Consideration
31 This case turns on the proper understanding of the Minister's reasons for deciding to cancel the applicant's visa. Counsel for the applicant submitted that the Minister's reasons reveal striking incompatibility, whereas counsel for the Minister submitted that there was no inconsistency in the reasons. Consequent upon their competing submissions, counsel for the applicant submitted that the Minister's decision must have been affected by some material legal error, and suggested that the error may be a form of legal unreasonableness, whereas counsel for the Minister submitted that there was no legal error and that the decision to cancel the applicant's visa had an evident and intelligible justification, and was open to the Minister.
32 It is well settled and often repeated that the reasons of an administrative decision-maker, such as the Minister in this case, are to be read as a whole and not over-zealously dissected with an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; 185 CLR 259 at 272 (Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ). Passages within a statement of reasons must be understood in their context, and allegations of inconsistencies within a statement of reasons must be assessed in light of the reasons as a whole.
33 I have set out a summary of the Minister's reasons at [14]-[23], above. That summary outlines the structure of the Minister's reasoning, which involved three steps. First, the Minister found that his discretion to cancel the applicant's visa under s 501(2) of the Act was enlivened because he reasonably suspected that the applicant did not pass the character test, and the applicant did not satisfy him that he passed the character test. It is uncontroversial that the applicant did not pass the character test, by reason of his substantial criminal record from his conviction on four counts of aggravated sexual penetration without consent. Second, the Minister considered whether various factors were for or against cancelling the applicant's visa. The Minister considered those factors under the individual headings to which I referred, which were "Protecting the Australian Community", "Criminal Conduct", "Risk to the Australian Community", "Best interests of minor children", "Expectations of the Australian community", "Ties to Australia", and "Extent of impediments if removed". Relevantly, the Minister treated the "Risk to the Australian Community" and the "Expectations of the Australian community" as separate factors, which he addressed separately. Third, under the heading "Conclusion", the Minister undertook a balancing exercise, in which he considered the weight to be attributed to those factors. The Minister concluded that the risk of harm that the applicant posed to the community outweighed the countervailing considerations, and decided to cancel the applicant's visa.
34 The sole ground of review in this proceeding is focussed on two factors considered at the second step of the Minister's reasoning - the "Risk to the Australian Community" and the "Expectations of the Australian Community" - and how the Minister brought those factors to bear in the third, evaluative step of his reasoning in assessing whether to exercise his discretion to cancel the applicant's visa. The applicant's case requires that a close examination of those parts of the Minister's reasons be undertaken, although as I have mentioned, that examination must not extend to over-zealous dissection without regard to the context of the reasons as a whole.
35 Viewed in context, the relevant parts of the Minister's reasons are to be understood as follows -
(1) In assessing the risk to the Australian community at [22]-[57] of his reasons, the Minister engaged in a detailed assessment of the risk posed by the applicant. I have summarised the Minister's reasoning on this factor at [18], above. The Minister concluded at [57] of his reasons that there was a "very low risk" that the applicant would reoffend. The finding that there was a "very low risk" necessarily included a finding that there was at least some risk, because the Minister also found that if the applicant did engage in further criminal conduct of a similar nature to his past offending, then that "could cause psychological and/or physical harm to a member of the Australian community." That is, the Minister found that while there was a very low risk that the applicant would reoffend, the Minister found that if he did, there could potentially be severe consequences.
(2) In assessing the expectations of the Australian community at [67]-[70] of the reasons, the Minister began by referring to the expectations of the Australian community towards non-citizens generally, and then turned to assessing the expectations of the Australian community towards the applicant in particular, given his personal experiences living in Australia. As observed by counsel for the applicant at the hearing of this application, the factor of the expectations of the Australian community is necessarily a metaphorical reference point because the community's notional, singular expectations are to be found and considered by the Minister himself. The Minister found that the Australian community generally expects non-citizens to obey Australian laws while in Australia, and that where a non-citizen has breached that trust, or there is an unacceptable risk that a non-citizen will breach that trust, it may be appropriate to cancel that person's visa. The Minister then considered whether that general expectation would be moderated when applied to the applicant, given his particular experiences living in Australia. The Minister found that it would be. The Minister stated that, in his view, the Australian community would take into account the fact that the applicant was a victim of institutionalised child sexual abuse in Australia, which led to extreme trauma and which the sentencing judge accepted had played a role in his sexual offending. Therefore, as to the expectations of the Australian community, the Minister concluded that the Australian community would take into account the serious nature of the applicant's offences, but it would also afford him significant leniency in its expectation as to whether or not he should hold a visa.
(3) In undertaking the third, evaluative step of his decision-making process at [103]-[109] of the reasons, the Minister considered whether to exercise his discretion to cancel the applicant's visa. At [104] of his reasons, the Minister emphasised the very serious nature of the applicant's offending, and stated that non-citizens who commit such offences should not generally expect to be permitted to remain in Australia. The Minister was there referring to his earlier comments that the Australian community generally expects non-citizens to obey Australian laws, and that where a person breaches that trust, it may be appropriate to cancel that person's visa. At [105] of his reasons, the Minister then turned to the risk that the applicant posed to the Australian community. The Minister found that the Australian community could be exposed to harm if the applicant reoffended in a similar fashion, and the Minister refused to rule out the possibility that the applicant would reoffend. That reasoning was in keeping with the Minister's earlier finding at [57] of his reasons that there was a very low, but nonetheless necessarily some risk that the applicant would reoffend, and that if the applicant did engage in conduct of a similar nature to his past criminal conduct, that conduct could cause psychological and/or physical harm to a member of the Australian community. Then, in the final sentence of [105] of the reasons, the Minister stated the "Australian community should not tolerate any further risk of harm." The Minister was there expressing his view that the Australian community should not tolerate the risk posed by the applicant, and not commenting on the notional expectations of the Australian community as to whether the applicant should hold a visa. Following that, in the opening sentence of [106] of his reasons, the Minister stated "I found the above consideration outweighed the countervailing considerations in the [applicant's] case". The Minister's reference to the singular above consideration was a reference to the risk of harm that the applicant posed to the Australian community, which he had considered in the preceding paragraph. That construction is reinforced by [107] and [108] of the Minister's reasons, where he further explained his conclusion that the risk of harm posed by the applicant outweighed the countervailing considerations that weighed against cancelling the applicant's visa. In those paragraphs, the Minister stated that where a person could inflict great harm on the Australian community, even strong countervailing considerations would generally be insufficient for him not to cancel that person's visa, and expressed his view that the applicant represented an unacceptable risk of harm to the Australian community. Notably, in those paragraphs in which the Minister set out his reasoning on the balancing exercise, the Minister did not rely on the expectations of the Australian community as a factor weighing in favour of cancelling the applicant's visa. Rather, the Minister relied only on the risk of harm that the applicant posed to the Australian community. That was consistent with what the Minister had found about the notional expectations of that Australian community - in essence, that that factor did not weigh strongly against the applicant, as it ordinarily might have done for a person convicted on four counts of aggravated sexual penetration without consent, because the Australian community would afford the applicant significant leniency in light of his personal experiences in Australia as the victim of institutionalised child sexual abuse.
36 Read as a whole, I consider that the Minister's statement of reasons demonstrates a cogent reasoning process, which did not bear the inconsistency alleged by the applicant. I do not accept the applicant's submission that the Minister's reasons include an intellectual gap because the Minister did not explain why the community should not tolerate any further risk of harm, when the Minister had earlier found that the community was prepared to tolerate some risk. It is not necessary to decide whether, as the applicant claims, the notional expectations of the Australian community as to whether the applicant should hold a visa, as found by the Minister, were necessarily informed by an assessment of the risk of harm that the applicant posed to the community. The fundamental point is that it was open, and not inconsistent, illogical or irrational, for the Minister to find that the Australian community in assessing whether the applicant should hold a visa would afford him significant leniency because of his experience of institutional child sexual abuse, and also to find that nonetheless in his own view the Australian community should not tolerate any further risk of harm posed by the applicant. The Minister was entitled to his view that the community should not tolerate any further risk of harm posed by the applicant, and that view did not require any further explanation. The Minister was not obliged to evaluate the risk of harm posed by the applicant in any particular way, or to ascribe any particular characterisation to the quality of the risk: Moana v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 54; 230 FCR 367 at [71] (Rangiah J, with North J agreeing) and Brown v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 141; 235 FCR 88 at [44] (Rares, Flick and Perry JJ).
37 Further, it was open to the Minister to conclude that the risk of harm posed by the applicant outweighed the countervailing considerations against cancelling the applicant's visa. As was accepted by counsel for the Minister in this proceeding, it may be that not every decision-maker would have reached the conclusion that the Minister did on the facts. But that is not the point. Section 501(2) of the Act confers a discretion on the Minister, in certain circumstances, to decide whether to cancel a visa that has been granted to a person. It was a matter for the Minister to determine what weight to give to the different factors that he took into account in exercising his discretion, and the Minister by his reasons expressed an evident and intelligible justification for deciding to cancel the applicant's visa. The Minister's reasoning was not illogical, irrational or unreasonable: cf, Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; 240 CLR 611 at [131] (Crennan and Bell JJ). The Minister's reasoning, and his conclusion, were within the bounds of his power as conferred by the Act. The merits of administration action, to the extent that they can be distinguished from legality, are for the repository of the relevant power: Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin [1990] HCA 21; 170 CLR 1 at 36 (Brennan J).
38 Finally, at the hearing of this application, I directed counsel for the parties to the observations of Allsop CJ in Hands v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 225; 267 FCR 628 at [3]. In that paragraph, the Chief Justice emphasised the human consequences that removal from Australia can bring about, and stated that decision-makers deciding to remove a person from Australia must honestly confront those consequences, and that removal decisions are not a place for decisional checklists or formulaic expression which may hide a lack of the necessary reflection upon those consequences. Counsel for the applicant submitted that those comments reinforced the applicant's submission that the inconsistency in the Minister's reasons for cancelling his visa, a decision with grave consequences, gave rise to jurisdictional error. Counsel for the Minister submitted that the Minister's reasons demonstrated that, in deciding whether to cancel the applicant's visa, the Minister did grapple with the real consequences of making that decision. Counsel for the Minister highlighted those parts of the Minister's reasons where the Minister found that the applicant was a central figure in his family to both his wife and children (at [76]), that the applicant's removal from Australia would cause significant emotional destruction to an entire family unit whose sense of family irrevocably included the applicant (at [82]), that the applicant's immediate family would experience significant emotional distress and an irreversible impact on their close family bond (at [85]), and that the applicant would very likely experience a significant deterioration in his physical and mental health (at [101]). I accept that the Minister squarely confronted the reality of the consequences of his decision to cancel the applicant's visa, which I have found was a decision made in accordance with law.