Principles relevant to amendments
29 Rule 8.21 of the Rules provides:
8.21 Amendment generally
(1) An applicant may apply to the Court for leave to amend an originating application for any reason, including:
…
(g) to add or substitute a new claim for relief, or a new foundation in law for a claim for relief, that arises:
(i) out of the same facts or substantially the same facts as those already pleaded to support an existing claim for relief by the applicant; or
(ii) in whole or in part, out of facts or matters that have occurred or arisen since the start of the proceeding.
(2) An applicant may apply to the Court for leave to amend an originating application in accordance with paragraph (1)(c), (d), (e) or subparagraph (g)(i) even if the application is made after the end of any relevant period of limitation applying at the date the proceeding was started.
(3) However, an applicant must not apply to amend an originating application in accordance with subparagraph (1)(g)(ii) after the time within which any statute that limits the time within which a proceeding may be started has expired.
(Notes omitted).
30 Rule 16.53 provides:
16.53 Application for leave to amend
(1) Unless rule 16.51 applies, a party must apply for the leave of the Court to amend a pleading.
(2) A party may apply under subrule (1) for leave to amend a pleading to add or substitute a new claim for relief, or a new foundation in law for a claim for relief that arises out of the same facts or substantially the same facts as those already pleaded to support an existing claim for relief by the party, even if the application is made after the end of any relevant period of limitation applying at the date the proceeding was started.
…
31 It seems to be well accepted that the Rules permit the Court to allow amendments to an originating application and statement of claim in respect of claims arising out of the same facts or substantially the same facts as those already pleaded, even where that will have the effect of extending the period of limitation in respect of such claims: see Voxson Pty Ltd v Telstra Corporation Ltd (No 7) (2017) 343 ALR 681; McGraw-Hill Financial Inc v Clurname Pty Ltd (2017) 123 ACSR 467, 474 [23].
32 On the other hand, it has been held that if the relevant period of limitation had expired at the date the proceeding was started, leave should not be granted on the basis that the new claims for relief arise out of the same or substantially the same facts because, in those circumstances, that cause of action is obviously futile and the Court should not allow hopeless amendments: Global Brand Marketing Inc v Cube Footwear Pty Ltd (2005) 66 IPR 19, 23 [12]; Plaintiff P1/2003 v Ruddock (2007) 157 FCR 518, 524 - 525 [12] - [15]; see also Caason Investments Pty Ltd v Cao (2015) 236 FCR 322, 326 [21].
33 Whilst the power to grant or refuse an application to amend under rr 8.21(1) and 16.53 is discretionary, that discretion must involve the consideration of the overarching purpose of the Rules set out in s 37M of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (Federal Court Act). It provides:
37M The overarching purpose of civil practice and procedure provisions
(1) The overarching purpose of the civil practice and procedure provisions is to facilitate the just resolution of disputes:
(a) according to law; and
(b) as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible.
(2) Without limiting the generality of subsection (1), the overarching purpose includes the following objectives:
(a) the just determination of all proceedings before the Court;
(b) the efficient use of the judicial and administrative resources available for the purposes of the Court;
(c) the efficient disposal of the Court's overall caseload;
(d) the disposal of all proceedings in a timely manner;
(e) the resolution of disputes at a cost that is proportionate to the importance and complexity of the matters in dispute.
(3) The civil practice and procedure provisions must be interpreted and applied, and any power conferred or duty imposed by them (including the power to make Rules of Court) must be exercised or carried out, in the way that best promotes the overarching purpose.
(4) The civil practice and procedure provisions are the following, so far as they apply in relation to civil proceedings:
(a) the Rules of Court made under this Act;
(b) any other provision made by or under this Act or any other Act with respect to the practice and procedure of the Court.
(Emphasis in original).
34 The obligations imposed upon litigants by s 37N of the Federal Court Act are also relevant:
37N Parties to act consistently with the overarching purpose
(1) The parties to a civil proceeding before the Court must conduct the proceeding (including negotiations for settlement of the dispute to which the proceeding relates) in a way that is consistent with the overarching purpose.
(2) A party's lawyer must, in the conduct of a civil proceeding before the Court (including negotiations for settlement) on the party's behalf:
(a) take account of the duty imposed on the party by subsection (1); and
(b) assist the party to comply with the duty.
(3) The Court or a Judge may, for the purpose of enabling a party to comply with the duty imposed by subsection (1), require the party's lawyer to give the party an estimate of:
(a) the likely duration of the proceeding or part of the proceeding; and
(b) the likely amount of costs that the party will have to pay in connection with the proceeding or part of the proceeding, including:
(i) the costs that the lawyer will charge to the party; and
(ii) any other costs that the party will have to pay in the event that the party is unsuccessful in the proceeding or part of the proceeding.
(4) In exercising the discretion to award costs in a civil proceeding, the Court or a Judge must take account of any failure to comply with the duty imposed by subsection (1) or (2).
(5) If the Court or a Judge orders a lawyer to bear costs personally because of a failure to comply with the duty imposed by subsection (2), the lawyer must not recover the costs from his or her client.
35 It is generally accepted that, on an application for leave to amend, the onus is on the party seeking the amendments to persuade the Court that leave should be given: Dye v Commonwealth Securities Limited [2010] FCAFC 118 [17]. It is also accepted that the principles relevant to such applications are those which were referred to in Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175 (Aon). They include:
(a) the nature and importance of the amendment to the party applying for it: Aon at 214 [102];
(b) the extent of the delay and the costs associated with the amendment: Aon at 214 [102];
(c) the prejudice that might be assumed to follow from the amendment, and that which is shown: Aon at 182 [5] and 214 [100], [102];
(d) the explanation for any delay in applying for leave to amend: Aon at 215 [102] - [103] and 216 [108];
(e) the parties' choices to date in the litigation and the consequences of those choices: Aon at 217 [112];
(f) the detriment to other litigants in the Court: Aon at 211 [93], 212 [95] and 217 - 218 [114]; and
(g) the potential loss of public confidence in the legal system which can arise where a court is seen to accede to applications made without adequate explanation or justification: Aon at 182 [5], 189 [24] and 192 [30].
36 Necessarily, the weight to be accorded to each consideration in any particular case, either individually or in combination with others, and the outcome of the balancing process may vary according to the particular facts and circumstances of the case at hand: Cement Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2010) 187 FCR 261, 275 - 276 [51].