Consideration on costs
19Costs are sought by the Council on an indemnity basis under general costs principles applying to contempt proceedings which apply in this Court. As observed in GE Dal Pont, Law of Costs , 2nd ed (2009) LexisNexis Butterworths, indemnity costs may be awarded in contempt proceedings as a matter of judicial discretion. White J in ASIC v Sigalla suggests these are commonly awarded. Dal Pont states at 547 - 9 (footnotes omitted):
In EMI Records Ltd v Ian Wallace Ltd Megarry VC observed that special costs orders are needed in cases of contempt because 'nothing should be done to deter a person from bringing a contempt to notice of the court; and the risk of having to bear any of the costs will often be a real deterrent'. Contempt proceedings, it is reasoned, serve a public interest, such that a person who successfully brings these proceedings should not be left out of pocket. It has been judicially remarked, to this end, that it is a 'common or usual practice' to order that the contemnor pay costs on an indemnity basis, and the case law reveals multiple examples of indemnity costs awards in this context. But there is no 'rule' that successful contempt proceedings necessarily attract indemnity costs orders, as this would be inconsistent with the exercise of the curial costs discretion.
A relevant consideration is whether, aside from the costs order, a penalty has been imposed for the contempt. If no other penalty is imposed, the court may be more inclined to employ 'a heavy order for costs as a means of imposing something in the nature of a sanction'. If, say, significant fines have been imposed, the 'penal' or 'deterrent' aspect of a special costs order may have less justification. Also relevant is the plaintiff's conduct and level of success.
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That the contemnor has subsequently purged the contempt will not by itself guard against a special costs order if the contemnor's conduct has already caused the opponent to incur costs in bringing contempt proceedings.
20Whether a further source of the power to award costs is found alternatively in s 49 of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act was also raised. I am not aware of any authority where costs in contempt proceedings have been awarded under that section and perhaps the issue has not arisen before in Class 6 proceedings. As I am not convinced that an appeal to which the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act applies includes contempt proceedings I prefer to consider costs in this case under the general principles for costs applied in contempt proceedings referred to in the previous paragraph.
21I will first consider whether costs ought be awarded. The information in the affidavit of Ms Lenson identifies that it was reasonable that contempt proceedings were commenced against Mr Gerondal by the Council on 17 December 2010. There was no information forthcoming from Mr Gerondal about what steps he had taken to remove items the subject of the Court order by 30 August 2010 despite several requests by the Council identified in the letters and emails attached to her affidavit (dated 3 September, 9 September and 10 - 15 September 2010) that he tell them what his intentions in relation to compliance were. The Council accepted by the time of the hearing that Mr Gerondal had removed some of the items the subject of the order being steel girders and beams, water pipes, window frames and timber and did not press the charges for contempt relating to those items.
22Before contempt proceedings were commenced, Mr Gerondal was granted three extensions of time to comply with the original order made by me which required removal of the items identified in the order by 25 December 2009 (on 12 February 2010 until 1 June 2010 by Biscoe J, on 22 April 2010 to 30 June 2010 by Sheahan J and on 16 July 2010 until 30 August 2010 by Sheahan J - see chronology in Gerondal No 5 ) and these orders were not complied with. The Council finally moved to enforce the last order made by Sheahan J. Mr Gerondal has had ample opportunity to remove the items the subject of the orders over a period of 19 months (from 25 December 2009). The contempt proceedings were reasonably commenced given the clear non-compliance with the order made by Sheahan J. Further, the Council was successful as I made findings of contempt in relation to six charges in Gerondal No 5 on 24 June 2011.
23It is also telling that only a few days before the sentencing hearing on 1 August 2011 Mr Gerondal finally removed several of the major items still outstanding being the treated timber poles, the concrete pipes and the scaffolding (charges 1, 3 and 9). The necessity of continuing the proceedings is demonstrated by the lengthy time taken by Mr Gerondal to comply with the Court order.
24I do not consider the Council has caused in any way the prolongation of the proceedings and these have been conducted in as orderly a fashion as possible in the circumstances. That no agreement could be reached following the orders of Biscoe J does not reflect poorly on the Council. It has been successful given my finding of contempt on six charges. That the Council sensibly determined after lunch on 1 August 2011 not to press the remaining items under charges 4, 5 and 6, but for some metal sheeting (charge 4) the subject of the intended order, is not disentitling conduct but reflects a commonsense approach to try and finalise unnecessarily lengthy proceedings. There is no disentitling conduct of any kind on the Council's part to suggest a costs order in favour of Mr Gerondal ought be made, even assuming that he was entitled to legal costs. I am not aware that he has been legally represented at any stage of the proceedings.
25The affidavit of Ms Simmons attaches several offers of settlement made to Mr Gerondal by the Council even after the commencement of the contempt proceedings which I consider are reasonable offers in the circumstances. Mr Gerondal's criticism of the offers is not reasonable. This is further evidence supporting a finding that the Council has acted reasonably in this matter.
26In relation to means to pay, there is no information before me of Mr Gerondal's means. He referred to an application for a fee waiver being made by him to this Court but did not have a copy. No such application was located after inquiry in the Court registry in the course of the hearing. I summarised the evidence Mr Gerondal gave concerning his income at [22] of Gerondal No 5 . I do not have a clear appreciation of Mr Gerondal's assets and liabilities. His evidence previously is that he has a limited income. In any event, I do not consider his means to pay a substantial costs order is a relevant consideration in the circumstances of a contempt finding, applying the reasoning of Lloyd J in Ableway which concerned a bankrupt defendant in contempt proceedings. Mr Gerondal did not effectively comply with the order until immediately before the sentencing hearing. The importance of compliance with court orders and their enforcement is identified above at par 8. Those observations are also relevant to the imposition of a costs order particularly where there is no penalty to be imposed despite a finding of contempt by Mr Gerondal on six charges.
27For all these reasons, the Council should be awarded its costs of the contempt proceedings.
28The Council seeks its costs on an indemnity basis. As already identified, that no penalty is to be imposed at this stage in relation to the proven contempt charges is one reason why indemnity costs might be ordered, see Dal Pont above. While the order has now generally been complied with that occurred immediately before the sentencing hearing by which time the Council had incurred substantial costs in these contempt proceedings, including the finding of additional affidavit material. The circumstances of the proceedings should be considered to see if these have been unduly prolonged or hopeless arguments maintained, some of the circumstances referred to in Colgate-Palmolive . The matters to be considered in determining indemnity costs are not closed. The unnecessarily lengthy history of the order giving rise to the commencement of proceedings is clear when viewed as a whole. The first order Mr Gerondal had to comply with specified 25 December 2009 and three extensions of time were granted but not complied with, necessitating the commencement of contempt proceedings. The arguments finally mounted by Mr Gerondal in resisting the contempt charges, par 12 above, as to why the order was ambiguous and unclear were manifestly groundless as shown by their rejection in Gerondal No 5 at [56] - [58]. These factors suggest that if the same effort spent on resisting the order had been spent on removing the items the subject of the order these proceedings could have been avoided. An award of costs on an indemnity basis is justified.
29I consider that Mr Gerondal should pay the Council's costs of these contempt proceedings on an indemnity basis and will so order.