Consideration - Was the Dismissal of Mr Peck Unfair?
- Pursuant to s 87 of the IR Act, if conciliation has failed, the Commission is to determine an application made pursuant to s 84 " … by making an order under section 89, dismissing the application or making any other order it is authorised to make under this Act."
- In determining an application, the fundamental question the Commission must answer is whether a dismissal is unfair, as being a dismissal that is one or more of harsh, unreasonable or unjust. Section 88 of the IR Act provides certain matters which the Commission may, if appropriate, take into account.
- In this claim, the matters in s 88 of the IR Act which are appropriate to take into account on the question of whether the dismissal was unfair are those in s 88 (a), (b) and (d).
- Section 88 (c) is not appropriate to take into account as there is no suggestion in this case that Mr Peck was dismissed for unsatisfactory performance.
- Section 88 (e) will only be appropriate to take into account in this case in respect of any remedy permitted by s 89 of the IR Act, if the Commission first determines the dismissal is unfair.
- There is no dispute in this case that Mr Peck was told in clear terms the reason for his dismissal (s 88 (a)), or that he was given an opportunity to make out a defence or give an explanation in respect of that reason (part of s 88(b)).
- Whether the reason Mr Peck was given had a basis in fact is one of the issues in dispute between the parties (the remainder of s 88(b)).
- Clearly Mr Peck was not vaccinated as contemplated by PHO1, PHO2 or the Determination. In dispute is whether those requirements could apply to Mr Peck, given his submissions that it is not possible to comply with the requirements of PHO1, PHO2 and the Determination.
- I do not consider that, as the respondent submitted, I should give the submissions of Mr Peck that only a final approval can amount to an approval, short shrift. Mr Peck's submission was not fanciful, contrived or clearly unarguable.
- Mr Peck took the Commission to parts of certain TGA publications on the TGA processes for approval which might suggest that a provisional approval is a step along a process to an "approval". Ultimately, I consider it would be asking this Commission to read too much into those publications to conclude that a provisional approval is not a form of approval.
- Moreover, it is the whole of the phrase "approved by the [TGA] for use in Australia as a vaccine against COVID-19" which should be considered, not just the word "approved".
- Each of the PHO2 and Determination referred to a COVID-19 vaccination which is approved for use in Australia. It is true that each of the COVID-19 vaccinations approved by the TGA is provisionally approved. Nevertheless, they are approved for use in Australia.
- The absence of the words "in Australia" from the definition of COVID-19 vaccine in PHO1 probably makes no difference to this conclusion, but the dismissal occurred when PHO2 was in place.
- Accordingly, I consider that the respondent's reason for termination has a basis in fact.
- Mr Peck submitted that a choice to take a vaccine, or be dismissed, was an unfair choice. However, that this formulation fails to take into account the obligations on the respondent pursuant to PHO1 and PHO2 not to allow an unvaccinated health care worker to do health care work. A health care worker who cannot do health care work is unable to perform an inherent requirement of their job.
- This additional factor would of itself be sufficient to prevent the choice being unfair, as the impact of the choice on Mr Peck needs to be balanced against the impact of the parallel obligation on the respondent created by PHO1 and PHO2.
- However, even without this counter balancing obligation on the respondent it would not be an unfair choice. It may be a choice that Mr Peck does not like, and it may be one with serious consequences, but it was one imposed in particular circumstances. Those circumstances included unprecedented restrictions on citizens, businesses and public services, and most importantly that the choice was imposed on health care workers.
- It is frankly impossible to conceive of a profession on whom such a choice could more obviously be imposed. In Mr Peck's case he was a registered nurse working in a public hospital.
- To the extent I need to consider whether the Determination is a lawful and reasonable direction it follows from the foregoing that I do consider it both lawful and reasonable.
- From the totality of [44-48] it is clear that consideration of the issues covered by s 88(d) of the IR Act do not support a conclusion that the dismissal was unfair.
- In terms of such other matters as I consider relevant (s 88(f)), I have taken into account Mr Peck's substantial employment history with the respondent and the clear economic impact of the dismissal on Mr Peck. I have also taken into account the clearly genuinely held concerns of Mr Peck about the risks of the available vaccines.
- I considered the matters Mr Peck raised in his Original Application as to vaccinated individuals still being susceptible to being infected and infecting others with COVID-19, along with his related offer to wear PPE or undertake other infection prevention measures.
- I do not consider I can give much weight to such matters. Primarily this is because no evidence was presented to the Commission about the risks of infection for vaccinated individuals.
- The use of PPE and other infection controls were similarly not the subject of any evidence which would enable this Commission to include consideration of the issue in this decision.
- I do not consider any of the specific matters set out in s 88 (a), (b) or (d) make the dismissal of Mr Peck unfair.
- I do not consider that any other matters, as set out above, make the dismissal of Mr Peck harsh, unreasonable or unjust.