is an abuse of process, on the basis that: Hallen J dismissed the motion for joinder that was made back in 2016; there was no application for leave to appeal from the decision of Hallen J; the legal representation in the earlier motion remains the same as the case now; the legal representatives were clearly aware of the earlier application; and, it is said, that when the matter came before Robb J, the existence of the earlier application was not disclosed. I am not in a position to test whether that last proposition is correct or incorrect. It is clear from Robb J's reasons that his Honour was aware of the fact that an application had been made before Hallen J, which Hallen J had dismissed.
31. It is submitted for Jenny that Robert has had this present motion heard on two previous occasions; that this is now the third bite of the cherry; and that there is no suggestion of any new evidence or evidence of a change in material circumstances. It is submitted that Robert bears the onus to satisfy the Court that there has been such a change in circumstances. Reference is made in that regard to Sundararajah v Teachers Federation Health Ltd (No.3) [2010] NSWSC 471, a decision of Davies J where (at [7]) his Honour speaks of an application pursuant to r 36.16 of the UCPR for the setting aside, variation or discharge of an interlocutory order, and refers to the requirement as applicable pursuant to the principles set out in Brimaud v Honeysett Instant Print Pty Ltd (1988) 217 ALR 44 (Brimaud) (at 46): … the ordinary rule of practice is that an application to set aside, vary or discharge an interlocutory order must be founded on a material change of circumstances since the original application was heard, or on the discovery of new material which could not reasonably have been put before the Court on the hearing of the original application.
32. It is submitted that the present is not such a case.
33. In any event, it is said that, even if the application is not an abuse of process, joinder should be refused on a number of discretionary grounds.
34. First, that Robert consented to the defendant being appointed to represent the estate. (There is no evidence before me as to what the position was at the time of the appointment of the defendant.)
35. Second, that there is no conflict between the defendant, Mr Salier, and Robert in the proceedings, or generally. That is inconsistent with the history as explained to me by Counsel for Robert but, in any event, it is inconsistent with the candid acknowledgement made by Mr Salier through his Counsel on the present occasion as to his difficulty in obtaining instructions from Robert. I should say that that is not a matter that stands to Robert's credit in any way.
36. Third, it is said that there can be no suggestion that the administrator has not engaged able legal advisers capable of raising every defence. I accept that the Mr Salier has engaged able legal advisers and that they appear perfectly capable of raising in a balanced way matters in relation to the claim. Nevertheless, it must be said that it is frankly acknowledged by them that they may not be prepared to make the submissions that Robert, properly advised, might be able to make in relation to the matter.
37. Next, it is said that the joinder of Robert would not be in line with s 56 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW). I am acutely aware of the obligations prescribed by the Civil Procedure Act in relation to ongoing case management and the overriding purpose of the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in dispute. I will come back in due course to that issue.
38. Last, it is said that the "eye-watering legal costs" of at least $1.4 million incurred by Robert in the estate litigation should not be condoned or encouraged. I am told in that regard by Counsel for Robert that the $1.4 million in costs relates to numerous sets of proceedings in which Robert, as the main beneficiary of the estate, has been involved in one capacity or another. It is not appropriate at this stage to engage in analysis of the respective costs incurred or costs orders made in all of the proceedings.
39. The submission made for Jenny is, as to the first ground, that the argument that the administrator does not have access to documents and the transcript of the proceedings before Sackar J last year is not surprising, since the applicant has refused to provide them to the administrator. It is said that if the substantial beneficiary of some $10 million to $15 million wants to "hold back" information from the administrator, that is not a proper basis for being joined.
40. As to the second ground, (the alleged disentitling conduct), it is said that Robert has failed to respond to the administrator's enquiries as to whether certain matters are going to be asserted, such as the suggestion that Jenny was involved directly or indirectly in the deceased's death. It is submitted that this argument was raised, at least before Robb J, and is not a new material fact.
41. Reference is made by both parties to the decision of Brereton J, as his Honour then was, in Boldi v Crozier [2015] NSWSC 2155 (Boldi v Crozier). There, his Honour noted (at [2]), that Courts ordinarily discourage beneficiaries from defending applications of this kind: In proceedings under (NSW) Family Provision Act 1982 - and now (NSW) Succession Act 2006 - the proper defendant is the executor. Courts ordinarily discourage beneficiaries from defending the application [see Re Klease [1972] QWN 44; Vasiljev v Public Trustee [1974] 2 NSWLR 497 at 503]. This is because it is the particular and peculiar duty of the executor to defend the will and, in those circumstances, the intervention of anyone else to uphold it is ordinarily regarded as unnecessary [see ReBurton (deceased) [1958] QWN 27; Re Klease; Will of Lanfear [1940] 57 WN (NSW) 181 at 183]. A practical reason for this approach is to avoid the proliferation of parties and minimise the impact of costs on the estate. Thus, courts not infrequently decline to award costs to any beneficiary who has unnecessarily become a party to the proceedings.
42. Nevertheless, his Honour noted that there were circumstances in which a beneficiary will be joined as a defendant (at [4]): A number of cases have indicated that a beneficiary will more readily be permitted to intervene where the beneficiary receives very substantial benefits under the will which are liable to be disturbed if a family provision order is made [Will of Lanfear at 183; Frangos v Frangos (Victorian Court of Appeal, 7 July 1995, unreported)].
43. In Frangos v Frangos (Court of Appeal (Vic), 7 July 1995, unrep) (Frangos) it was stated by Ormiston JA (Charles JA agreeing) that: … The need for separate representation just as frequently arises where there is a risk that a particular beneficiary's interest will bear the whole or a substantial part of the burden of any further provision. In those circumstances it is inappropriate to speak of "mere speculation as to the course that proceedings might follow". Of course the executors will be under a duty to uphold the will and they will be under such a duty not merely to resist the plaintiff's claim but to ensure that, if that claim be successful, the burden is borne equally, except to the extent that any beneficiary instructs them to the contrary. Such a proportionate bearing of the burden of any further provision will flow in any event from the operation of sub-s.97(2) of the Act, unless the Court orders to the contrary. Nevertheless in the present case there is a real risk that the trial judge will be obliged to provide in a differential manner for the raising of any further provision for the plaintiff widow, pursuant to sub-s.97(1). Without wishing to express any final view as to the strength or otherwise of her claim, it is reasonably apparent from the facts set out above that the plaintiff's life interest in the residue is unlikely to provide her with any significant income, especially as the testator's interest in the Sims Road property will have to bear not only the costs and expenses of administration and this litigation but also the burden of $25,000 by way of legacies. Consequently, unless it is shown (contrary to her affidavit evidence) that she has substantial income and assets of her own, there is a considerable risk to the estate that some further provision will have to be made. It will be at this stage that the trial judge will have to determine which beneficiaries' interests will bear the burden of that provision. … Moreover [the primary judge] failed to place sufficient emphasis on the fact that a beneficiary wished to appear to protect a substantial interest in the estate in circumstances where there was a real risk that that interest might be extinguished or reduced in value. It follows that both error and potential prejudice have been sufficiently demonstrated, so that leave to appeal should be granted and, by reason of the nature of the appeal and the consent of the parties, that appeal should be heard instanter and allowed.
44. In Boldi v Crozier, Brereton J concluded that, with no criticism of the executor, the executor in that case could not be expected to put before the Court and robustly prosecute the applicant's version of the events, and that when that circumstance was coupled with the applicant's interest in the estate and her desire to be heard to oppose the application, which was liable to affect her interests, and where it was as to her own risk as to costs, a case for her joinder at her own risk as to costs was made out.
45. Jenny emphasises that in this case the administrator is an independent experienced practitioner appointed by the Court who had no involvement with the deceased or any party prior to his appointment.
46. I also note that it is submitted that, to suggest otherwise than that Robert's joinder to the proceedings will cause delay in the hearing time, is disingenuous. Issue was again raised by Jenny as to the fact that there had been no provision of information as to the evidence on which Robert is suggesting is not before the administrator and that Jenny should have an opportunity to be put on notice of that evidence and may wish to make an application for further evidence to be adduced to meet any issues that arise from that.

Determination

1. In my opinion, this is a most unfortunate set of circumstances. I am not persuaded that this is an application to set aside or vary Hallen J's orders made in 2016. As such, I am not persuaded that the principles set out in Brimaud therefore necessarily apply with the same force as would apply to an application of that kind.
2. In any event, if it were necessary to point to a material change of circumstances since the position as dealt with by Hallen J, the very fact that there has been another two years of litigation and dispute between the parties, during which time hostility on the part of Robert (I do not suggest there is any hostility on the part of the administrator) has apparently festered and has led to the current situation.
3. I am conscious of the fact this is a substantial estate and Robert has a significant interest that will be affected (or almost inevitably will be affected) if Jenny's claim is made out; and that Robert is adamant that he wishes forcefully to be able to test the evidence likely to be adduced by John and Jenny in the proceedings in opposition to the application.
4. I further note that Robert has now put on record that he is not seeking to adduce any further evidence in relation to the proceedings. It is further submitted that in the debt proceedings between John, to which Robert was joined as a party, the proceedings were able to be run efficiently without additional time being expended by reference to Robert's joinder.
5. I will impose conditions that seek to address the issue in relation to no further substantive evidence without further leave of the Court and to ensure that this is not litigation by ambush.
6. Insofar as Robert seeks to "keep up his sleeve" whatever was said in the transcript before Sackar J (and I have no knowledge of what that was), I consider that the days of litigation by ambush are now over. If Robert had wished to provide that information to the administrator so that the administrator could use it in the course of cross-examination in due course, he was perfectly capable of making that information available and he has chosen not to do so. That was a forensic decision on his part and he will have to live with the consequence of that, which is that I will now order that the material be provided both to the administrator and to Jenny's solicitors in advance of the hearing.
7. In the circumstances, and particularly having regard to what was said in Boldi and in Frangos, I will accede to the application by Robert to be joined as a party. I do so with some reluctance given that in one sense I do not consider that it is in the interests of the just, quick and cheap prosecution of issues in the dispute to have overly emotive parties who arguably are parties unable or are likely to be unable to look at matters objectively taking the kind of central role that is sought to be taken by Robert in these proceedings.
8. However, I consider that in all of the circumstances, the appropriate order is to permit Robert to be joined as a party, subject to strict conditions to try to ensure that the hearing dates are not prejudiced and that the matter proceeds as efficiently as possible.
9. I put on record that it will be incumbent on Robert's legal advisors, owing professional obligations to the Court, to keep control of their client in the conduct of the hearing and to work cooperatively with the administrator in order to minimise any additional time or cost as a result of Robert's joinder in the proceedings.
10. For those reasons I make the following orders: 1. Order that Robert Angius be joined as second defendant to the proceedings, pursuant to r 6.24 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) on the following conditions: 1. that Robert Angius be at risk as to his own costs, in that he will pay his own costs of the proceedings, unless the Court otherwise orders, and that his costs of the proceedings should not be taken into account in determining his financial circumstances for the purposes of the Family Provision proceedings; 2. that, unless leave of the Court is granted, the cross-examination by Robert Angius' Counsel will be limited to areas not otherwise covered by Senior Counsel for the first defendant; 3. that, without the leave of the Court, no further evidence as to the substantive issues in the proceedings, other than updating evidence as to the financial circumstances of the parties or as to the value of the estate, is to be filed and served; and 4. that Robert Angius provide to the administrator and to the legal representatives for Jenny Angius a copy of the transcript of the proceedings before Sackar J and any affidavit evidence read in the proceedings before Sackar J on which reliance may be placed in the course of the Family Provision proceedings brought by Jenny Angius. 1. The administrator have his costs of this application on an indemnity basis out of the estate; 2. Order that Robert Angius bear his own costs of the notice of motion filed 3 April 2018 and there be no order as to the costs of Jenny Angius in relation to the application with the intent that Jenny Angius bear her own costs of this application. 3. Direct the provision by Robert Angius to Jenny Angius and the administrator of the transcript and affidavit evidence on which Robert relies (and has referred to in the course of this application) within seven days. 4. Make the usual Family Provision order for the updating of financial evidence within 21 days. 5. Make the usual order for hearing. 6. Direct the applicant to file within 7 days an amended summons naming Mr Robert Angius as the second defendant.

DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 09 August 2019