wrongful dismissal, although analogous to it. The chairmen of
conciliation committees had entered into no contract of service
with the Crown. They were independent persons occupying a public -
office to which rights and duties were assigned by Jaw, not by contract.
When they are treated for the purposes of compensation as having
suffered a wrongful deprivation of office, the inquiry must be directed -
to ascertaining what were the profits and advantages which they
might justly expect to flow from occupying it, and what corresponding
burdens or restrictions they were relieved from by losing it. Street J.
addressed himself to this question, but he treated the appellant as
entitled as of right to hold office for the full residue of five years.
In this, we think, he was wrong, because the appellant: was subject
to the Minister's power of summary removal. But, on consideration,
we have come to the conclusion that no diminution should on this.
ground be made in the amount of compensation awarded. The '
appellant had a definite appointment of five years duration. This,
although it would not prevent the exercise of the Minister's power
of removal, amounts to a definite assignment of the term for which |
the Crown meant the appellant to hold office. It founded a just
tight to expect that, in the absence of misconduct, incapacity, or
the like, on his part, the term would not be abridged by the exercise
of the power to intervene and remove from office. The Legislature
itself appears to have acted upon this view of the matter in removing
the occupants of the offices by legislative means instead of leaving
the Executive to resort to its statutory powers. In assessing com-
pensation for loss of office, the practice has been to give an amount
which represents the future advantages which the holder has a just
right to expect. Under sec. 66 of 5 & 6 Wm. IV. c. 76, an officer of :
a borough in any office of profit which should be abolished became